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1 Decentralization and agricultural service provision in 
post-socialist Kyrgyzstan: an institutional analysis 
1.1 Decentralization, institutional change and agricultural services 
Agricultural infrastructure and agricultural services, such as agricultural 
extension, irrigation, the provision of basic agricultural inputs, and financial and 
property-related administrative services are key elements for fighting rural 
poverty. Particularly in developing countries, those key services are often 
provided either in insufficient quantities, poor quality and are, in addition, 
difficult to be accessed by the poor (World Bank 2003). In order to overcome 
service provision and service access problems international donor organizations 
have identified decentralization, frequently summarized as bringing decision 
making “closer to the people” (de la Vega-Leinert 2000; Kaiser et al. 2006; 
Khaleghian 2004; World Bank 2003), a helpful strategy to arrive at more 
efficient and pro-poor service provision (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b; 
Brinkerhoff et al. 2007; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007; Cohen and Peterson 
1996; Johnson 2001; Korten 1990; Olowu 2003; Pincus 2001; Smith 1997; 
Works 2002).  
Since the 1940s (Cohen and Peterson 1996: 3) decentralization has evolved 
from describing power shifts within the governmental administrative apparatus 
(e.g. Smith 1985) to sharing power, authority and responsibility among 
governance institutions, civil society organizations and private economic actors 
(Cheema and Rondinelli 2007: 2). The many attempts to classify decentrali-
zation approaches are partly conflicting (e.g. Ribot 2002a; Rondinelli et al. 
1983; Works 2002). However, three areas of decentralization are commonly 
dinstinguished: a) political or democratic decentralization as an “institutional-
ized form of the participatory approach” (Ribot 2002a) that shifts decision 
making power to non-governmental bodies; b) administrative decentralization 
referring to power transferred to local branches of the central government; and 
c) fiscal decentralization, which concerns the shift of resources and revenue-
generating powers away from the central authority (Ribot 2002a). Based on 
these three, clearly partly overlapping, forms of decentralization, several sub-
types are described, which lack any common definition (e.g., deconcentration, 
delegation, privatization, devolution, deregulation, or delocalization).1 
1 Examples for the confusing use of terminology are different definitions of the terms 
“deconcentration”, “devolution” and “delegation” by Ribot (2002: iif.) and Rondinelli et al. 
(1983: 13f.). A drastic example of the many definitions of decentralization are summarized 
in a UNDP-background paper on decentralization (UNDP 1999) which lists 40 pages of 
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For the purpose of this text, I define decentralization as a shift of decision 
making authority, responsibility and resources from higher authorities to smaller 
administrative units, but also “between government and civil society” by means 
of “service co-production, partnerships, joint policy making and feedback 
mechanisms“ (Brinkerhoff et al. 2007: 190-191).  
As a general concept, decentralization has come to promote a variety of 
objectives, including increased administrative, procedural efficiency, 
distributional equity and deepening democracy (Ribot 2002a: 8f; see also 
Bardhan 2002: 186f; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b; Crook and Sverrisson 
2001a and O'Neill 2003). Often seen as a one-fits-all approach in order to fight 
economic and social problems, many developing countries have adopted 
decentralization as a guiding principle in national development strategies 
(Romeo 2003; Works 2002). In the agricultural sector, a wide range of service 
areas, including administrative services, have become subject to 
decentralization. Examples for such services are: 
1. Input provision  
2. Agricultural education including agricultural training and advice 
3. Natural resource management including the planning and administration of 
irrigation, management of pastures and agricultural land 
4. Agricultural marketing 
5. Veterinary health care 
In highly centralized countries, services decentralization programs or policy 
strategies seek to abolish the state’s service delivery monopoly by introduction 
of private firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local 
governments as service providers. The assumption is that decentralized service 
provision leads to better and cheaper supply as decentralized provision is 
assumed to be more responsive to consumer needs and preferences and is 
associated with lower levels of rent-seeking and corruption (Agrawal and Ribot 
1999; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006a; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006c; Brinkerhoff et al. 2007; Oakerson and Parks 
1989; Ribot 2002a). 
 “[…] local decision makers have access to better information on local circumstances 
than central authorities, and they use this to tailor services and spending to local needs 
and preferences; the public provides input to local decision making processes and holds 
local decision makers accountable for their actions; and administrative autonomy 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
definitions and views on decentralization used in documents of the United Nations 
Organizations sub-units and other donor organizations. 
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creates space for learning, innovation, community participation and the adaptation of 
public services to local circumstances” (Khaleghian 2004: 165). 
Decentralization outcomes often fall behind expectations (Bardhan 2002). In 
many cases, corruption remains a major problem, when power is transferred to 
local levels and elite capture secures the benefits of decentralization often only 
for those close to the local power elite (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b). There 
are also cases where decentralization has led to outcomes contradicting its 
objectives, such as increased instead of reduced central power (Khaleghian 
2004), an increase in power of influential local groups (O'Neill 2003; Matsui 
2005; Thomi 2000) or an imbalanced allocation of decentralization cost and 
benefits to the disadvantage of the poor (Cleaver 2005). 
As described above, decentralization entails a set of assumptions about local 
decision making. Firstly, it is assumed that local decision makers possess better 
information on service user needs and expectations and also have the 
willingness, capacity and means to convert this knowledge into effective action. 
Secondly, local citizens are assumed to be willing and able to actively take part 
in decision making, either formally through elections or informally through 
other participatory processes. Thirdly, it is assumed that citizens can control 
their local representatives or local decision makers and have effective means to 
control and influence local decision making. This conditions are supposed to 
facilitate more targeted and cheaper provision of services and goods, given that 
corruption and wasteful use of local budgets is constrained by local control 
through active involvement of the citizens (Agrawal and Ribot 1999).  
Decentralization critics emphazise that relevant preconditions tend to lack in 
many decentralization implementation settings. Among these are: a) a 
democratic political environment with strong central organizations and a 
functioning legal system, which supports effective accountability relations, 
control of capture and corruption and which motivates decision makers to serve 
citizens needs (Bardhan 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b; Smith 1997); b) 
citizens’ and local decision makers’ endowment with resources and knowledge – 
enabled, among others, by open media and adequate citizen education (Agrawal 
and Ribot 1999; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b; Khaleghian 2004), stable 
local-central relationships as well as government support for the overall 
decentralization program (Crook and Sverrisson 2001b). 
Decentralization of services as a one-size fits all paradigm is problematic 
because the different sub-transactions within service provision and production 
require adjusted and also mixed governance approaches (Saito 2000 and Lewis 
1998 cited in Ribot 2002a: 10f; see also Fuhr 1999/2000). Hence, different types 
of services as well as different stages of service provision and production (e.g. 
service provision, financing, production, regulation and consumption) require 
different governance structures aligned to the specific sub-transaction. 
Decentralization might only be one among other governance structures that 
might serve best for a specific service transaction or sub-transaction. 
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"Thus to a large extent, the appropriate level of subsidiarity is an empirical question 
which will be a function of the size of a country, the number of levels of sub-national 
government, the resource endowments of the country and the particular characteristics 
of different goods and services. We should therefore anticipate a continuum of 
decentralisation with widely differing roles being played by various actors in different 
circumstances. This is also likely to be a dynamic process with the degree and extent of 
devolution and the relative role of different actors varying over time" (Smith 1997: 4-5). 
1.2 Decentralization in post-Soviet environments. The example of 
Kyrgyzstan 
Particularly in transition countries with a Post-Soviet legacy and a tradition of 
highly centralized administrative and service provision organizations, 
decentralization has been considered among the key reform priorities in 
administration and the economy (Illner 2000; Jones Luong 2004). There are 
plenty of examples for decentralization of different public services such as 
education (Steiner‐Khamsi and Stolpe 2004 for Mongolia), electricity supply 
(Lampietti et al. 2007), health services (Baschieri and Falkingham 2006), fiscal 
decentralization (Jones Luong 2004 for Kazakhstan; Leschenko and Troschke 
2006 for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; the IMF and World Bank 2006 for 
Kyrgyzstan) or privatization in the agricultural sector (e.g. Csáki and Tuck 
2000; Csáki et al. 2000 and Mudahar 1998 for Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia). The outcomes of these reforms are in some of those transition countries 
very disappointing and some initially ambitious reforms have come to a halt. 
This is not a surprise as considerable problems with democratic decision 
making, and administrative proficiency (e.g. Babajanian et al. 2005; Collins 
2002; Engval 2007; Goetz 2001; Libman 2008) which are necessary socio-
political frame conditions for succesfull decentralizaion, already discussed in 
Section 1.1, remain to exist. 
Like all former Soviet Republics, the Kyrgyz Republic experienced drastic 
economic, social and political changes during the early 1990s. During the Soviet 
period the economy was mainly directed towards the production of sheep meat, 
wool and hides for the entire Soviet market. Production was organized in the 
form of large-scale collective and state farms (Fitzherbert 2006). After the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of 
Kyrgyzstan in 1991, input and output markets were suddenly located in foreign 
countries, such as the independent Russian Federation but also other former 
Soviet Republics which had become independent. Fiscal transfers from the 
Central Soviet government, on which the Kyrgyz Soviet Republic had depended, 
were no longer provided. Both these factors resulted in a drastic decline of the 
productivity of the economy (Pomfret 2002; Pomfret 2006; Pomfret 2007). A 
bottom line was reached in 1994 when real GDP fell by about 20 percent (see 
Figure A-1 in the Annex) 
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The government, supported by international donor organizations, responeded 
with a decentralization program which is considered the most ambitious in the 
Central Asian region (INTRAC 2011).With substantial donor support 
Kyrgyzstan underwent a – in the broadest sense – decentralization program 
which focused on a set of measures including privatization of most economic 
sectors, price liberalization, macroeconomic stability and fiscal reorientation 
which made it for several years the outstanding reformer in the Central Asian 
region (e.g. Light 2007). Hence, Kyrgyzstan is one of the examples where it has 
to be seen whether decentralization can deliver. 
The important agricultural sector, which remains to contribute with about 20 
percent to GDP (see Figure A-2 in the Annex) and which provides the majority 
of income opportunities to the poor (World Bank 2007b), was strongly affected 
by the disintegration of the Soviet economy. As a result of the subsequent 
deconstruction of the centrally managed kolkhoz and sovkhoz farming system, 
due to which all management structures vanished, agricultural infrastructure 
progressively decayed and is currently in a state of deterioration. Besides, 
farming families face severe constraints with respect to input and service 
provision. 
The breakdown of the Soviet economic and political system left a void in 
economic, social and administrative public service provision in the rural areas 
and contributed to drastic loss in infrastructure (World Bank 2007b). While 
some economic progress is achieved, with an exception of 2005, annual GDP 
growth rates are positive since 1996 (see FigureA-2 in the Annex) – there are 
still considerable problems in service provision. Statistics indicate that neither 
general public services, nor farm and agricultural services are sufficiently 
provided. A 2005 household study by the National State Statistics Committee 
found that “almost a third (28 %) of the population living in rural areas take 
drinking water from rivers, springs and ditches, […] less than 25% of the 
population of the republic has access to a sewage system; [and] less than 15% of 
poor households use a centralized method of waste collection” (SAEPF and 
UNDP 2007: 44).  
In the agricultural service sector a decentralization program called Agrarian 
Policy Concept until 2010 has been launched that shifted responsibility for a 
number of previously publicly provided agricultural services to local level 
administrations, private entrepreneurs and civil society organizations. Until now, 
the scholarly literature on the effects of the Kyrgyz decentralization program is 
sporadic. Reports from international organizations working in different service 
areas and statistical data indicate that adequate services provision in rural areas 
of Kyrgyzstan has not been achieved, yet and pace and scope of decentralization 
is rather slow. The few reports that are available are discouraging as inadequate 
supply or provision but also entire absence and bad quality is reported for most 
agricultural services. Problems have been reported for the following agricultural 
service areas: fertilizer provision; machinery services; irrigation management; 
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pasture management and administration; veterinary services including artificial 
insemination, and appropriate vaccination; agricultural extension; machinery 
renting services and seed provision (Goletti and Chabot 2000; Herrfahrdt et al. 
2006; Light 2007; MAWRPI et al. 2007; Sabates-Wheeler and Childress 2004; 
Schillhorn van Veen 2004; Sehring 2007; UI Hassan et al. 2004; UNEP 2006; 
World Bank 2007a). 
While the available data on rural and agricultural services provides sporadic 
information on the outcomes of service decentralization, the actual practice of 
service decentralization is not explored. Until now, there is no scholarly 
information on the local processes that bring about service provision and 
production. The lack of knowledge on the practice of service decentralization 
also hinders the development of policy measures to improve the efficiency of the 
decentralization process. Neither an analysis of implementation procedures at 
municipality level nor comprehensive documentation of the effects of 
decentralization on service availability, cost and accessibility of agricultural and 
other services is at hand. This is particularly unfortunate as exactly such 
contextual information has been shown to play a decisive role of the 
implementation context and the specific local conditions on reform outcomes in 
the post-Soviet context (Hanisch 2003; Schlüter 2001; Theesfeld 2005). Based 
on the experience from these works, it has been proposed that a successful post-
Soviet policy reform design needs to take local conditions into account and re-
quires some sort of non-typical process of institutional change that involves both 
policy reform initiatives from the top and locally based institutional change 
(Hagedorn and Gatzweiler 2003).  
The available research it is not clear to which extent such interrelated 
processes of institutional design actually happen in Kyrgyzstan.  
The following chapters therefore study if local involvement and bottom-up 
processes, if at all, take place at local levels during actual policy 
implementation. I use case studies of policy implementation at municipality-
level and describe and explain ongoing processes of institutional change in the 
Kyrgyz agricultural sector that occurred as a result of the decentralization of 
previously publicly provided services. The studies in this book look into 
different aspects of formal and informal institutional change in Kyrgyzstan. 
More specifically it is being studied: 
• What decentralization-related formal institutions, i.e. laws and regulations 
have been designed in the agricultural sector? 
• To which extent and how are these formal rules being implemented?  
• How are previously publicly provided agricultural services provided today?  
• Which institutions for agricultural service provision emerge as a result of the 
decentralization of previously publicly provided agricultural services? 
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Each chapter of this book is written in the form of an essay. This means that 
each chapter can stand by itself and can be understood without reference to any 
other chapter. It implies that there are some overlaps in methods and theory. The 
chapters are, however, tighly linked: the following two essays , Chapters 2 and 
3, provide detailed contextual information on what decentralization actually 
means in the Kyrgyzs Republic in terms of governance structures in general and 
further provide specific information on institutional change in the agricultural 
sector. Those details allow the reader to better contextualize the findings from 
three specific studies on the decentralization of pasture management in three 
essays following in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Those chapters have 
been published in international peer-reviewed journals. Footnotes in the 
beginning of each of those chapters inform the reader about the respective 
publishing journal. 
In the first essay, I set the ground for the following studies. I introduce a 
concept based on which I review the state of the art of scholarly research on 
decentralization, local governance and agricultural services and analyse to which 
degree the legal provisions relate to the analytical concept of decentralization. In 
this essay I seek to investigate the nature and scope of decentralization and its 
implications for local governance and municipality-level agricultural service 
provision. The legal analysis shows the government’s attempt to allocate service 
provision tasks to different levels of state actors, municipality administrations – 
which are on paper independent from the state, private service providers and 
donors. This analysis finds a difficult degree of incomprehensiveness of legal 
regulations, overlaps in formal authority and only sporadic implementation. The 
essay concludes with an outline of the specific knowledge gaps in terms of 
agricultural service provision and decentralization. 
In the second essay, I use a multiple case study in four rural study sites in 
Kyrgyzstan in order to explore the releationship of decentralized governance and 
service provision. This study finds that municipality-level decision making has 
not supported the evolution of sufficient agricultural sevices at municipality-
level, because of the inaccessibility of knowledge and financial means. 
Decentralization has, instead led to municipality actors’ dependence on external 
service providers, mainly donor organizations, which the municipality-level 
governments find difficult to hold accountable.  
The focus of the remaining essays is on decentralization in pasture 
management: a community-based management reform which was introduced in 
the pasture sector after a new law On Pastures had been signed in 2009. Among 
several donor-initiated reforms the reform of pasture management is a major 
project. 
In the fourth essay, I revisit the pre-decentralization period of pasture 
management. I explore the rationale based on which the community-based 
management reform has been implemented. The then dominating argument was 
that the pre-reform situation of dispersed administrative responsibility for 
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pasture administration hinders seasonal livestock migration. Based on that 
rationale, the unifying pasture management authority at the municipality-level 
was believed to increase livestock mobility. By using information from a single 
case study, the chapter studies the effective formal and informal rules for pasture 
access in the pre-reform period and how those rules determine migration – in 
other words the choice of pasture areas by herders. Contrary to what other 
studies have found, this study suggests that, in the case study municipality, 
administrative hurdles were not a major cause of the abandonment of seasonal 
migration. Based on this finding, I conclude that replacing dispersed 
administrative authority with community-based pasture management is likely 
not to necessarily improve the sustainable use of pastures and boost livestock 
mobility. The conclusion is that community-based management is only likely to 
lead to an increase in livestock mobility if effective local enforcement rules and 
a non-local enforcement authority are established. 
The book continues with two in-depth implementation studies of that law On 
Pastures. Chapters five and six employ a newly developed analytical framework 
for the study of policy implementation processes which help to understand 
policy implementers’ choice of action. 
In Chapter five I study the design of rules for the creation of CBNRM 
governance bodies. Empirical data comes from a multiple case study. The 
analysis builds on a modification of Kiser and Ostroms’s three-leveled approach 
to the study of institutional change. The study finds that multiple actors were 
involved in a multi-phased rule design process under conditions of legal 
pluralism. It documents a case of institutional change which is triggered by 
exogenous (re)design of formal institutions leading to local-level institutional 
design strongly impacted by the distribution of authority among members of the 
local implementation network and the objectives of each actor group. 
In Chapter six, I explore information rule design. This chapter looks into 
lowest-level policy implementers’ (street-level bureaucrats’) role in donor-
initiated natural resource governance reforms. I use an institutional analysis 
framework with a specific policy implementation focus. A multiple case study 
reviews a resource user information campaing during the early phase of the 
community-based pasture management reform. It finds the simplification of 
implementation rules by policy implementers at the expense of full resource user 
involvement. This results from an insufficient contextual fit of the formal 
information rules. The results emphasize the need of well-designed 
implementation rules in order to ensure full and equitable resource user 
involvement in community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). 
In the concluding section in Chapter 7 I review my contribution to the 
literature on service decentralization research in Kyrgyzstan, draw conclusions 
my studies have for decentralization research in general and explore its 
implications for decentralization implementation practice in general and in 
Kyrgyzstan in particular. I also discuss theoretical insights gained from the use 
Decentralization and agricultural service provision 9 
 
 
of already existing approaches of analysis of institutional change and critically 
review the contribution my own study framework can make. 
 
10 Chapter 1 
 
Table 1-1: Structure of the book 
Chapter Essay title Contribution Key content 
1 Decentralization and agricultural 
service provision in post-socialist 
Kyrgyzstan 
Introduction Problem statement, research interest and outline 
of book’s structure 
2 Exploring decentralization Literature review and 
document analysis 
Review of agricultural reform strategies in 
Kyrgyzstan 
Legal provisions and the administrative context 
for policy reform implementation 




Case study on governance structures and service 
provision in four rural communities 
4 Improving the sustainability of 
pasture use in Kyrgyzstan: the 
impact of pasture governance 
reforms 
Case study Study of implementation practice and impacts 
of the 2002 pasture governance reform on 
sustainability of pasture use 
5 Introducing decentralized pasture 
governance in Kyrgyzstan: 
designing implementation rules 
Case study Study of implementation of 2009 pasture 
governance reform 
Establishment of Community-based 
organizations 
6 Street-level bureacrats at work: a 
municipality-level analysis of 
community-based natural resource 
Case study Study of implementation of 2009 pasture 
governance reform 
Resource user participation and involvement 




practice in the pasture sector of 
Kyrgyzstan 
7 Conclusion Summary of findings 
and conclusion 
Studies’ contribution to the literature on service 
decentralization and community-based natural 
resource management and practical 
implications.  
 
2 Exploring decentralization 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I investigate the nature and scope of decentralization and its 
implications for local governance and municipality-level agricultural service 
provision in Kyrgyzstan. For this, I review the available literature on 
decentralization, local governance and agricultural service decentralization and 
analyze legal documents and expert interviews. This chapter reviews the legal 
basis for decentralization reforms in Kyrgyztan in general and for the 
agricultural sector in particular. It then presents two results of decentralization: 
the present governance structure and the status of agricultural services. The 
concluding section outlines knowledge gaps and links the chapter to the 
following empricial analysis of municipality-level governance and decentralized 
service provision. This chapter explains the governance structures which impact 
the design of local institutions which will be explored in the following chapters. 
The following sections seek to answer these questions: 
• How has decentralization impacted local governance in Kyrgyzstan?
• Which specific roles have different actors received in agricultural service
provision? 
• Which impact has decentralization had on agricultural service provision in
Kyrgyzstan? 
• What knowledge gaps about the relations of decentralization and agricultural
service provision exist? 
Because “decentralization” is not precisely defined, there is a lack of 
comprehensive analytical frameworks to study it. In Section 2.2, I therefore 
develop, based on works by Agrawal and Ribot (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; 
Agrawal and Ostrom 2001), an analytical framework to study institutional 
change in the form of decentralization in Kyrgyzstan. In Section 2.3, I 
investigate the key elements of decentralization derived from the analytical 
framework: actors, the transfer of authority and accountability relationships. 
This is followed by Section 2.4, where I review the literature about the impact of 
decentralization on agricultural service provisions. I smmarize the findings in 
Section 2.5 and conclude by mentioning relevant knowledge gaps (Section 2.6).  
2.2 Exploring decentralization – a study framework 
Decentralization is often analyzed using frameworks that that have been first 
proposed by Rondinelli et al. (1983). Rondinelli et al. study several “types of 
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decentralization” (Rondinelli et al. 1983: 13f.): deconcentration, delegation, 
devolution and privatization.  
Deconcentration refers to  
“[…] handling over some amount of administrative authority or responsibility to lower 
levels within central government ministries and agencies. It is a shifting of the workload 
from centrally located officials to staff or offices outside of the national capital. 
Deconcentration, when it is more than mere reorganization, gives some discretion to 
field agents to plan and implement programs and projects, or to adjust central directives 
to local conditions, within guidelines set by central ministry or agency headquarters” 
(Rondinelli et al. 1983: 14-15). 
Delegation refers to transferring authority to organizations outside the state 
apparatus. Devolution refers to transferring authority to local governments, but 
also to non-state bodies, such as user groups. In the decentralization literature 
privatization is usually understood as the transfer of responsibility for 
government services to  
“[…] privately owned or controlled enterprises […] but also organizations that represent 
various interests in society and that are established and operated by members of those 
organizations [such as] farmers’ cooperatives, credit associations, mutual aid societies, 
village development organizations, trade unions, or women’s and youth clubs” 
(Rondinelli et al. 1983: 28). 
Similarly widespread is a classification into political, fiscal and administrative 
decentralization. Political decentralization focuses on transferring power to the 
electorate. Fiscal decentralization refers to a downward transfer of the power to 
tax and generate public revenues. Administrative decentralization describes 
power transfer within the government hierarchy. Administrative decentralization 
is further split into the aforementioned categories of deconcentration, delegation 
and devolution (e.g. Gregersen et al. 2004: 4).  
The available classifications have been criticized for not holding as analytical 
categories and not allowing to disentangle real processes of decentralization 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Ribot 2002a and Ribot 2002b). Therefore, Agrawal 
and Ribot have proposed  
“[…] a framework to examine whether the policy choices being made […] constitute 
decentralization. Governments often perform acts of decentralization as theater pieces to 
impress or appease international donors and nongovernmentmal organizations (NGOs) 
or domestic constitutencies. Our framework can be seen as an analytical lens for 
assessing reforms in the name of decentralization. It can be used to identify shortfalls in 
decentralization – design flaws or political obfuscation. Identification of such flaws can 
allow advocates of decentralization to push reforms beyond proclamations and closer to 
action on the ground. […] Instead of identifiying decentralization simply as an 
institution reform in the political, fiscal or administrative realm, as is commonly done, 
our framework shows how a particular reform can be analysed by referring to changes 
in actors, powers or accountability” (Agrawal and Ribot 1999: 474-475). 
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The framework helps to study “constituent elements” (Agrawal and Ostrom 
2007, 48) that are found in all decentralization processes: “the powers of various 
actors, the domains in which they exercise their powers, and to whom and how 
they are accountable” (Agrawal and Ribot 1999: 5). Elswhere, Ribot has called 
those elements “dimensions of decentralization” (Ribot 2002a: 16-31). 
2.2.1 Actors 
Decentralization usually requires joint action by members of central govern-
ment, international donors, lobby groups and many others (Agrawal and Ribot 
1999). These actors differ in their particular accountability relations and have 
certain powers: 
“These [accountability] relations depend on the historical, social, and political 
constitution of the powers of each of the actors, which may be based on ideology, 
wealth, heredity, election, appointment, or other means. Actors may also be 
differentiated from each other by their beliefs and objectives; the internal structure of 
their organization, including the membership and funding sources of the organization, 
and the laws to which they are subject” (Agrawal and Ribot 1999: 476). 
The actors thus might differ in their support of decentralization programs. 
Among actors’ objectives, increasing power and economic benefits have been 
discussed as particularly important. Agrawal and Ostrom (2007) propose an 
overview of characteristic interests in decentralization for each of what they 
consider the most relevant actor groups (see Table 2-1). 
Central governments are “congeries of decision makers who have conflicting 
objectives and who lack unified rationalities and common agendas” (Agrawal 
and Ostrom 2007: 49). Budgetary and power-related consequences might impact 
the central government’s role in decentralization. On one hand, government 
might be a potential critic of decentralization, fearing an erosion of its power; on 
the other, it might anticipate an opportunity to increase its budget. Transferring 
difficult and expensive public service tasks to lower levels of the administration, 
private or civil society actors – i.e., transferring “service costs” (Agrawal and 
Ostrom 2007:45) from the central budget to other budgets – might also support 
an interest in decentralization. In addition, adopting decentralization policies 
allows access to international donor support, so that “access to ... resources can 
become [the] incentive” (Agrawal and Ostrom 2007: 50) to opt for decentraliza-
tion.  
Besides budgetary considerations, perceptions of influence and power distri-
bution may also affect the government’s decision what to decentralize to whom. 
Decisions for or against decentralization are hence no different from other do-
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mains, but driven by considerations on relative influence (Agrawal and Ostrom 
2007: 49).  
Local governments, like central governments, are also motivated by potential 
economic benefits and influence.2 They might expect more authority and rele-
vance from increasing local budgets through fiscal decentralization. Opportuni-
ties for local rent-seeking might also render support to decentralization. Re-
sistance might emerge from expected erosion of power and local acceptance, if 
the delegation of tasks is not accompanied by sufficient funds to actually per-
form these tasks (Clark 1984). 
The second group of actors identified by Agrawal and Ostrom (2007) are 
called “international organizations”, which refers to  
“… international actors and bilateral agencies and multilateral actors – such as donors – 
who support decentralization in order to create a political-administrative environment 
which makes it easier for them to manage own funds. Hence, decentralization can be a 
means to pursue other objectives, as an ‘instrument to leverage the funds they disburse 
more efficiently” (Agrawal and Ostrom 2007: 50). 
“Lobby groups” hold a similar position – Agrawal and Ostrom apply this term to 
major supra-national organizations – for example the United Nations or the 
World Bank – which they call NGOs, but also to local civil society organiza-
tions3 who expect funding in the course of decentralization. 
In summary, Agrawal, Ribot and Ostrom (Agrawal and Ostrom 2007; 
Agrawal and Ribot 1999) propose the following criteria to analyse actors’ roles 
in decentralization programs: (i) interests and objectives; (ii) the internal struc-
ture of their organization; (iii) their funding sources and (iv) the legal framework 
within which they operate.  
Table 2-1: Actors’ roles in decentralization 
Actors Supportive role Limitations 
Central govern-
ments 
Can formally initiate legal 
decentralization 
Cannot ensure participa-
tion of local actors 
                                                 
 
2 I add local governments – which are not specifically discussed by Agrawal and Ostrom 
(2007) – as a group of actors. 
3 I emphazise this definition used by Agrawal and Ostrom (2007) as NGOs are commonly 
understood as civil society organizations. 




Provide monetary and finan-
cial incentives for central 
governments 
Assume better control of funds 
Cannot monitor whether 




Support is required to put 
decentralization into practice 
Interested in obtaining finan-
cial resources and decision 
making power  
Too weak to exert pressure 
on central government 
actors to undertake decen-
tralization program 
Source: own representation based on Agrawal and Ostrom (2007: 50) 
2.2.2 Power 
In the following section, I adjust the power element in Agrawal and Ribots’s 
(1999) framework to my analytical purpose. I add an approach to power transfer 
based on property rights. 
To study power transfers, Agrawal and Ribot (Agrawal and Ribot 1999: 
476f.) suggest four types of power: (i) power to create and change rules; (ii) 
power to decide about using resources and opportunities; (iii) power to control 
rule compliance; (iv) power to resolve conflicts.  
However, for this study I would like to modify Agrawal and Ribot’s vague 
concept of power which, for example, cannot explain why power to change rules 
needs to be distinguished from “power to make decisions in some domain of 
action that influences others” (Agrawal and Ribot 1999: 477). Such classifica-
tion ignores that changed rules often influence other actors’ domains of action. 
To apply the Agrawal and Ribot framework to decentralization in Kyrgyzstan, I 
propose four classes of rights which capture the relevant power transfers in the 
Kyrgyz decentralization legislation: 
• The right to allocate property rights and other benefits;  
• the right to acquire new property rights; 
• the right to contribute to collective decisions; and  
• the right to information.  
The rights are listed by descending value. I define the value of a right as the 
degree to which it allows its holder to act independently and/or impose his or her 
will on other actors.  
Rights to distribute property rights and duties refers to rights which allow the 
rights holder to transfer benefits and costs to third parties and therefore put him 
or her (depending on the economic value of the property rights and duties that 
are to be distributed) into a powerful position.  
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Rights to acquire new property rights are rights which allow the rights holder 
to expand his or her bundle of rights and make him or her less dependent on 
third parties. Such rights are therefore very important in order to allow the rights 
holder to expand his or her realm of autonomous decision making. The two 
types of rights, metioned above, are linked. Often, the right to acquire new prop-
erty rights is linked to the right to allocate property rights and duties. In the Kyr-
gyz case it means that local governments first receive rights to a share of the 
local budget (acquisition of new property rights), which they are also entitled to 
use for municipality-level purposes (the right to distribute benefits – in other 
words property rights – from the acquired financial resources). 
The right to contribute to collective decision making allows actors to express 
interests and opinions but gives no direct power to impact behaviour of others. 
The third group of rights therefore offers less power than the first two.  
For the study of power transfers it is also important to explore the allocation 
of rights to obtain information. Which information rights are allocated to whom 
determines the structure of accountability relationships in decentralization situa-
tions. In the context of decentralization, access to knowledge about responsibili-
ties and actions of others, for example central and local governments, but also 
other locally relevant processes and facts, such as of the status of the physical 
environment are important sources of power. Those rights, as will be shown 
below, are particularly relevant as they are an important precondition based on 
which functioning accountability relationships might occur. 
Table 2-2: Framework for institutional analysis of decentralization 
Class of rights decen-
tralized 
Specifications for the study of decentralization in 
Kyrgyzstan 
Rights to allocate prop-
erty rights and duties 
The right to decide about income opportunities of 
third parties. This includes the right to hire and fire 
staff. 
The right to decide about the direction of benefit 
streams from property rights to resources to third 
parties. This includes the right to allocate land, pas-
tures or other natural resources to citizens. 
Rights to acquisition of 
new property rights  
The right to use public or privately owned resources 
without interference from others. 
Rights to participate in 
decision making  
The right to form interest groups. 
The right to make recommendations to government 
bodies. 
Rights to information  Right to receive information about actions of others. 
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2.2.3 Accountability 
In its narrow meaning, accountability has become synonymous with answerabil-
ity and responsibility (Callahan 2007) or answerability and enforcement (Brink-
erhoff 2001). Accountability is a relationship in any system of control in which 
one actor has the right to demand reporting on certain activities from the other 
actor and also holds the right to impose sanctions. Consequently, “being ac-
countable means having the obligation to answer questions regarding decisions 
and/or actions” (Brinkerhoff 2001: 2). 
Depending on where principal and agent are located, accountability relation-
ships might be directed upward or downward, horizontally or inward (Eun 
2010). Upward accountability relationships entail answerability of subordinates 
to supervisors, e.g., local bureaucrats to higher – more centralized – authorities, 
or grant recipients to donor organizations. Downward accountability usually 
refers to administrators’ obligation to actors outside their organization such as 
the public, the press or the electorate, service users and interest groups. Inward-
accountability4  refers to answerability of sub-units of an organization to each 
other, this also includes the accountability of higher levels to lower levels. Last-
ly, horizontal accountability refers to obligations within peer groups, such as 
among members of professional volunteer organizations.  
Figure 2-1: Relation between decentralization, accountability and discretion 
 
Source: own representation 
Accountability is claimed to be the heart of good governance (Callahan 2007) 
and decentralization programs (Blair 2001) and determines their “effectiveness” 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999: 478). Accountability is important in controlling dis-
                                                 
 
4 Inward accountability has – however – also been discussed as an inward sense of moral 
obligation or responsibility and has also been called professional, personal subjective 
accountability (see discussion in Mulgan 2000: 558f).  
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cretion – in other words autonomy – which is inevitably increased in any mean-
ingful decentralization process. In the decentralization context, discretion might 
be understood as the “ability of local governments to carry out in their own 
manner their own particular objectives in accordance with their own standards 
of implementation” (Clark 1984: 199). Hence, discretion entails the danger of 
arbitrary action, corruption, elite capture and the like. Therefore, successful 
decentralization is believed to depend on functioning accountability relation-
ships, which control or “manage discretion” (also Brinkerhoff et al. 2007) (see 
Figure 2-1).  
There are a number of instruments for calling people to account. Efficient ac-
countability mechanisms must, considering the aforementioned elements of 
accountability provide applicable and functioning means of reporting, in other 
words information and control. Besides elections, Agrawal and Ribot 1999) 
propose a list of possible accountability mechanisms including: 
“… procedures for recall; referenda; legal recourse through courts; third-party 
monitoring by media; … independently elected controllers; audition and evaluation; 
political pressure and lobbying by associations and associative movements; provision of 
information on roles and obligations of government by the media and NGOs; public 
reporting requirements for governments; education; embeddedness of leaders in their 
community; belief systems of leaders and their communities; civic dedication and pride 
of leaders; performance awards; widespread participation; social movements; threats of 
social unrest and resistance; central-state oversight of local government; and taxation” 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999: 479). 
Choosing the appropriate means of accountability decides about the impact of 
any decentralization effort. If the accountability mechanism cannot control dis-
cretion or does not allow sufficient discretion for specific decisions, decentrali-
zation will not produce the intended effects. However, the characteristics of the 
decentralized transaction determine the required discretion and the appropriate 
accountability mechanism (Cohen and Peterson 2002). Particularly difficult are 
transactions tailored to local needs, as they require more discretionary space.  
Many authors criticize the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms. They 
write that introducing solitary, non-contextual mechanisms, such as elections, 
often does not improve accountability which is impacted by many factors in-
cluding a supportive political-administrative context: 
“Effective accountability requires a statement of goals (whether in adherence to certain 
rules or achievement of identified performance levels), transparency of decision making 
and relations, honest reports of what resources have been used and what has been 
achieved, an appraisal process for the overseeing authority(ies) to judge whether results 
are satisfactory, and concrete mechanisms for holding to account (i.e. rewarding or 
penalizing) those responsible for performance” (ODA 1993 quoted in Edwards and 
Hulme 1996: 967). 
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The ability of local governments and decision making units to resist corruption 
or rent-seeking – or citizens’ ability to hold them accountable – is usually debat-
ed. However, in the studied context it seems crucial to ensure that local govern-
ments or other decentralized units themselves can hold accountable the central 
government, or others to whom they are upwardly accountable. To improve 
services at all, the local authorities need resources, information, training and 
staff. 
2.2.4 The literature on decentralization and agricultural services 
The literature on decentralization in Kyrgyzstan is scarce. Only two empirical 
studies on decentralization in Kyrgyzstan (Grävingholt et al. 2006; Mukanova 
2008) exist (see Table 2-3).  
Table 2-3: Literature on decentralization in Kyrgyz Republic 




















Dukenbayev  2004 Working 
paper 
Decentralization No method speci-
fied 
Baimyrzaeva 2005 Internet 
document 




2006 Book Decentralization Case studies 
based on “some 
hundred” semi-
structured inter-
views in 2 cities 
and 4 municipali-





Mukanova 2008 Book chap-
ter 
Decentralization Questionnaire 
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for data analysis 
specified 
Libman 2008 Working 
paper 
Decentralization No methodology 
specified 
Baimyrzaeva 2010 Journal 
article 
Decentralization No methodology 
specified 






Decentralization No methodology 
specified 
Source: own table 
The same holds for the literature on agricultural service provision. It consists 
mainly of gray literature5 or donor-commissioned reports of which many are 
anecdotal. With irrigation (Sehring 2007; Herrfahrdt et al. 2006) as the only 
exception, all these documents, both on decentralization and agricultural service 
provision lack information on data collection strategies and analysis. For most 
agricultural services no literature at all existed, not even informal online 
documents. 
2.2.5 Laws and regulations on decentralization  
The available literature does not explore the role of municipality-level actors in 
providing agricultural services. An analytical problem during the early stages of 
the research for this book was therefore to gain an overview of the actual 
distribution of authority and responsibility for agricultural service provision and 
to identify specific tasks of municipality-level actors (the municipality 
government in particular). Two sets of laws were identified: (i) decentralization-
related, delegating natural resource distribution to municipality-level actors; and 
(ii) defining responsibilities in agricultural service provision. Laws prescribing 
actors’ roles, their power and accountability relationships were also identified.  
                                                 
 
5 “Grey literature stands for manifold document types produced at all levels of government, 
academics, business [and] industry (on-governmental organisations, multilateral 
organisations and international financial institutions), in print and electronic formats that are 
protected by intellectual property rights, of sufficient quality to be collected and preserved 
by library holdings or institutional repositories, but not controlled by commercial publishers, 
i.e. where publishing is not the primary activity of the producing body” (Schopfel 2010 
quoted in Shigaeva et al. 2013: 17). 
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The massive scope of new regulations, changing directions within the drafted 
laws and a piecemeal approach in many of them complicated finding relevant 
legal provisions.6 Therefore, expert interviews were necessary to find 
background information on laws for local agricultural service provision. 19 ex-
pert interviews were held with officials at the central and district levels, includ-
ing staff of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Re-
sources and Processing Industry (MAWRPI) as well as the Agency for Local 
Self-government. International Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) in 
charge of implementing decentralization programs were also interviewed, in-
cluding the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Delegation 
of the European Union in the Kyrgyz Republic, which ran projects focusing on 
decentralization and civil service reforms, the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID), which promoted decentralization of land admin-
istration, and the Hanns Seidel Foundation, which supported public administra-
tion education and training. Other interviews were held with state, private and 
NGO agricultural service providers engaged in legal rural advice, input trade, 
rural advisory and veterinary services. Respondents were identified by snowball 
sampling. This started with an online research for organizations involved in 
supporting Kyrgyz decentralization reforms . 
As the objective was to research the relationship between decentralization leg-
islation and its effective agricultural service provision at municipality-level, the 
interviews were used not just to identify relevant legislation, but also to find 
information about ongoing decentralization processes. The four key questions 
were therefore:  
• Which laws and regulations do you consider most relevant for the ongoing 
decentralization process?  
• What do you think about the current status of the implementation of the de-
centralization reforms? 
• Which challenges to reform implementation do you observe?  
• What specific impact of decentralization on the provision of agricultural ser-
vices do you see? 
                                                 
 
6A review of existing studies on decentralization provides an outline of the legislation specific 
to local self-government (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2002; Grävingholt et al. 2006; INTRAC 
2011; Mukanova 2008; (UNDP and GKR 2005). However, the authors consider different 
legal provisions relevant. Grävingholt et al. (2006) refer to only one law and the National 
Decentralization Strategy (Grävingholt et al. 2006: 44-48), whereas authors of the INTRAC 
report on decentralization refer to 5 laws and normative acts (INTRAC 2011: 2); Alymkulov 
and Kulatov list 24 resolutions, 30 decrees and 8 laws as “major legislation” (Alymkulov 
and Kulatov 2002; 591-593), and Mukanova also refers to 8 basic regulations, albeit 
different ones (Mukanova 2008: 249).  
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The expert interviews and information from the literature identified 21 laws and 
legal acts which respondents considered most important (see Table 2-4). The 
contents of both bodies of laws – broader decentralization legislation and 
agricultural laws – were analyzed. The remainder of this chapter reviews 
findings from the literature and from laws and policy documents, based on the 
analytical framework developed in Section 2.2.  
2.2.5.1 Decentralization of governance – the key legislative acts 
Governance reforms started in the early 1990s with the law On Local Govern-
ment in the Kyrgyz Republic (1991) and a constitution (1993) which states that 
“local government” is to be “exercised by local communities”. A large body of 
laws, presidential decrees and regulations has emerged since then: the law On 
Local Self-government and Local Self-administration in 1992, the establishment 
of independent municipal administrations in 1996 and the creation of municipal-
level Local Self-governments (LSGs) were landmarks of the early decentraliza-
tion process. More laws took effect in 2002, most significantly the law On Local 
Self-government and Local State Administration. This law was amended in 
2008. A National Strategy on Decentralization of Public Administration and 
Local Governance Development in Kyrgyzstan until 2010 was also adopted in 
2002.  
At the time of data collection, the 2006 Country Development Strategy for 
2006-2010 was the government-approved guideline for agricultural, 
environmental and social sector developments in rural areas. Besides general 
poverty eradication and decentralization issues, it includes agricultural and 
environmental objectives, such as developing agricultural support services; and  
improving the normative-legislative base governing agriculture (MAWRPI et al. 
2007). 
2.2.5.2 Decentralizing service provision to the agricultural sector – the key 
documents 
The key document outlining reforms in the agricultural sector is the Agricultural 
Sector Program (1995). It covers 36 reform measures for decentralization, 
including: (i) supporting land reform and farm restructuring; (ii) improving 
water rights management and user contribution in irrigation water use; (iii) 
improving markets of input supplies; (iv) improving social protection; (v) 
promoting environmental protection; and (vi) enhancing institutional capacity 
building and restructuring of selected government agencies. The primary sector 
reform program was followed by other measures, the most important of which 
are a new Land Code (1999), the law On State Registration of Rights to Immov-
able Property (1998), the law On Water (1994, latest amendments in 2002), the 
law On Unions of Water Users (2002), the Resolution of the Government of the 
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Kyrgyz Republic on Approval of the Regulations on Order of Allocation of Pas-
tures for Rent and Use (2002), and the law On Pastures (2009). 
In 2004, the Agrarian Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic until 2010, 
prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Ressources and Processing 
Industry (MAWRPI), was issued.  
2.3 Governance reforms and decentralization 
Since its declaration of independence in 1991, the former Soviet Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan experienced a drastic transformation. Together with Kazakhstan, it 
has gained a reputation as the Central Asian country most open to economic 
reforms.7 In the early years of the reform – compared to the rest of the Central 
Asian states – Kyrgyzstan achieved good progress towards political 
decentralization and economic liberalization (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2002; 
Goletti and Chabot 2000; Grävingholt et al. 2006; World Bank 2001).  
Besides poverty eradication, political and fiscal decentralization reportedly 
became one of the main policy objectives of the Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic (GKR): 
“Three of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic‘s overall policy objectives … are the 
alleviation of poverty, improvements in the level and quality of the population’s living 
standards, and effective democratic governance, including decentralization and provid-
ing local communities with more authority and improved budgets” (MAWRPI et al. 
2007: 6). 
Particularly in the first years after independence, the GKR demonstrated a 
considerable commitment to administrative decentralization by creating a 
Ministry of Local Self-government and the post of a Minister of Local Self-
Governance and Regional Development in 2000. However – one might consider 
it symptomatic – this ministry was not endowed with an own administrative 
apparatus. 
Decentralization has largely been initiated by international donor 
organizations. Donors not only played a key role in formulating the 
decentralization policy documents, but also as its main implementers. Donor 
organizations supported the decentralization program through various 
interventions, including advice for drafting decentralization policies at the 
national level, capacity building at different administrative levels and among 
7 The National Strategy for Further Decentralization and Local Self-government Development 
in the Kyrgyz Republic until 2010 (GKR 2002) – which is discussed further down – covers 
the areas of “political and administrative decentralization, financial and economic 
decentralization, municipal service delivery, social mobilization and society consolidation” 
(Grävingholt 2006: 48) and was – by 2006 – considered the most progressive policy 
document developed in the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
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civil society organizations, support in designing and implementing fiscal 
decentralization and provision of basic administrative infrastructure, such as 
computers (ADB 2012; Mukanova 2008). Thereby, donors became very 
influential (Pétric 2005) and – by the mid 2000s – were even described to be as 
influential as the Soviet administration once was (Baimyrzaeva 2005). 
Table 2-4: Major legal acts in transferring authority to the municipality 
level (1999-2009) 
Year Legal act and outline of key provisions 
1990 Law On Local Self-governance* 
• Establishment of local councils
1991 Law On Local Self-government in the Kyrgyz Republic* 
• Vague definition of local self-governance system
Decree On Peasant Farms, February 
Law On Land Reform* 
• Local councils receive right to allocate land of former collective
and state farms to individual farmers
1992 Presidential decree On Local Self-government and Local Self-
administration 
• Citizens receive rights to equal shares of restructured non-land
assets of former state and collective farms
• Rural committees formed (head appointed by district
administration) and receive responsibility for dissolution of state
and collective farms
1993 Constitution 
• Local governments receive right to self-governance (but only few
means to execute it)
• Separation of Local Self-governments and national authorities
promulgated (but no separate local administration established)
1994 Presidential decree On Measures to Enhance the Land and Agrarian 
Reform in the Kyrgyz Republic (and additional land decrees in 1995, 
1996), February 
• National land fund transferred to land redistribution fund (from
district administration to MAWRPI); size of land fund reduced
from 50 to 25% of the arable land
• Land reform reinforced: land distributed to previous workers,
land certificates issued with 99-year lease rights (rural
committees play a major role)
1996 Presidential decree 
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Year Legal act and outline of key provisions 
Resolution of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, April 
• Creation of Local Self-government executive bodies8
• Municipality administrations receive right to register land plots,
authority over social infrastructure (club houses, libraries, etc.),
authority to mobilize local population
Tax Code (numerous changes followed) 
• Municipality administrations entitled to collect 16 different “local
taxes”
1998 Referendum on constitutional amendment 
• Transformation of citizens’ land use rights into ownership rights
Law On Main Principles of Budget Rights in Kyrgyz Republic  
• Main principles of drafting and implementation of the republican
budget and local budgets
• Determines budget process of drafting, consideration, approval and
implementation of the republican budget and local budget
procedures
1999 Land Code 
• Land next to villages defined as communal property to be
administered by local councils
• Citizens receive usufruct and alienation rights (but exercise of
alienation right deferred for five years)
Presidential decree 
• Establishment of State commission to support Local Self-
government reform
• Domination of local executive bodies over local councils officially
acknowledged, therefore number of council members increased to
reinforce power base of councils
• Introduction of reporting duties of heads of executive bodies to
council members
2001 Amendments to Land Code  
• Municipality administrations receive management and disposal
rights to land under communal ownership, state or Local Self-
government bodies are prohibited to interfere in activities of land
users
• Land sales fully legalized
8 Aiyl okmotu (Kyrg. “village government”), more recently preferred in official documents is 
the term Aiyl okrug (Kyrg. “village district”). In this book I refer to this municpality-level 
governance structure as municipality administrations. 
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Year Legal act and outline of key provisions 
2002 Law On Unions (Associations) of Water Users (amendment of previous 
decrees: Regulation On WUA9s in Rural Areas (1995) and Statute of 
WUAs in Rural Areas (1997)  
• Water User Associations receive rights to the management of on-
farm irrigation structures10, including maintenance responsibilities, 
and rights to impose fee on water users 
 Law On Local Self-government and Local State Administration, 
January (amendments 2005 and 2006) 
• Clarified principles of autonomous local government and functions 
distributed between municipality administrations and other 
administrative bodies 
• Establishes right of citizen meetings (kurultai) to make 
recommendations to local council (aiyl kenesh) 
Law On Communal Ownership of Property, March (amended and 
renamed law On Municipal Property; 2005) 
• Municipality administrations receive limited property rights over 
infrastructure and buildings 
• Local kenesh responsible to manage and dispose of municipal 
property, fix prices and tariffs for public utilities provided by the 
municipal institutions 
• Income from management of this property and financing of 
municipal institutions becomes revenue of local governments  
Decree National Strategy for Decentralization of State Administration 
and Development of Local Self-government in the Kyrgyz Republic until 
2010 
2003 Action plan for National Strategy for Decentralization of State 
Administration and Development of Local Self-government in the 
Kyrgyz Republic until 2010  
Law On Financial and Economic Basis of Local Self-government 
(contradictions with law On basic principles of budgetary rights led to 
amendments of this law in 2004 and 2005)  
• Devolution of revenue raising powers; municipality administrations 
receive rights to tax collection 
• Budget surpluses remain property of municipality administrations, 
land tax remains in local budget 
• States financial and economic independence of municipality 
                                                 
 
9 The abbreviation is used in the formal title of the law. WUA refers to Water User Assoction. 
10On-farm irrigation structures are secondary and tertiary irrigation channels which are 
located within the boundaries of the previously existing state and collective farms. 
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Year Legal act and outline of key provisions 
administrations, clarifies sources of income of local self-
administrations, limits district administrations’ rights to interfere in 
local tax issues 
• Municipality administrations receive right to collect local taxes and 
non-tax revenue 
• Defines local budgets: clarifies procedures and principles of 
drafting and implementing the local budget and extra-budgetary 




Law On Municipal Service 
• Defines legal status, rights and duties of local administration staff 
• Amendments to law On Basic principles of budget law in the 
Kyrgyz Republic  
• Prohibits interference of state authorities in local budget affairs 
• Defines sources of revenue for local budgets 
Water Code 
• Local Water User Associations become owners of previous on-farm 
irrigation infrastructure and are responsible for irrigation water 
management at local levels (previous on-farm irrigation 
management infrastructure). Water User Associations receive right 
to independent budgets and to collect fees from water users 
Agrarian Policy Concept until 2010 
• A number of agricultural services are assigned to the private sector 
and to civil society organizations, such as cooperatives. State’s 
withdrawal from the agricultural sector confirmed (specific 
regulations lack, financing unclear) 
2005 Law On Jamaats 
• Local citizen organizations of municipality administrations entitled 
to own resources, explicitly those received from international 
donors 
Law On Municipal Property  
• Improved property rights over movable and immovable property, 
land, infrastructure, and residential and non-residential funds for 
municipality administrations 
2006 Action Plan for the National Decentralization Strategy for 2006-2007 
approved by parliament  
• Confirmation of the need to analyze legal and normative acts on 
decentralization of public administration and development of 
municipality administrations, as well as elaborate proposals to 
ensure effective legal framework for the self-governance entities 
Tax Code 
Decentralization and agricultural service provision 29 
 
 
Year Legal act and outline of key provisions 
• Reduction of 16 local taxes to 8 “workable” local taxes (resort tax, 
advertisement tax, parking tax, waste management tax, hotel tax, 
local sales tax, real estate tax, vehicle tax) 
2007 Law On Republican Budget for 2007  
•  Fiscal decentralization/budgetary system reform comes into effect: 
two-tier system of interbudgetary relations – local units submit 
budgets directly to Ministry of Finance and receive direct payments 
• All institutions of oblast (region) and rayon (district) level are 
integrated in the republican budget and directly financed from this 
budget, de facto abolishment of independent regional (oblast) 
budgets 
• Improved decision authority of Local Self-governments over 
establishment and use of local budgets  
2008 Presidential decree  
• Instructs government to draft a law On Republican Budget of the 
Kyrgyz Republic for 2008  
• Since 2008 autonomous local budgets in some municipality 
administrations in effect, two-level budgetary system that reduced 
influence of the regional (oblast) administration in budget affairs at 
local level 
• District (Rayon) administrative structures shall regain rights to 
share income tax 
• Reestablishment of three-tier budgetary system and retransfer of 
some power to the regions’ (oblast) governors by creating a reserve 
fund at their disposal 
Amendments to law On Local Self-government and Local State 
Administration 2002  
• Further task splitting between administrative bodies: municipality 
administrations receive 17 state authorities and responsibility of 23 
“issues of local significance” (such as economic development, 
municipality property management, drinking water, sewage 
systems, local roads, establishment of land use and development 
regulations or heating supply), 10 further competences of aiyl 
okrug, including rights to draft local budgets 
• Action plan for national decentralization strategy for 2008 to 2010 
to be approved  
• Government-announced appointment of heads of Local Self-
governments by the district (rayon) administration from 2009 
elections on 
2009 Law On Pastures 
• Transfer of management rights over all pasture land from the 
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Year Legal act and outline of key provisions 
district (rayon) and regional (oblast) administrations to 
municipality administration 
• Optional right of municipality administrations to transfer pasture 
allocation authority to civil society groups (Pasture User Unions) 
 
2.3.1 Actors involved in decentralization 
2.3.1.1 The central government and the local state administration  
Understanding roles of actors in decentralization requires a short introduction to 
the Kyrgyz administrative system. The Kyrgyz administration consists of four 
levels: the central government, 7 oblasts (regions), 40 rayons (districts) and 
45911 aiyl okrugs.12 Aiyl okrug, for which no English translation exists, refers to 
the smallest administrative unit. The term aiyl okrug is recent; municipality-
level administrative bodies were previously called aiyl ökmöt (aul13 govern-
ment) which is still the common name. In the previous section I have and will 
for the rest of this and the following chapters refer to these lowest-level adminis-
trative bodies as municipality administrations.  
The territorial administrative division of the country is based on the Soviet 
structure. The central government consists of the president and the prime 
minister, who is the head of government and the ministries. Figure 2-4 shows 
the two parallel structures in the Kyrgyz administration at sub-national level.  
The left-hand side of the figure shows the local state administration (LSA) – 
the sub-units of presidential and line ministry offices at regional and district 
levels. The right-hand side shows a parallel structure, which is called Local Self-
government (LSG). It consists of district-level and municipality-level bodies. 
These bodies consist of representative keneshs (English: councils) whose mem-
bers are elected by local residents.  
The municipality-level self-government also has an executive body under the 
head of the municipality council. In some very remote villages, the lowest level 
                                                 
 
11 Due to inaccurate statistical information and reorganization of the territorial-administrative 
structure of the country, the number of sub-district administration units has changed. The 
most recent census has only 440 administrative units classified as Aiyl okrug (NSC 2009: 
36). At the time of data collection, the official number was 459.  
12 There is no official translation of the term Aiyl okrug found in official documents. 
According to the 2009 Housing Census, Aiyl okrugs are “administrative and territorial 
unit[s] consisting of one or several villages where the local community executes local 
government according to the Constitution and Laws of the Kyrgyz Republic” (NSC 2009: 
71).  
13 Aul = local Central Asian and Caucasian term for “village” 
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of administration is represented by individuals called “village heads” who are 
appointed by the heads of the municipality. Further discussion of government 
bodies requires an overview of accountability relations (see Section 2.3.3). 
The central government’s support of the decentralization proccess has 
periodically changed. Observers found economic and political motivations 
behind government’s support for decentralization in the early 1990s. Mukanova 
2008) and Baimyrzaeva (2010) consider expected revenue savings by 
transferrring services and functions to the municipality-level and a desire to 
express sensitivity to donor demands for democratic goverance the most 
important reasons.  
Decentralization in Kyrgyzstan has experienced different phases 
(Baimyrzaeva 2010):  
• In the period from 1991-1996, privatization and downsizing of government 
dominated, as the central government sought to save on public employement 
expenditure.  
• The period from 1996 – encouraged by donors who strongly pushed for 
administrative and governance reforms against growing corruption and 
drastic theft of public property during the first reform phase – focused on 
administrative reforms and attempts to strengthen state institutions.  
• From 2005 to 2009 – the period under study – President Bakiev first ignored 
and even aimed to reverse state governance reforms. According to 
(Baimyrzaeva 2010), the policy documents prepared under his presidency 
never exerted real impact; from late 2009, reforms for establishing new 
administrative organizations were initiated. However, those reforms were 
allegedly aimed at increasing the presidential family’s access to public funds 
and to weaken political and economic competitors.14 
Several authors observed little government support for decentralization reforms 
and little interest in effective change15 (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2002; Baimyr-
zaeva 2005; Baimyrzaeva 2010; Asian Development Bank 2012; Liebert and 
Tiulegenov 2013; Libman 2008); this was confirmed by interview partners. 
Reasons for the central government’s hesitation include fear of destabilizing 
                                                 
 
14 My own interviews underline this pessimistic view of the state and the future of 
decentralization in the country. Many interviewees found that the country had entered a 
period of re-centralization, continuously growing corruption and a departure from 
democratic principles. 
15 The only scientific paper specifically recognizing government support for the 
decentralization program is by Pandey and Misnikov (2001). It has to be noted that the 
authors are employees of the UNDP in Kyrgyzstan. 
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power networks which sustain seemingly effective channels of corruption (Bai-
myrzaeva 2010).16  
2.3.1.2 Local Self-government and local actors 
In Kyrgyzstan, the municipality level formally does not exist. However, authors 
have used the term Local Self-governments synonymous with “municipality 
level” (Grävingholt et al. 2006; Mukanova 2008). As discussed in the section 
above, this is not fully correct, because Local Self-governments comprise not 
only of execcutive municipality government (aiyl okmotu) and the municipality-
level elected council (aiyl kenesh), but also the district-level elected council.  
Figure 2-2: Governance structure in Kyrgyzstan (2008) 
 
Source: own representation  
In 1996, more than 45917 municipalities were created. In rural areas, they 
replaced the kolkhoz – Soviet-type collective farms – as the lowest-level 
authority. Hence, they were formed out of clusters of villages, often along the 
borders of former collective or state farms. Municipalities consist of 1 to 21 
settlements. The municipal executive body includes a head, a secretary and up to 
seven specialized staff members (see Figure 2-3). Since 2001, the head of the 
                                                 
 
16The same lack of support for decentralization was observed by Grävingholt et al. (2006) at 
the level of the Local State Administration (LSA). 
17The exact number changes frequently, since the recent reforms aim to merge local self-
government units which are considered too small. 
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municipality is elected by popular vote. The executive body is, in practice, the 
local administration and is formally accountable to a municipality council. 
The municipality council (aiyl kenesh) consists of about 9-15 elected 
representatives. It controls the municipality government, approves the local 
budget and controls its use, manages and controls communal property and 
approves community by-laws.  
According to the Tax Code, the municipality budget consists of so-called tax 
and non-tax revenues collected at municipality level and of national-level tax 
and non-tax revenues partially transferred back to the municipality. The munici-
pality also receives other transfers from the national level. However, local reve-
nues are far too small to cover even basic expenditures, such as staff salaries 
(Mukanova 2008; Liebert and Tiulegenov 2013). Hence, the municipality gov-
ernment fully depends on grants and transfers from the central government and 
possesses no economic autonomy (further details on municipality budgets are 
described in Section 2.3.2.3). Municipalities also suffer from limited capacities 
and inadequately qualified staff members (Mukanova 2008; Grävingholt et al. 
2006).  
For lack of empirical studies, there is no information on roles of municipality-
level actors during decentralization. Mukanovas’ (2008) study suggests that 
municipality-level actors participated passively in  designing decentralization 
legislation.  
 
Figure 2-3: Structure of the municipality government (aiyl okmotu) 
 
 
Source: own representation based on Mukanova (2008: 215-216) 
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2.3.1.3 External donors 
Donors very much supported decentralization, particularly since the mid 1990s. 
Their main objectives are documented in policy papers, part of which they initi-
ated: poverty eradication, economic growth and environmental protection are 
among the key motivations for decentralization. Donors also hoped to improve 
government administration of donor funds and cooperation with the government 
in general.18 
Key donors involved in supporting the decentralization reforms are the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the Department for International Development 
(DFID), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) through an organization called Urban Insti-
tute, the World Bank through a Community and Development Agency called 
ARIS, Soros Foundation and many others (INTRAC 2011; Mukanova 2008).  
Donors’ main activities have been summarized as policy development, ca-
pacity building and support of fiscal decentralization, as well as improving local 
administrative infrastructure (INTRAC 2011). Donor focus has shifted over the 
years. Action plans developed by donors and government focused on issues like 
local development or local budgets. Reports indicate that different donors played 
different roles throughout the decentralization process. Although donors were 
the initial force behind decentralization, critics mention the negative role donors 
have also had on decentralization: lack of sensitivity for local conditions and 
insufficient efforts for administrative change. Baimyrzaeva (2010) notes that 
donors started decentralization in the Kyrgyz Republic based on wrong 
assumptions about the best administrative system for the country, insufficient 
support for developing administrative norms and professional standards, as well 
as failure to support, monitor and enforce the policy changes they had initiated: 
“[D]onor incentives, especially during Akaev’s regime, did play a role in promoting re-
forms, but donor promises were flawed – they readily accepted reform outputs (laws, 
provision, and organizational changes) instead of outcomes. This had the effect of neu-
tralizing any impact on changing targeted behaviour and practices” (Baimyrzaeva 2010: 
43).19
Since the beginning of the decentralization process, donors have been strongly 
involved in reform design and have commented on the government’s policies. 
Donors have frequently reemphazised a need for withdrawal of the state. In its 
18See Section 2.2.3 for an outline of these regulations. 
19Why donor organizations failed to implement meaningful decentralization is beyond the 
scope of this section. However, it seems to have resulted from donors’ internal incentive 
systems, which prioritized quantitative document production instead of unquantifiable real 
impacts. This however, is a problem clearly not limited to donor involvement in Kyrgyz 
Republic. 
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Livestock Sector Review of 2007, the World Bank (2007a), provides the – to 
date – most comprehensive report on the agricultural sector and suggests 
reforms: 
“The rationale for the recommended reforms of public policies and institutions 
concerned with livestock production is the same as in other sectors: withdrawing from 
roles and activities which the private sector can do and focusing on those that the 
private sector cannot perform” (World Bank 2007a: 78). 
Donor organizations have also criticized the government’s agricultural policy 
for incoherence, for example, the government’s programs for animal breeding or 
fodder production. The World Bank criticizes the scope,20 pace and strategy of 
many government programs and finds ineffective use of limited resources, for a 
too broad range of activities and with a false perception of agricultural sector 
clients – who are no longer a few hundred agricultural producers, but tens of 
thousands of smallholders (World Bank 2007a). Donors also believe that 
piecemeal policy design hinders private sector development: 
“Despite market-oriented reforms, the state continues to announce ad hoc interventions 
in commodity markets as a means of supporting agricultural producers, creating 
uncertainty and unrealistic expectations among market participants and stifling private 
initiative” (IMF and World Bank 2006: 10). 
Hence, donors have recommended a focus on what they see as the most 
important agricultural services21 – land administration, irrigation services and 
rural financial services: 
“A large agenda for further reforms would include developing capacity for appropriate 
and effective agricultural policy formulations, ensuring that all farm land holders have 
proper title to land and that the water code is implemented, as well as taking actions to 
increase access to market-based rural credit” (IMF and World Bank 2006: 10). 
2.3.2 Distribution of tasks and responsibilities as a result of decentralization 
The following section aims to apply the framework developed in Section 2.2 to 
the study case. This section has two parts. First, based on the 21 legal acts 
identified in Section 2.2.3, it describes the transfer of responsibilities and tasks 
for the provison of general and agricultural services from central government to 
municipality-level actors (2.3.2.1). Second, it summarizes – also based on a 
legal review – the transfer of different types of power (see Section 2.2.1.2 for a 
20The World Bank criticizes the government’s engagement in agricultural services which the 
World Bank considers better provided by private suppliers – for example, breeding and 
fodder production. 
21The same document emphasizes veterinary services and machinery services. 
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definition of those types of powers) to municipality-level actors (2.3.2.2 - 
2.3.2.4). 
2.3.2.1 The transfer of responsibilities to municipality-level actors 
At the time of data collection, which started with a first visit to the country in 
December 2007 and continued intermittently until December 2010, responsibili-
ties for rural public and agricultural services were confusing. The legal docu-
ment relevant then was the law On Local Self-government and Local State Ad-
ministration of 2002, with amendments from 2008. The law transfers the 
responsibility for a large number tasks from the central government to munici-
palities. The scope of tasks is impressive: the law outlines 25 “issues of local 
significance” put “under the jurisdiction of a Local Self-government” (Article 
18): 
“The following issues of local significance shall be under the jurisdiction of a local 
government for it to organize functioning and developing a system of life support on a 
territory, social and economic planning and providing social and cultural services to the 
population: 1) ensuring economic development of a relevant territory; 2) municipal 
property management; 3) formation, approval and execution of a local budget; 4) provi-
sion of drinking water to people; 5) facilitating operation of sewage system and treat-
ment facilities in settlements; 6) facilitating municipal roads functioning in settlements; 
7) organization of common use area lighting; 8) facilitating cemeteries functioning and
providing ritual services; 9) territory improvement and greenery of common use areas; 
10) facilitating parks, sport facilities and recreation ground functioning; 11) waste man-
agement; 12) facilitating municipal transport functioning and public transport operation 
regulation within the boundaries of settlements; 13) protecting cultural and historical 
sights of local significance; 14) organization and support of local libraries operation; 
15) establishing land use and development rules for a relevant territory of a settlement;
16) posting advertisements on the territory of a settlement in accordance with laws of
the Kyrgyz Republic; 17) supporting protection of public order; 18) creating conditions 
for folk art, creative activity development; 19) creating conditions to spend leisure time; 
20) organization of activities on working with children and young people; 21) providing
conditions to develop physical culture and mass sports; 22) promoting prevention and 
liquidation of extraordinary situation consequences; 23) organization of heating support 
on a relevant territory” (GKR law On Local Self-government and Local Self-
Administration, amended version of 2002; Article 18). 
Among the so-called “issues of local significance” transferred to municipality 
administrations, only two are specific agricultural services. First, the 
management of municipal property, including agricultural land and pasture; 
second, the establishment and design of land use and land development rules.  
There are a number of additional agricultural services in the same law 
classified as “state authorities”:  
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“… 10) allocation and use of the Agricultural Land Redistribution Pool22; 11) summa-
rizing material on perspective of development of agricultural production, making eco-
nomic forecasts of agricultural production; 12) assisting in taking timely veterinary and 
sanitary and anti-epidemic efforts, as well as pedigree and selection efforts in animal 
husbandry”; [and] 13) taking appropriate efforts related to fighting the damage caused 
to agricultural crops, protecting harvest, forest shelter belts and forestland.” (Art 20, Pa-
ra. 6)  
According to the law, these “state authorities” 
“can be delegated [to the local government] only in such cases when the state along 
with state authority delegation, shall provide for earmarked transfers from the 
republican budget to a local budget, or determine other sources of financing, required 
for delegated state authority execution.” (Art. 20, Para. 3)  
The law allows further transfer of these tasks to other “legal entities and 
individuals” by an “executive administrative body of local government as agreed 
with the local kenesh.” (Art. 20, Para. 2) However, the distribution of functions 
is optional and the wording does not provide for transparent allocation of tasks. 
Task specifications lack and ambiguous formulations like “facilitating,” 
“organization,” “ensuring,” or “support” are characteristic for the document.  
The most comprehensive information on the distribution of agricultural service 
tasks is the 2004 resolution of the Kyrgyz Government titled Agrarian Policy 
Concept until 2010. The document generally emphazises the government’s 
support for private sector development in agriculture: 
“The Government should promote setting up of private agrochemical and agro-technical 
services countrywide, ensure unhampered sale of mineral fertilizers, chemicals, 
pesticides, agricultural tools and spare parts to the agricultural machinery. For that 
purpose machine-tractor workshops, warehouses and other material and technical 
resources available in the Republic should be used.” (GKR 2004 :18). 
The document also lists prioritized agricultural services, which include pasture 
management, advisory services, market information services to rural producers 
and veterinary services.23  
Like most of the Kyrgyz decentralization legislation, the Agrarian Policy 
Concept until 2010, avoids a clear distribution of functions. The document lists 
different potential service providers to whom planning, management, provision 
22Elsewhere called “Land Redistribution Fund” 
23The diverse priorities for agricultural sector development found in the policy and donor 
documents suggest that prior to the introduction of the World Bank’s Agricultural and 
Services Investment Project in mid-2008, which started with a focus on pasture management 
and rural advisory, there was no commonly agreed focus for agricultural sector development 
among donors and government. 
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and monitoring have been assigned: the state, private service providers, service 
users, and donors. However, vague formulations, coupled with duplicate 
responsibilities, are frequent. The prescribed distribution of agricultural service 
tasks is found in Table 2-7 to 2-10 and, in a simplified version in the following 
Table 2-5.  
Generally speaking, the governement follows donors’ recommendations for 
economic liberalization. The simplified outline of tasks in the following table 
shows that the government sees the state’s role in service planning and 
monitoring, while service provision is considered as the responsibility of various 
actors. Agricultural services, unlike the Soviet period, are mainly paid by service 
users.  
The document is full of ambiguities. It defines providers for some services, 
but gives little information on planning and financing. Services such as 
veterinary and quarantine, breeding, machinery services, seed breeding, 
chemical input provision, land administration and agricultural edcuation are 
allocated to what the authors of the document call “the state” and to other 
providers at the same time. The authors make no specific statements on which 
administrative levels are actually responsible for “state” services. In case of 
duplicate responsibility, it is not clear who holds which specific role. As a 
consequence, the document also provides no information on the role of 
municipality-level administrations in agricultural service provision.  
Table 2-5: Authority for agricultural service domains according to 
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Agro-chemicals - 
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Rural advisory 
services S D U - 
Land 









(U/D) S - 
Marketing and 




Source: Information summarized from Agrarian Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic until 
2010 
S = State; P = Private service providers; U = Service users; D = Donors; – = not 
specified in the Agrarian Policy Concept 
2.3.2.2 The transfer of power and rights to municipality-level actors 
To make decentralization meaningful, authority needs to be accompanied by 
rights to independently execute tasks. Kyrgyz decentralization legislation has, 
besides transferring service provision responsibilities, provided for a transfer of 
powers to actors at municipality level – including Local Self-governments, 
community-based organizations, but also individual citizens. 
To explore which powers were formally transferred to whom, I reviewed the 
statements on power transfers found in each of the most important legal acts that 
were shown in Table 2-4 in Section 2.2.3.1. Based on this information, I 
identified which municipality-level actor group received which type of power 
according to the classification in Section 2.2.1.2. The findings are summarized 
in Table 2-6 below.  
2.3.2.3 The right to contribute to collective decisions and the right to 
information 
Municipality actors have received the right to contribute to collective decisions 
and information. During decentralization, municipality citizens received the 
democratic right to contribute to collective decisions by voting. Most important 
is the active and passive right to elect heads of municipality administrations and 
members of municipality councils. Such citizens’ rights to impact decisions 
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gradually evolved: until 1995 heads of municipality administrations were ap-
pointed by district administrations; in 1996 elections for municipality govern-
ments – municipality councils and heads of municipality administrations – were 
introduced.  
By law, the municipality councils (aiyl kenesh) are the most powerful bodies 
at municipality level because they are the “main controlling representative body 
of local government” (Karashev and Tarbinski 2002: 111). They approve the 
head of the municipality and can revoke his/her decisions, determine differenti-
ated land tax rates, define the land rental process for hayfields and did this, prior 
to the law On Pastures in 2009, also for municipality pastures. They also ap-
prove the staff of the municipal administration. The head of the municipality 
administration is therefore accountable to the municipality council. Municipality 
councils also have the right to request information on activities and budget deci-
sions of the rural administration (Karashev and Trabinski 2002: 75). 
Citizens received rights to form interest groups and fora to influence decisions 
taken by the elected municipality councils. The 2002 law On Local Self-
government and Local State Administration) and the 2005 law On Jamaats give 
citizens the right to independently form community-based groups, such as tradi-
tional elders’ groups, women’s associations or condominium associations. In 
addition, they acquired the right to hold citizen meetings which are entitled to 
make recommendations to municipality councils (Grävingholt et al. 2006). 
The law grants economic autonomy to community-based groups by giving 
them the right to own property and managing their own budgets without state 
intervention. As shown in the following sections, NGOs and donor organizations 
have used such groups as anchors for municipality-level programs and have 
formed such groups to allocate funds directly to municipality-level actors.  
2.3.2.4 The allocation of new property rights 
Municipality actors – Local Self-governments, rural citizens and community-
based organizations – have aquired new property rights. Decentralization has 
given municipality-level actors new rights to own physical asssets and financial 
resources. Citizens received full private property rights to land, including the 
right to sell and purchase agricultural and non-agricultural land. Local Self-
governments received property rights to important physical resources, including 
local infrastructure, buildings, agricultural and non-agricultural land as well as 
pastures. 
In the following section, I summarize the most important property rights 
municipality administrations received. According to the law On municipal 
property (2005), they were declared owners of municipal property, which 
includes: 
• The local infrastructure, including stuctures for transport, energy supply,
water supply, the sewage system, and communications; 
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• non-privatized commercial buildings, streets, bridges and local roads;
• public parks and land allocated for parks, forestry, historical monuments and
cultural landmarks; 
• forests and agricultural land, lakes, sources of water, and local deposits of
mineral resources, given that those lands are not defined as public natural 
resources; and 
• unclaimed land.
Local governments received the right to lease this municipal property. While 
this regulation formally created a potential source of budget revenue, there are 
no clear regulations for leasing. Hence, the poorly trained municipality 
administrators cannot make the best use of these revenue resources. Hence, 
leasing practice is ad hoc and intransparent. Observers report many cases where 
use rights to municipality property are allocated without formal rental 
agreements or any payment at all (Mukanova 2008).  
As mentioned above, agricultural land became property of the municipality 
administrations. During the 1990s, land and buildings previously managed by 
collective and state farms were distributed to the population. 20 to 25% of the 
agricultural areas were not distributed to the population, but transformed into a 
so-called “Land Redistribution Fund”, which came under municipal authority. 
According to the Land Code of 1999 (amended 2003), the municipality 
administration can lease such land plots to citizens. According to the law, the 
municipality council can set a local land lease rate – land tax rates are defined 
by the central government. While leasing out municipal property has generally 
not increased budget revenues, leasing out agricultural land is currently among 
the most important revenue sources for municipality budgets. 
Besides, municipality administrations have gained property rights to vast 
pasture areas. According to the 2002 pasture regulations), municipalities held 
management rights over the nearest pastures, which are usually used for winter 
forage only. The 2009 law On Pastures extended municipality authority also to 
pastures used during spring, autumn and summer. It thereby gave municipalities 
“responsibility for management” (Art. 1, Para. 1) and “pasture use authority” 
(Art. 1, Para. 2) and thereby deprived the previously responsible district and 
regional state administrations of their management rights and the right to 
revenues from leasing out these pasture areas (for further details on the pasture 
law see Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6). In most cases, the municipality 
administrations transferred these management rights to community-based 
organizations, called “Pasture Committees”. 
In addition, municipality administrations have received greater budget 
autonomy. The Tax Code (1996), the law On Fiscal and Economic Basis of 
Local Self-governance (2003) and the law On Basic Principles of Budgetary 
Rights (1998) introduced amendments in interbudgetary relations that allow 
42  Chapter 2 
 
establishment of an independently managed municipal budget. According to the 
Tax Code of 1996 (and following amendments) and the law On Fiscal and 
Economic Basis of Local Self-government of 2004, revenue sources consist of 8 
local taxes24 and a number of fees25 and shares of national taxes – which include 
property tax and the land tax,26 as well as budgetary transfers from the central 
government. Surplus from these revenues remains with the municipality 
governments. Among these taxes, land tax, which is fixed by the government, is 
the most important revenue source.  
“There are two sources of land tax – the tax for individual plots of land paid by owners 
and the tax for leasing state land. The state land share is about 20 percent after the in-
tense privatization of land. This 20 percent of land is the source for local land tax gener-
ation. [The] LSG [(Local Self-government)] is allowed to let these lands, and rent pay-
ment is to be accumulated in a special LSG treasury account. The share of income 
generated from land leasing is 7 to 10 percent, on average” (Mukanova 2008: 237). 
In addition, rules were introduced to prevent regional and district administra-
tions from reducing transfers from the central to the municipal budget. The na-
tional budget of 2007, which has the status of a law, introduced simplified budg-
et transfer rules. Prior to 2007, national tax and budget support for local 
administrative bodies was channelled from the central government, the Ministry 
of Finance specifically, through the regional and district administrations. The 
reform of 2007 eliminated transfer through regional and district administrations 
and introduced a procedure according to which regions, districts and municipali-
ties receive direct payments from the republican government, which reduces 
municipality-level dependence on intermediary administrations.  
At the time of data collection, the first experiences with direct budget trans-
fers between the Ministry of Finance and the municipality administrations had 
been made. UNDP staff considered the budgetary impacts very positive: 
“[T]en, twelve municipalities worked directly with the Ministry of Finance. … [W]hen 
more authority was given to the municipalities, in terms of collection of, for example, 
local taxes and fees, they showed better results. Those municipalities showed very good 
                                                 
 
24Mukanova (2008) indicates the following taxes as local taxes and fees: resort tax, tax on 
advertising, charge for parking, charge for garbage disposal, hotel tax, tax on vehicle 
owners, tax on sales and retail trade, tax on real estate. Regulated taxes (100% transferred to 
local budget revenues): unified tax on small entrepreneurs, receipts from mandatory 
patenting, income tax on patent basis, income tax charged by tax authorities 
25State duty, administrative fees, confiscation of derelict property, charges of traffic police, 
deposit amounts, unclaimed cargo, license issuance fees. 
26Local taxes and revenue sources refer to locally collected payments which fully enter the 
municipality budget. National taxes are collected by state tax bodies and shares of the 
collected amounts are transferred back to those municipalities where the taxes were 
collected.  
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results and collected twice the income or revenues in comparison with the previous 
years. So we can say these are very good results” (Interview UNDP Decentralization 
Expert). 
The right to collect and distribute benefits from local taxes, including the power 
to decide about how local budgets are spent, greatly improved municipalities’ 
independence. However, tax collection challenges, such as the unclear compe-
tencies of state tax collectors and municipality-level tax inspectors, lack of basic 
competencies and information among administrative staff, but also discretionary 
interference of district and regional administrations in local tax affairs, have not 
been solved (UNDP and GKR 2005) and are, according to interview partners, 
likely to persist: 
“… [T]hese district structures27 no longer have the right to influence the municipalities’ 
budgets but nevertheless it’s a tradition for years and they got used to this and they, of 
course, will continue to control the municipality budgets!” (Interview UNDP Decentral-
ization Expert). 
At the time of data collection, the future of the simplified direct tax transfer to 
municipality administrations was unclear. A new tax code was under review by 
government and parliament. According to the interviewed experts, this new code 
was considered to allow too little local tax revenues. In addition, statements by 
leading politicians in favour of re-introducing district-level authority over mu-
nicipality budgets, which would lead to a three-level interbudgetary transfer, as 
well as announcements by the president to abandon the election of municipality 
heads for the next two years, made experts pessimistic about the future of inde-
pendent municipality budgets (Interview UNDP Decentralization Expert). 
The second important recipient of new property rights are community-based 
organizations. The law On Jamaats (2005) grants these groups independent 
budgets and specifies the right to autonomously receive and use funds from 
donor organizations. This law and the law On Associations of Water Users 
(WUAs) as well as the 2009 law On Pastures, gave community-based organiza-
tions the possibility to receive property rights to natural resources and important 
infrastructure. However, these rights depend on the voluntary transfer of irriga-
tion management and pasture management authority from municipality admin-
istrations to community-based organizations. Once holding authority, communi-
ty-based organizations can earn revenue from allocating use rights to resource 
users. 
27Refers to Local State Administration at district (rayon) level. 
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2.3.2.5 Rights to allocate property rights and other benefits 
The allocation of management rights to property and increased autonomy to use 
tax income has greatly increased the ability of municipality actors to direct bene-
fit streams from these resources. 
First, the new land administration legislation gave Local Self-governments 
the right to distribute benefits from natural resource use. As mentioned above, 
Local Self-governments received the right to issue certificates for land plots 
(1996) and rights to the administration of land (1999) and to lease land from the 
land redistribution fund. They thereby determine who receives access to agricul-
tural land. 
Second, the law On Pastures formally gives Local Self-government bodies 
the power to allocate usufruct rights to large pasture areas. Pasture management 
authority was transferred from district and regional authorities to municipality 
administrations. However, these rights are often not executed by Local Self-
governments, as they usually transfer them to community-based organizations, 
so-called “Pasture User Unions” (PUU).  
Third, Local Self-governments received the right to independently allocate 
municipality-level budgets for service planning/provision and infrastructure 
development. This includes the right to design rules for payment and use of 
services. Municipality administrations thereby control access to services. How-
ever, authority over service provision is often also a burden to the municipality 
administration, because the available budget does not allow to provide even the 
most necessary services to residents or to prevent further decay of much of the 
service infrastructure. 
Fourth, formally, Local Self-governments have received the right to staff mu-
nicipality administrations and have thereby gained the right to allocate salaries 
to chosen individuals. Some Local Self-governments could, as Mukanova’s data 
(Mukanova 2008: 265-266) suggest, determine the structure of their own de-
partments and could also, without interference from the district and regional 
LSA levels, decide about the administrative staff they hire. In rural Kyrgyzstan, 
where regular off-farm income is very rare, this is a powerful resource. Howev-
er, Local Self-governments can often not use this power, as the municipality 
budgets cannot even cover staff salaries and the most important local services. 
In effect the lack of funds makes Local Self-governments in many cases fully 
dependent on donors and the government.  
The second group which benefited greatly from decentralization by receiving 
power to allocate benefits are agricultural community-based organizations: de-
centralization laws – and also specific agricultural laws, such as the Water Code 
and the law On Pastures established the right of citizens to form interest groups. 
Those community-based organizations have received the right to manage own 
budgets, for example funds acquired from donor organizations (which the law 
explicitly mentions). Community-based organizations (water user associations 
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and pasture user associations)28 have thereby received significant power for fund 
management and distribution of rights to the use important resources to agricul-
tural community-based organizations. These organizations also receive the right 
to manage and use the resources and relevant infrastructure. This bundle of 
rights has given them substantial influence. They can allocate access to irriga-
tion and pastures and set and collect usage fees for irrigation water and pasture 
use, using the proceeds for maintenance and infrastructure development as well 
as payment of own staff.  
28 Drinking water user associations were found to hold similar rights in practice. However, the 
legislation was not reviewed. 
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Table 2-6: Transfer of formal decision power to municipality-level actors based on decentralization legislation (1990-
2009) 
















1990 Law On Local Self-governance Local 
council* 




Decree On Peasant Farms Citizens 
Land Code Local council* 
1992 Presidential decree On Local Self-government 
and Local Self-administration 
Private Rural* 
committee 
1993 Constitution Local 
governments* 
1994 Series of presidential decrees 
On Measures to Enhance the Land and Agrari-
Private Municipality 
administration* 
1 Summary of key content of these laws and regulations in Table 2-4. 
2 * Preceding organizations of current municipality administrations (Aiyl okrug) and municipality councils (Aiyl kenesh) 
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Amendments to Law On Local Self-government 











Source: Review of legal provisions from Table 2-4: according to classification of power types in Section 2.2.1.2.
3 Jamaat is translated as ‘community’ and refers to “a form of organisation in local self-governance for joint responsible decision-making on 
local issues based on voluntary association of members of local community residing in one street, block or other territory of a village or town” 
(Law On Jamaats and their Associations, Article 1). 
4 The annual state budget has the status of a law (Liebert and Tiulegenov 2013: 86) and is issued each year. The 2007 budget is specific, as it 
grants municipality administrations the right to generate own revenues and draft own budgets. 
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2.3.3 Accountability relationships among the different actor groups 
The following section provides findings from the literature and interview tran-
scripts about accountability relationships between the actor groups identified in 
Section 2.3.1. It reviews who is accountable to whom and the relevant accounta-
bility mechanism. Note that most information is based on two available empiri-
cal studies on municipality-level government in the Kyrgyz Republic (Gräving-
holt et al. 2006; Mukanova 2008). In addition, I used complementary 
information from other sources, such as donor reports or other gray literature. 
Those documents usually lack a description of methods for data generation and 
interpretation and can therefore be only understood as its authors’ perception. If 
I have used information from those sources it has been marked as such. 
2.3.3.1 Local state administration and central government 
Many observers of the post-independence Kyrgyz administration find that de-
centralization has neither effectively redistributed administrative powers, nor 
impacted accountability relationships. It is a widespread belief that the move 
towards democratic decentralization has remained formal: 
“The introduction of liberal economic policies, the relatively vibrant civil society, and a 
less authoritarian political climate than in the rest of Central Asia even merited the 
country the label of ‘Central Asia's island of democracy.’ Thus, on the surface, the Kyr-
gyz state looked rather impressive. ... [B]eneath the formal structures the actual political 
situation was never as bright as suggested by official directives and international proc-
lamations” (Engval 2007: 36). 
Some observers see all executive, legislative and judicative powers in the hands 
of the president (Dukenbayev and Hansen 2003; Engwal 2007). Reportedly, 
decentralization had had not no impact on the lack of society’s control over the 
president:  
“The following features of Soviet administration are still extant in the current public 
administration of Kyrgyzstan: 1. A high degree of centralization and state involvement 
in regulations of nearly all processes in society; 2. The accumulation and concentration 
of power in the hands of the President and state bureaucracy; 3. A limited parliament 
and weak judiciary system; 4. Underdeveloped and weak local government; 5. A com-
mand-type, top-to-bottom style of management; 6. The absence of a professional civil 
service system based on internationally recognized standards” (Dukenbaev and Hansen 
2003: 34-35). 
Also, has upward accountability remained high. Regional and district admin-
istrations, summarized as local state administration (LSA), are considered sub-
divisions of government and fully dependent on the president. By directly ap-
pointing administrative heads at district level (called akhim) and at regional 
level (called governor) and by tight budget control, the presidential apparatus 
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holds all levels of administration fully accountable (Alymkulov and Kulatov 
2002; Dukenbayev 2004; Libman 2008; Liebert and Tiulegenov 2013; Muka-
nova 2008; Works 2002): 
“There is high pressure on the local self-administrations to perform the transferred tasks 
as they have to fear job loss” (Mukanova 2008, 217). 
Downward accountability, in contrast, has not increased. The Central Govern-
ment does not endow LSAs with clear procedural rules, responsibilities and 
resources. Hence, LSA staff face (i) unclear competencies and distribution of 
tasks; (ii) unclear accountability relationships between departments and adminis-
trative bodies; (iii) inadequate allocation of tasks, resources and staff; (iv) fre-
quent task duplication. This leads to high dependency of lower administrative 
branches on governmental orders and lack of transparency, which enables inac-
curate use of public resources (Baimyrzaeva 2010, Mukanova 2008). 
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Figure 2-4: Formal and informal governance structure 




Source: Dukenbayev and Hansen 2003: 50 and 52
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2.3.3.2 State administration and citizens 
There is ambiguous evidence on the relationship between the presidential appa-
ratus and parliament as representative of the citizenry. Most observers suggest 
that central government and LSAs are not accountable to citizens: corruption in 
the administration and in business has reached extraordinary levels (Engval 
2007; Martini 2013; Transparency International 2015). Kyrgyzstan in 2008 
ranked 166th, in 2009 162th and in 2010 164th out of 176 countries in the Global 
Corruption Index (Transparency International 2015). A national opinion poll by 
Transparency International found:  
“72% of the citizens interviewed … reported that corruption is a big issue for the coun-
try. For 36%, corruption is seen as the second most important issue faced by the coun-
try…” (Martini 2013: 4). 
The reason is seen in lacking mechanisms for monitoring government and ad-
ministrations:  
“[t]he government provides very limited information to the public on the budget pro-
cess, making it almost impossible for citizens to hold government accountable for its 
management of public resources” (Martini 2013: 4). 
Public frustration with drastic cases of corruption, combined with increasing 
public service costs, has threatened the country’s social peace. The collapses of 
two post-independence governments also suggest insufficient ability to serve 
citizens. There is great dissatisfaction with use of resources and increasing levels 
of corruption.  
The literature also suggests the persistence of a “Soviet mentality” (Gräving-
holt et al. 2006: 9 f; Karashev and Tarbinski 2002: 112): non-democratic mind-
sets, unrestricted obedience to authorities, little interest in collective action and 
participation in democratic collective activities. According to the authors, these 
are further obstacles to democratic control. 
Once elected, there might be very little control of members of parliament. 
Pétric (2005) reports the efforts of parliamentary candidates to please their elec-
torates:  
“Politicians must have an important local stronghold to ensure popular support. The 
democratization [of] political life … reinforces clientelistic practices and the activity of 
informal solidarity networks; one of the campaign leaders of a member of parliament of 
the region of Naryn confided that ‘I often come during the summer to maintain relations 
with the people here, you need to give time, to eat and drink with people … I also fi-
nance the construction of a monument, during the summer we organize equestrian 
games with prizes, we help the school too. You have to give in order to obtain people’s 
trust’” (Pétric 2005: 325). 
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Pétric (2005) observed that parliamentary candidates are motivated by their own 
and their clienteles’ economic interests. Ideology or party membership do not 
seem to play a relevant role. Instead, parliamentarians mainly seek to secure 
economic benefits of their solidarity networks which “rest upon complex rela-
tions that link individuals through personal bounds (friendships, kinship ties, 
matrimonial alliances, professional bounds, etc.) of patronage” (Pétric 2005: 
325). 
2.3.3.3 Local Self-government and different levels of state administration 
Despite their formal autonomy, municipalities are upwardly accountable to the 
state. Mukanova (2008), reporting on data collected prior to fiscal decentraliza-
tion, states: 
“Appointed mayors have dual loyalties, and typically are less responsive to local needs. 
Directly elected AO [municipality administrations’] heads ideally should have the 
strongest degree of autonomy, derived from the electoral mandate. However, they also 
depend a lot on the LSA and report to it for execution of presidential and governmental 
resolutions, resolutions of ministries, and for functions shared with the state.” (Muka-
nova 2008: 226) 
Due to very limited empirical research, there is not much information on how 
the municipality level is actually accountable to other administrative levels. An 
UNDP report claims that the government’s staff directly control municipality-
level use of funds through personal supervision and observation (UNDP and 
GKR 2005). In 2007, new “interbudgetary relations” were introduced. Since 
then, Local Self-governments receive funds directly from the Ministry of Fi-
nance. This measure was intended to reduce district (rayon) and region (oblast) 
administrations’ illegitimate reduction of funds for municipality-level admin-
istrations, but the direct budget relations between the central government and 
Local Self-governments clearly increased their subordination. 
2.3.3.4 Elected councils at municipality level and municipality-level 
administration 
Elected councils operate at two levels: district level and municipality level. Both 
are formally part of the local self-governance structures. Contrary to formal 
prescriptions – but typical for the entire region, as shown in the following quote 
– these councils do not possess any power to control executive bodies (Gräving-
holt et al. 2006, Mukanova 2008): 
“From the point of view of formal decentralization, all countries of the region are uni-
tary and have a multi-level administrative system, inherited from the Soviet past. … The 
heads of local administration are appointed by the central government; the governors … 
act as representatives of the president and heads of regional executive […]. There are 
local elected councils at provincial and sub-provincial level (maslikhat in Kazakhstan, 
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local councils in Uzbekistan, madzhilis in Tajikistan, gengesh in Turkmenistan and 
kenesh in Kyrgyz Republic), which are, however, virtually powerless and often domi-
nated by the executive…” (Libman 2008, Section 4.2) (Italics in original). 
The local councillors are badly informed about their rights and, even if they 
have received external training, are rarely able to pressure the municipality or 
district administration (Grävingholt et al. 2006; Mukanova 2008). 
2.3.3.5 Municipality-level Local Self-government and citizens 
Since independence, the heads of the municipality-level administration (aiyl 
okmotu) – in other words the mayor – and the municipality councils (aiyl 
kenesh) have been elected twice. The open and seemingly fair elections report-
edly did not ensure full accountability of municipal administrations and councils 
to citizens (Karashev and Tarbinski 2002; Mukanova 2008). The reason is seen 
in lacking compliance with democratic principles:  
“Due to such situation the government (both representatives and executive authorities) 
is still non-transparent for the population. The population still does not realize the es-
sence of government and does not comprehend that it is the people who are the main 
sources of governmental authorities and local government performance. On the other 
hand, the governmental authorities themselves still cannot realize and admit that their 
main objective is rendering services to [the] population” (Karashev and Tarbinski 2002: 
112). 
The role of the municipality councils is very problematic. For lack of training 
and information on their role, facilities for open meetings (Karashev and Tarbin-
ski 2002) and financial compensation for their work (Mukanova 2008: 211), 
they fail to control the local executive, are not accountable to citizens and tend 
to use their positions for their own benefit. 
There are different views on the relationship between municipality admin-
istrations and the population: while most authors are very critical of the account-
ability of local municipalities and even describe the government as “isolated” 
from the population (Karashev and Tarbinski 2002: 112), a closer look at Muka-
nova’s data shows that citizens frequently approach municipality administrations 
about daily problems, and that the vast majority have received at least some 
support (Mukanova 2008). 
2.3.3.6 Government and donors 
Even though some authors consider donors very powerful actors who impact 
policy choices, it seems that, donors have little influence on the implementation 
of policies. Besides, policy formulation, based on donor recommendations, is 
often not specific (task formulation, functional differentiation, etc.), not funded 
and not supported by the government (UNECE 2009). Grävingholt et al. (2008: 
8) call this the governments’s “unwillingness” to implement the new regula-
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tions. The low impact donors have on the government might also be shown by 
the withdrawal of many donors from several policy fields – including decentral-
ization (Asian Development Bank 2012). 
2.4 Impact of decentralization on agricultural service provision in 
Kyrgyzstan 
I have already outlined general public service responsibilities and specific agri-
cultural public service responsibilities which were decentralized to the munici-
pality level. This section aims to summarize the literature about the impact of 
decentralization on service provision at municipality level. The only study on 
municipality-level service provision is the extensively cited Local Self-
government study by Mukanova (2008). Mukanova has shown that most of the 
public service functions to be performed by Local Self-governments are not 
executed: 
“[M]ost of those [delegated] functions, due to lack of capacity, low staff capability, and 
lack of funds, are unperformed, and … many of the functions are technically and opera-
tionally complex and even their delivery-provision is not feasible for regional subdivi-
sions of the ministries and agencies themselves. The provision of those service delivery 
functions requires professional, appropriate institutional capacity and organization, clear 
sets of rules and regulations, and many other things that are unavailable to the current 
LSG [(Local Self-government)] system” (Mukanova 2008: 215). 
Hence, most services are provided only on an ad hoc basis, depending on donor 
or governmental support (Mukanova 2008): 
“… [V]illage governments are able to perform a maximum of three to four functions out 
of 11 assigned. They are few communal services that can be financed through local tax-
es. Other functions are performed from time to time when external resources are availa-
ble through grants of the international community (USAID-funded ARIS program, 
UNDP, WB Rural Investment Project) or charitable donation of citizens. Some func-
tions (social protection, employment and migration program, public order) are per-
formed by regional subdivisions of the ministry (efficiency of which is a question 
mark), and subsequently financed out of the budget of the ministry. Even when they are 
financed through the republican (ministry) budget, only the so-called “protected line 
items” – payroll and social tax – are covered. The efficiency of service provision was 
not achieved by the ad hoc transfer of technical functions to LSGs since little attention 
was paid to the organizational coherence of LSGs and ministries” (Mukanova 2008: 
216). 
I will not explore general service provision in the remaining section because 
Mukanova (2008) has discussed service provision outcomes in great detail. This 
review focuses on agricultural service provision at municipality level, which – 
despite the importance of agriculture for the country’s economic development – 
to date has been largely ignored in the literature. It is therefore of interest to 
study how decentralization has impacted those agricultural services previously 
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provided by the state or produced as part of the Soviet agricultural 
administration. I therefore reviewed the available information on: (i) the 
direction of reforms in that sector; (ii) the allocation of service provision tasks; 
and (ii) the status – or outcomes – of the reform. 
At the time the review was conducted, scientific literature was available only 
for irrigation services. I therefore also reviewed gray literature, which consists 
almost entirely of donor reports. Before I discuss service provision, a short 
introduction to the general transformation of agricultural structures in 
Kyrgyzstan after the disintegration of the Soviet Union is required. 
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2.4.1 Agricultural reforms 
Decentralization affected the entire agricultural sector. The dissolution of all 
public farms – collective farms (kolkhoz) and state farms (sovkhoz) – led to a 
massive shift of property rights to land from public to private owners and also – 
as the kolkhoz had important administrative and economic roles (Baimyrzaeva 
2005) – to the extinction of important rural services.  
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The land reform started in 1991. Soviet state and collective farms were 
dismantled and shares of land, equipment and buildings were distributed to those 
who previously worked on the farms. The restructuring of collective and state 
farms was almost completed in 1997 (Crewett 2003; Mudahar 1998). Among the 
Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan realized the fastest, most liberal land reform: 
“The pace and depth of land reform in Kyrgyzstan was the most aggressive in Central 
Asia …. In February 1991, the Kyrgyz government passed laws that allowed local 
councils to create peasant farms. And by 1994, approximately 10,000 private farms 
were created, leading up to the ‘watershed’ year, between 1994-1995, when the Kyrgyz 
government aggressively distributed farmland to all household types. Although holdings 
were initially considered to be leased for 99-year periods, this approach was replaced by 
outright ownership in 1998” (Light 2007: 10-11). 
The land reform led to a drastic reorganization of the agricultural sector: in 
seven years the number of large collective and state farms decreased from about 
500 to 22 (Figure 2-6). Since then, more than 52,000 farms emerged, among 
them 672 newly formed collectives (Mudahar 1998).  
With the dissolution of the state and collective farms and the abolishment of 
the entire Soviet agricultural system, central management of the agricultural 
production chains, including administration, input provision, processing and 
marketing, broke down. Therefore, the government set the (re-)establishment of 
agricultural services as a key priority. Two key policy documents illustrated this 
interest: the already discussed Agrarian Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic 
until 2010 and the Country Development Strategy (2006).  
2.4.2 Impact on agricultural service provision 
At the time of data collection, donors and the government had different percep-
tions of those agricultural services needing most urgent improvement. The gov-
ernment’s Agrarian Policy Concept emphasized pasture administration, advisory 
services, information services and veterinary services:  
“The ‘Agrarian Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic to 2010,’ prepared in 2004 by 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MAWRPI), highlights the importance of introducing a 
more sustainable system of pasture management, of strengthening agricultural advisory 
and information services, and of improving veterinary service provision as priority 
tasks” (MAWRPI et al. 2007: 6). 
According to the Country Development Strategy 
“… [i]n the agricultural sector the main goals are increases in agricultural productivity, 
income growth and environmental soundness, placing high priority on (i) developing 
agricultural support services and (ii) improving the normative-legislative base govern-
ing agriculture” (MAWRPI et al. 2007: 6). 
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Figure 2-6: Desintegration of state and collective farms in Kyrgyz Republic 
(1991-1997) 
Source: Based on data from National Statistics Committee, adapted from Crewett 2003: 7 
The reform of the irrigation management structures and the reconstruction of the 
irrigation infrastructure is part of an “Irrigation Rehabilitation Project” (1998-
2005) and a “Water Management Improvement Project” (2006-2010).1 Both 
focus on participatory, water-basin-based management of water resources. Wa-
ter user associations were established during the mid-1990s, initially by the 
government and since 1998 with considerable support of the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank (Sehring 2007: 285). 430 Water User Associations 
(UNEP 2006: 11) were formed and the government planned to establish about 
500 by 2010 (Herrfahrdt et al. 2006, 57).  
The outcomes of the irrigation system reforms are difficult to assess. In a lit-
erature review (Crewett 2015a), I have identified the available studies and re-
viewed their scope. The scientific studies available at the time data collection 
started (Herrfahrdt et al. 2006 and Sehring 2007) cover five Water User Asso-
ciations. Reports commissioned by donor organization involved in irrigation 
management reforms (UI Hassan et al. 2004, Yakubov 2006) cover additional 
three cases of Water User Associations (Crewett 2015a). The Water User Asso-
ciations do not ensure equitable water distribution, particularly to those at the 
1 Relevant decrees were the “Regulation on WUAs in Rural Areas” in 1995 and the “Statute 
of WUAs in Rural Areas” in August 1997. Strong donor influence contributed to the 
development of these provisions (Herrfahrdt 2006, 50). In 2002, the “Law on Unions 
(associations) of Water Users” refined the role, legal status and organizational framework 
for WUAs as being “voluntary, non-commercial organizations operating in public interest” 
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tail end of irrigation systems. The Water User Association executives find it 
hard to collect sufficient funds to improve infrastructure (Herrfahrdt et al. 2006, 
Johnson III et al. March 2002, UI Hassan et al. 2004, Yakubov 2006). It is also 
described that Water User Associations, although planned as participatory or-
ganizations, lack support among water users, and that many of the Water User 
Association members – by law: all water users – do not know about their mem-
bership in these associations (Sehring 2007). 
The other agricultural service sector for which scientific literature emerged – 
however, only after field work for this study started, is the pasture sector. Dörre 
(2012) explores in great depth the first of the two waves of pasture administra-
tion reforms and particular legislative changes. Dörre and Borchardt (2012); 
Schoch et al. (2010), and Steimann (2011) report on outcomes of the first reform 
approach, which allocated pasture management authority to different administra-
tive levels and established a quasi-rental market, where interested livestock 
owners received the right to rent pasture plots for very low yearly fees set by the 
public authorities. As the lease was not determined by the market but by the 
administration only a quasi-rental market developed. Donors and the govern-
ment found this reform rather unsuccessful. Pasture rental practices largely de-
viated from legal provisions so that, as reported by the MAWRPI “most pasture 
rights allocations are made on a first-come first-served basis without considera-
tion of the needs of other pasture users” (MAWRPI et al. 2007: 6). Unclear 
regulations leave the administration without oversight of pasture use arrange-
ments. Large-scale pasture degradation is seen as a result of lacking enforcement 
of maximum stocking rates:  
“Yet pasture conditions have deteriorated significantly during the recent past, with vil-
lage and close-in (winter) pastures being severely overused and degraded, while the 
more remote summer pastures are underutilized. As a result, pasture productivity has 
declined, particularly that of winter pastures … pasture use has become environmentally 
and socially unsustainable …” (MAWRPI et al. 2007: 5). 
However, in all Central Asian countries pasture quality is not assessed based on 
current scientific methodology; scientists have therefore called for careful 
interpretation of the available data on pasture degradation and have urgently 
recommended exploring reasons for pasture degradation (Kerven et al. 2012). 
The widely held belief is that overgrazing of pastures close to villages, 
undergrazing of distant summer pastures and lack of pasture improvement 
measures result from failures of the quasi-rental approach (World Bank 2007a). 
However, pasture administration and allocation are not seen as the only prob-
lems in agriculture but a severe lack of farmer education, forage supply and 
agricultural extension services also contributes to a poor performance of the 
sector: 
“The close-in pastures no longer provide adequate livestock nutrition, and supplemental 
winter feed is insufficient in both quantity and quality. Combined with widespread and 
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largely untreated livestock parasites and diseases and the general lack of farmer 
knowledge of good husbandry techniques, this has led to poor animal performance and 
livestock production” (Ministry of Agriculture Water Resources and Processing Indus-
try (MAWRPI) et al. 2007: 5). 
Since 2009, a second reform approach, on which there existed no scientific 
literature at the beginning of the research process2, was introduced. Like in the 
irrigation sector, resource users received the right to manage the municipality 
pastures by forming local committees. For the remaining agricultural services – 
input supply and machinery services, market information and marketing 
services, extension services, veterinary services and rural financial services – no 
scientific literature is available.  
However, one document from the gray literature on donor-driven programs 
offering relevant information is the Livestock Sector Review (World Bank 
2007a). This report takes an intermediary position between donor report and 
scientific report and is clearly based on interview data. However, besides the 
number of respondents, nothing is said about respondent selection, data 
documentation and data analysis. It is nevertheless a rich source, mainly for the 
veterinary service sector.  
Most veterinary services that served Soviet farms still operate. The State 
Veterinary Department has survived in its Soviet structure. There are public 
veterinarians at regional and district level, as well as local veterinarians paid by 
the municipality. Private veterinarians have started their own operations. Both 
private and public veterinarians are subordinated to the State Veterinary 
Department (World Bank 2007a).  
Financial support to the veterinary sector has been drastically withdrawn, 
while donor involvement in the veterinary sector is very small. Central state 
laboratories exist in most regions and in several districts; however, most of these 
laboratories are unable to fulfil their obligations due to lack of staff, broken 
equipment, lack of materials and insecure access to electricity.  
Milk testing, meat inspection, pre-mortem and post-mortem inspection of 
livestock products have become inadequate or happen only on paper. Veterinary 
permits – a precondition for selling livestock – are issued by public veterinarians 
who, as vaccination is offered by a growing number of private veterinarians, are 
often unable to evaluate the health of the animals for which they issue the 
permits (World Bank 2007a). 
The World Bank’s Livestock Sector Review sees major room for improving 
the functional distribution in the veterinary sector, as the veterinary law has been 
criticized for assigning responsibilities to state veterinary services which 
2 The first peer-reviewed scientific publication on the topic was published in January 2015 in 
Environmental Science and Policy (Crewett 2015a). This article has, in a slightly modified 
version, been included in this book as Chapter 6. 
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“considerably exceed the typical and recommended functions of a public 
veterinary service and also the capacity of the SVD [State Veterinary 
Department]” (World Bank 2007a: 46). A new veterinary law was issued in 
2005. The law does not clearly define: (i) appropriate responsibilities of the state 
veterinary service and other providers; (ii) safety management standards for 
laboratory and food based on HACCP systems; and (iii) private veterinary 
practices (World Bank 2007a: 47).  
“A central problem faced by the Kyrgyz veterinary services is the absence of policies 
and legislation that define the appropriate role of the state veterinary service in a market 
economy and comply with the requirements of the WTO, OIE and other international 
organization. The veterinary law of April 2005 is largely based on those of Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan and not very well geared towards the future” (World Bank 
2007a:46). 
Besides withdrawing direct services, the government also drastically reduced the 
number of vaccines provided to the veterinarian services from 45 to 5. In 
addition, service providers have no access to secure vaccines, marketing chains 
and sufficient veterinary diagnostic tools. Veterinary personnel are poorly 
qualified. Control and reporting mechanisms seem to be dysfunctional and 
oversight of animal diseases and infectious risks lacks. 
The veterinary system of the Kyrgyz Republic does not meet international 
veterinary and sanitary minimum standards. The incidence of animal diseases 
increased as a result of deficiencies in the current animal health system, 
including inadequate law enforcement (only 50 to 60 percent of the animals that 
should be vaccinated receive the required vaccines) (MAWRPI et al. 2007, 
World Bank 2007a).  
The increase in home-made animal foods with inadequate sanitary control 
over production also poses a significant health risk for the population. 
According to Ministry of Health data, the situation, especially in the case of 
brucellosis, is extremely critical and needs swift and determined action 
(MAWRPI et al. 2007). 
Rural financial services are inadequately developed. Although rural credit is 
available through private banks, there is a shortage of rural credit and a lack of 
longer-term credit. The ability to borrow is directly linked to the ability to 
provide physical collateral (buildings), and banks apply high collateral 
discounting rates. Domestic banks are unable or unwilling to accept other forms 
of collateral or to finance business transactions (World Bank 2007a: 31-32). 
There is no specific literature on available agricultural extension services. The 
World Bank reports about the Rural Advisory Service and the establishment of 
Agricultural Training Centres, which suffer a staff shortage. The state has fully 
withdrawn from agricultural extension services.  
Since 1999, a semi-autonomous, donor-financed, participatory Rural 
Advisory Service (RAS) has been runnning small offices in all seven regions. 
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The RAS merged different donor programs for agricultural training and advice. 
The implementing organization is the Swiss Helvetas Intercooperation. The 
RAS is co-financed by the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), the World Bank and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC). Besides the RAS, some smaller donor organizations 
provide agricultural training. However, long-term financing of the RAS is 
insecure. The donors’ long-term perspective is to fully withdraw and leave 
agricultural advisory services to private providers. 
2.5 Summary of findings 
Since independence, the Kyrgyz government has – supported by donors – creat-
ed an extensive but incomprehensive legal basis for decentralization. The legis-
lation has transferred the responsibility for many rural services to municipality-
level actors – the municipality administration, community-based groups or pri-
vate service providers.  
However, only very few agricultural services are clearly distributed: land 
administration is allocated to the municipality; irrigation and pasture 
management are allocated to municipality administrations, who are entitled to 
transfer them to community-based groups; agricultural extension and veterinary 
services, the provision of inputs and market information are allocated both to 
private providers and to unspecified public service providers.  
The law has not only allocated functions, but has transferred power from cen-
tral government to the municipality level. New property rights in the sense of 
ownership rights to natural resources and municipality-level revenues, as well as 
the right to decide about the distribution of benefits from these new property 
rights have changed the formal power of municipal administrations. In addition, 
citizens have received rights to participate in important political decisions by 
electing a municipality council (aiyl kenesh) which has the right to control the 
municipality administration and its elected head, the mayor. Also, community-
based organizations have the right to operate financially independent from the 
municipality administration.  
However, many of these entitlements cannot be used in practice – particularly 
by municipality administrations. Laws do not clearly allocate competencies and 
rights and are usually not enforced by the central authorities. Staff members are 
not trained, finances are not transferred and support is denied. Own budget reve-
nues and income from municipality property are insufficient for independent 
decisions. The same holds for community-based organizations. The Water User 
Associations received some decision making powers, but lack expertise and 
financial means to provide even basic services. In many cases, community-based 
organizations exist only on paper.  
Changes in accountability relationships have remained formal only. First,by 
law, municipality-level councils are to hold municipality-level executive bodies 
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formally accountable. However, as municipality councils lack information on 
their role, they seem to have very little impact on municipality administrations. 
Second, municipality administrations are formally independent from the central 
state. However, the very limited empirical evidence suggests that in practice, the 
municipality administrations are fully dependent on financial transfers from the 
central government and obey orders from different bodies of the LSA, as they 
face unclear rules, which restricts their autonomy.  
Scientific literature on agricultural services is scarce. The available infor-
mation is shallow, not comprehensive and often prepared by donors in coopera-
tion with government agencies. It suggests that most efforts went into improving 
agricultural services concerned with natural resources, such as irrigation and 
pasture management. Larger donor-supported programs have been set up here. 
All other services have not been comprehensively reviewed and their municipal-
ity-level provision is fully unexplored.  
2.6 Conclusions and knowledge gaps 
There is a lack of independent, specific studies on agricultural services. For most 
agricultural services there is no information. Only irrigation has received 
scientific attention. For specific services, such as marketing or input provision, 
there is no information at all. Besides, there is no information on service users’ 
satisfaction, interests and needs. The general literature finds that only some of 
the services allocated to municipalities are actually provided. Does this also hold 
for the agricultural sector? Which services are provided and why? How are these 
services provided? Do they satisfy user needs? 
Even though the literature suggests a link between a “post-socialist mindset” and 
decentralization outcomes, the available information on agricultural service 
provision is not contextualized and does not explore links between local socio-
economic conditions, decentralized local governance and agricultural service 
provision. There is little qualitative information on upward and downward ac-
countability of service providers and on reasons for failure of service provision. 
Hence, decentralized governance and agricultural service provision should be 
analyzed in context. 
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Table 2-7: Agricultural services allocated to government 
Service Provision-related statement in Agrarian Policy Concept 
Veterinary services Participation in controlling spread of animal diseases, 
veterinary diagnostics, inspection of product quality, 
regulation of private veterinary clinics and licensing of 
veterinarians, research, education and training of 
personnel. Also mentioned that veterinarians should get 
access to credit and donor support, but how this is 
achieved is not outlined. 
Financing: Veterinarians should receive “annual state 
allocations” of equipment. 
Phytosanitary 
control 
State inspectorate to supply rural producers with agro-
chemicals, organize agrochemical services, forecast pests 
and weeds. 
State control over use of pesticides through registration, 
certification of agrochemicals. 
Licensing of agrochemical activities. 
Certification of agrochemical products. 
Government invests in laboratory equipment for State 
Inspectorate for Chemicalization and Plant Protection. 
Seed provision Production of agricultural seeds and marketing to be 
gradually transferred to the private sector. In the future it 
is planned to keep 10 to 20% of state-owned seed farms, 
mainly to organize seed selection, production of seeds in 
nurseries, elite and super-elite seed reproduction, while 
giving preference to privately-owned seed farms for other 
activities. It is necessary to ensure proper marketing of 
agricultural seeds and to assign particular seed farms to 
agricultural farms.  
Transfer of regional variety centers into variety testing 
stations. 
Maintaining primary multiplication of seeds and planting 
stock of prospective crops. 
Seed inspectorates should keep improving seed potatoes 
and certify seed and planting materials. 
The government should improve the certification system 
and increase responsibility of laboratories for 
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identification of seed quality. The private sector will 
receive technical assistance to resume growing perennial 
seeds and exporting them to Central Asia and Russia. 
Financing to be provided to strengthen material and 
technical basis of the stations, and seminars and trainings 
conducted to study new varieties, variety agrotechnique 





Conduction of Extension and Farmers’ Days, training for 
farmers; organization of exhibitions and demonstration 
sites to spread innovation and advanced knowledge; 
organization of conferences and workshops are priority 
tasks of the government, donors and non-governmental 
organizations. 
Education and  
training 
Subsidized establishment of demonstration pastures in 
each district until 2010.  
To ensure timely and reliable provision of information, it 
is planned to set up a computerized network in the 
Republic offering the latest data on market situation and 
prices. 
Providing peasant and private farms with timely data on 
demand for products, and prices both in external and 
domestic markets. 
Source: Agrarian Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic until 2010 
Table 2-8: Agricultural services allocated to private sector 
Service  Provision-related statement in Agrarian Policy Concept 
Veterinary services  Prevention and treatment 
Machinery Machinery leasing (international leasing companies and 
firms mainly from the CIS countries) and domestic con-
struction of machinery and agricultural equipment. 
Seed Establish specialized seed firms, cooperatives and associa-
tions based on existing corn calibration plants, lucerne 
seed dressing stations, enterprises for modifying seeds of 
vegetables, melons, tobacco, sugar beet, and tree nurseries. 
Credit Improvement of credit availability through rural banks, 
and reorganization of credit unions into banks. 
Sheep breeding Two established private farms breeding Australian merino 
sheep – in Talas Region (Oblast) “Altyn Zhun” and in 
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Chui Region (Oblast) “Erlan A” – will be reorganized into 
breeding plants. 
To promote breeding, it is anticipated to reorganize state 
breeding plants into private breeding farms and state 
breeding enterprises into private artificial insemination 
companies and breeding stations. Development of state 
and private pedigree cattle and development of private 
selection and pedigree activities through associations and 
cooperatives of private cattle breeders and farmers. 
Program on milk and meat cattle breeding to be established 
soon. Central-Asian Breeding Service set up within the 
Kyrgyz-Swiss Agricultural Program. 
Source: own representation based on Agrarian Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic until 
2010 
Table 2-9: Agricultural services allocated to the cooperative sector 
Service  Provision-related statement in Agrarian Policy Concept 
Marketing Cooperatives should mainly cover support services, 
processing and marketing. Joint activities in seed 
production, genetic resources, cash crops and animal 
husbandry.  
Breeding With increasing sheep population and improved breeding 
quality, higher production and export of mutton is planned.  
Finance Kyrgyz Agricultural Finance Corporation and many other 
credit unions to be established under the “Rural Financial 
Institutions” project. In the future, these and other credit 
institutions should be reorganized into banks, as the main 
instrument of the agro-industrial complex. 
Source: own representation based on Agrarian Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic until 
2010  
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Table 2-10: Agricultural services allocated to donors 
Service Provision-related statement in Agrarian Policy Concept 
Agricultural support 
services 
“Significant role in the development of agricultural sup-
port services” (GKR 2004: 18).  
Seed improvement To be supported by not further specified donors 
Source: own representation based on Agrarian Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic until 
2010 
3 Decentralization of agricultural service provision 
3.1 Kyrgyzstan – a case study for the decentralization of publicly provided 
agricultural services 
The literature about decentralization in Kyrgyzstan is skeptical about the impact 
of decentralization on service provision (see findings in previous Chapter 2). 
The authors suggest that service provision was not positively affected by decen-
tralization. Their key criticism is a lack of effective accountability relationships, 
allowing neither citizens, nor Local Self-governments to hold accountable the 
central government, but also donors. The reviewed literature, however, did not 
explore agricultural service provision specifically. The few studies of rural de-
centralization do not take into account the full context in which services are 
provided. Hence, important knowledge gaps were identified. The previous chap-
ter has found the need to contextually analyze relationships between decentral-
ized local governance and agricultural service provision. The purpose of this 
chapter is therefore to explore the links between decentralization and agricultur-
al service provision. 
The overall research question is: how has decentralization impacted the avail-
ability and quality of agricultural services? Specific research questions are:  
• How has decentralization impacted accountability relationships, power and
the allocation of agricultural service tasks at municipality level? 
• Which agricultural services are available at municipality level and how and
by whom are these services provided? 
• What is the specific role of municipality administrations in the provision of
agricultural services? 
• How is the current status of agricultural service provision evaluated by ser-
vice users? 
To enable contextual analysis, this chapter provides an in-depth contextual case 
study of agricultural service provision in four rural municipalities in Kyrgyzstan. 
The next section outlines the case study approach, data collection and data anal-
ysis strategy used and  provides a detailed review of the case study municipali-
ties, their socio-economic conditions and local governance structures (Section 
3.2). In Section 3.3, I continue with a description of the specific outcomes of 
decentralization, based on Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) framework for the study 
of decentralization (see introduction of that framework in the previous Chapter 
2.2). I therefore explore municipality-level access to power resources (Section 
3.4). This is followed by information on the accountability relationship between 
local decision makers (Section 3.5). Section 3.6 summarizes the status of agri-
cultural service provision at the case study sites based on interviews with indi-
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viduals and groups of agricultural service users and service providers. Section 
3.7 analyses information on service user satisfaction collected at all study sites. 
The discussion and conclusions in Section 3.8 reviews the scope of action avail-
able to and used by Local Self-governments providing agricultural services, 
embeds the findings into the broader debate on decentralized service provision 
and highlights further avenues of research. 
3.2 The case studies 
3.2.1 Case study selection 
Field data was collected in four rural municipalities. Case study selection was 
based on a maximum variation purposeful sampling strategy (Patton 2001), 
aiming at maximum variation in agricultural production patterns, livelihood 
conditions and socio-political conditions. Due to a lack of reliable agricultural 
statistics and experience in the country at the time of case study selection, the 
selection was based on two key criteria. First, geographical location and, second, 
a cultural-political criterion. It was assumed that the country’s geomorphological 
conditions – with a lowest point at 132 masl and the highest point 7,439 masl – 
strongly impact agro-ecological conditions and agricultural production systems 
within the country. Choosing case studies located at different altitudes was 
therefore assumed to lead to a broad variation in agricultural patterns. Second, 
municipalities were chosen according to their location in two distinct cultural-
geographic regions of the country: the North, which refers to the regions Issyk-
Kul, Naryn, Chuy and Talas; and the South, which refers to the administrative 
regions of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken (see Map 3-1) for the location of the 
regions). While it is claimed that the North is impacted more strongly by Rus-
sian tradition, there is a widely held belief that in the South Central Asian tradi-
tions and Muslim religion have more influence. Both regions also support dif-
ferent political parties (Ryabkov 2008). There is also a belief that Northerners 
and Southerners differ in their agricultural expertise: 
“Several interviewees stated that in the South of Kyrgyzstan agricultural expertise is far 
better founded than in the North. The reason for this are land scarcity and the resulting 
need to cultivate in more intensive ways as well as a longer tradition of agriculture in 
the South. Also, the farmers in the South seem to be more interested in training pro-
grams …” (Herrfahrdt et al. 2006, 86). 
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Map 3-1: Administrative regions (oblasts) of Kyrgyzstan 
1= City of Bishkek, 2= Batken, 3= Chuy, 4= Jalal-Abad, 5= Naryn, 6= Osh, 7= 
Talas, 8= Issyk-Kul 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyrgyzstan 
Data for this study were collected from May to July 2008 in four case study 
municipalities. I held individual interviews with purposefully selected experts at 
national, regional and municipality level. In addition, I conducted two group 
interviews in each municipality. As I am bound to a confidentiality agreement 
with all municipality-level respondents, the names of the municipalities have 
partly been changed. I also decided to keep respondents anonymous. 
Table 3-1 links the case study selection criteria and the case study municipali-
ties. Municipality A, which I call Ala Too, is a community located in an elevat-
ed flatland area approximately 50 km South of lake Yssyk Kul in Tong district; 
Municipality B, which I call Bulak, is a very remote and extremely high-altitude 
community in the At Bashy river basin in At Bashy district; Municipality C, 
which is called Kyzyl Suu, is located in a mountainous area bordering Kara-
Daryja river in Uzgen district and Municipality D, which I call Bolshevik, is 
located in the lowlands near the Uzbek border in Osh district. As can be seen in 
Table 3-1, highland and lowland municipalities, in which different agro-
ecological conditions could be expected, were chosen from each of the two cul-
tural-political regions. In each municipality consisting of several villages, the 
municipality center was chosen for data collection.  
The municipalities had between 951 and 3,574 inhabitants (2008). As an effect of land 
distribution during de-collectivization, all families in all municipalities owned land and 
almost all except the poorest of the poor owned some heads of sheep.  
Table 3-1: Case study selection criteria 
Highland location Lowland location 
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The North Municipality B 
Municipality Bulak 
Municipality A 
Municipality Ala Too 
The South Municipality C 
Municipality Kyzyl Suu 
Municipality D 
Municipality Bolshevik 
Source: own representation  
3.2.2 Socio-economic conditions 
The dominating livelihood strategy in the highly mountainous villages is animal 
breeding for meat production. The transhumance period is from April to Sep-
tember. Animals are sent to the pasture with herdsmen, or the entire family (less 
common) migrates to the summer pasture. This is accompanied by regular or 
occasional selling of milk from cows, which are kept with young calves in the 
village. Potatoes are mainly grown for home consumption. For the majority of 
residents, producing other crops plays only a minor role. In the southern Munic-
ipalities Kyzyl Suu and Bolshevik, market-oriented crop production dominates. 
This is complemented by livestock production. Like in the highlands, livestock 
is kept on pastures far from the municipality and supervised by herdsmen.  
Other activities, varying between marketing purposes and subsistence produc-
tion, complement agricultural work: wage labour (mainly construction work or 
day labour on farms) or retail (small grocery and liquor shops or handicrafts 
shops). Running a business is rare and is only an option to the very wealthy.  
Particularly the poor work on farms of better-off farmers, in the construction 
business or as herdsmen. For them, government social transfer payments, which 
are very small, are a major source of cash income. Migration to Russia and Ka-
zakhstan, often for a time period of one or two years, is common among young 
residents in all municipalities visited.  
According to municipality statistics, the share of very poor households regis-
tered was between 14% and 36%. An assessment of the social-economic situa-
tion at the study sites was difficult, as official statistics are highly unreliable, and 
the existing instrument for identifying beneficiaries of social assistance, the so-
called social passport, was fully dysfunctional. Field work showed that the so-
cial passports were based on different calculation methods in each of the study 
municipalities. While there was a tendency to consider those with a monthly 
income under KZS 500-600 poor and entitled to government support, the in-
come levels according to which families were classed in different poverty cate-
gories – less poor, poor and very poor – differed between study villages. 
According to municipality administrators, poverty was decreasing at all study 
sites. Municipality administrators saw the following reasons for reduced pov-
erty: (i) improved engagement of the poor in the labour market; (ii) growing 
experience in farming and marketing of products; (iii) remittances, which more 
and more families received from relatives working in Russia and Kazakhstan. 
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Table 3-2: Case study municipalities 
Ala Too Bulak Kyzyl Suu Bolshevik 
Altitude of municipality 
(masl) 
1,900 2,400 1,100 850 
Socio-geographic location North North South South 








Distance to district centre 
(km) 
35 45 30 8 
Population 951 3,504 3,308 3,874 
Households 246 740 584 671 
Households classified as 
very poor (% of all house-
holds)1 
13.8 36.1 17.6 30.3 
Ethnic composition  
(% of total population) 
Kyrgyz 100 100 100 87 
Uzbek 0 0 0 10 
Other 0 0 0 3 
Source: Information obtained during interviews, data based on municipality statistics 2009, 
climate data based on Schuler et al. (2004). Order to maintain anonymity of the municipalities 
the altitudes of the municipalities have been slightly rounded 
3.2.3 Agricultural production patterns 
Agro-ecological conditions (climate, local topography and the status of the irri-
gation infrastructure) impacted land use at all study sites. Of the country’s 10.6 
million ha of agricultural land, only 6.7 % is arable land used for temporary 
crops; meadows and pastures cover 48.3% of the total agricultural area (FAO 
2015). Most arable land is in the northern Chui valley bordering Kazakhstan. 
The smaller share is located in the southwest, the Kyrgyz part of the Fergana 
Valley, near the Uzbek border. 
These conditions also impacted agricultural production patterns at the study 
sites. Dry summer continental climate – in other words cold steppe climate – 
1 Defined by municipality administration as households with an income of less than 200 
KZS/month. 
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impacts three of the four study sites, with annual precipitation between 382 
mm/m² in Municipality Bolshevik and only 209 mm/m² in Municipality Ala 
Too. In the two highland Municipalities Ala Too and Bulak, located above 1,900 
masl, transhumant livestock production dominated, while farmers in the two 
lower municipalities were also substantially engaged in crop production.  
In Municipalities Ala Too and Bulak, livestock production was based on natu-
ral pasture use. Farming families grew only a small selection of staple foods for 
home consumption: barley, potatoes and forage crops are the main crops, 
whereas in the lowlands, crops are more diversified and also include vegetables.  
In the highlands, all interviewed farmers considered grain production relative-
ly risky due to insecure weather conditions (hail) and an unreliable duration of 
the vegetation period; therefore, only better-off households engaged in costly 
crop production. At all mountainous study sites, the lack of reliable irrigation 
during the summer period was a key constraint for crop production.  
In the lowlands, crop production was much more important. A longer vegeta-
tion period and better rainfall data in Municipality Kyzyl Suu, and comparative-
ly functional irrigation system in Municipality Bolshevik, allowed for diversi-
fied crop production.  
Agricultural production data were compiled from locally available munici-
pality statistics. There is considerable concern about the accuracy of any local-
level data – land use data, for example, are skewed by overlapping classification 
systems. The available data, nevertheless, give some basic impression of land 
use. Figure 3-1 shows land use patterns for crop production in percent.  
According to local statistics for 2008, in Municipality Ala Too more land was 
used for perennial grass than for crops; the two major ones being barley and 
wheat. The larger part of the crop land of Municipality Ala Too was not irrigat-
ed, which made grain production impossible. In addition, the weather conditions 
are considered too unreliable for crop production, machinery lacks and many 
farmers considered agricultural inputs very expensive. In Municipality Bulak, 
barley – also for forage purposes – dominated. While the agro-ecological condi-
tions were broadly similar, the comparatively better status of the irrigation sys-
tem allowed for grain production.  
Municipality Kyzyl Suu had an intermediary position. Also due to a break-
down of the largest part of the irrigation system, most land was used for sun-
flowers, which were grown on non-irrigated land. Maize and wheat are the other 
important crops. There were small pockets of rice production next to the adja-
cent river.  
Municipality Bolshevik depended on irrigated agriculture. The municipality’s 
irrigation system needed reconstruction in some areas, but irrigation water was 
nevertheless much more available than at any other studied site. Consequently, a 
wide variety of crops is grown. Interview partners were mainly engaged in 
maize, wheat and cotton production.  
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Figure 3-1: Agricultural land use in percent (2008) 
Source: Case study municipality administrations 
Livestock data were compiled from the National Statistics Committee’s statis-
tics. Livestock numbers are also highly unrealistic, as farmers reportedly aim to 
hide as many animals as possible from tax inspections. In the highland Munici-
palities Ala Too, Bulak, and Kyzyl Suu respondents considered livestock their 
main agricultural income source. In Municipality Bolshevik, however, respond-
ents estimated that animal products made up only about one third of the house-
hold income. Hence, animal stocks were larger in the highland municipalities. 
Sheep were the main livestock and dominated the municipality herd (Figure 
3-2). Individual households possess sheep herds that are two times larger than 
those owned by lowland municipalities and households in the southern munici-
palities (Figure 3-3). 
3.2.4 Constraints on agricultural production 
Asked for key development obstacles in the municipalities, the municipalities‘ 
majors mainly mentioned, besides problems in drinking water supply, almost 
exclusively constraints on agricultural production. Most of these problems were 
caused by the absence of important services to the agricultural sector:  
• the ongoing or entire deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure, which most
of the municipalities had inherited from the Soviet period was considered a 
key problem by all interviewed mayors;  
• veterinary health problems, including a high prevalence of zoonotic diseases,
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Municipality Kyzyl Too, where no bull was available during summer, were 
mentioned by three of them; 
• insufficient access to agricultural machinery was considered a key constraint
in two of the municipalities. In both municipalities crop producers depended 
on using machinery owned by farmers in a neighboring village which usually 
let to delay in all agricultural activities from soil preparation to harvest;  
• and one mayor mentioned, in addition, problems with pests and crop diseases
as for which farmers lacked access to expert knowledge in crop protection 
and adequate access to crop disease and weed control. 
The key development obstacles listed above reflect the problem perception of 
the municipalities’ mayors, complementary information on agricultural service 
provision, based on group discussions held with service users in each study site 
are documented and analyzed in Sections 3.6 and 3.7. 
Figure 3-2: Heads of animals (2007) 
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Figure 3-3: Heads of animals per household (2007) 
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Figure 3-4:  Size of Land Redistribution Fund and size of village-adjacent 
pasture area (ha) (2007) 
Source: Municipality statistics; no official data on size of village-adjacent pasture for Munici-
pality Kyzyl Suu available. Note the size of pasture given by municipality administrations is 
highly unreliable because municipality administrations had no access to full information on 
the size of pasture used by their citizens. This was because large parts of the pasture used by 



















Ala Too Bulak Kyzyl Suu Bolshevik




Decentralization of agricultural service provision 79 
Table 3-3: Municipality mayor’s perceptions of key obstacles to 
development 
Ala Too • Lack of agricultural machinery
• Irrigation infrastructure destroyed
• Population suffers from health problems
• Animal diseases prevalent
Bulak • Irrigation infrastructure destroyed
• Drinking water project failed, too few drinking water
pumps
• Veterinary service insufficient, veterinary disease
control inadequate
• Lack of agricultural machinery
Kyzyl Suu • No improved drinking water provision, river is main
source for drinking water
• Breakdown of entire  irrigation infrastructure
• Support in control of crop diseases and weed needed
• No bull or artificial insemination in the municipality
during summer
• Insufficient access to village-adjacent pasture for graz-
ing of dairy cows
Bolshevik • Progressive decay of irrigation infrastructure
• Maintenance and improvement of drinking water sys-
tem required
• Frequent drinking water cut-offs
• Road reconstruction required
• Lack of building land
Source: Interviews with municipalities’ mayors 
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3.3 Local governance 
3.3.1 The municipality government 
In the study municipalities, the local governance bodies – so-called Local Self-
governments – were structured in the following way: each consisted of an elect-
ed village council (Kyrg.: aiyl kenesh) and an executive body called village 
government (Kyrg.: aiyl okmot). All village governments consisted of a social 
department, an agricultural department, a statistical department, an officer re-
sponsible for registration of military personnel, and a department of finance and 
tax collection. Some of the municipalities also had veterinary departments and 
employed librarians. At the time of data collection, the head of the village gov-
ernment was also the chairperson of the municipality council (see Figure 3-5). 
Figure 3-5: Structure of municipality administration (Aiyl Okmotu) 
Source: INTRAC (2011), modified 
3.3.2 Local organizations and groups 
A surprisingly large number of other organizations and groups existed in all 
study municipalities. Participants in group interviews reported of 4 to 11 groups 
in the different municipalities. On average, there was one group or organization 
per 67 households, with a range from one group per 62 households in Munici-
pality Ala Too to one group per 74 households in Municipality Bolshevik(see 
Table 3-4).  
The respondents considered these groups to provide important complemen-
tary services (see Table 3-5). Some were formed to provide public services or 
implement programs, others were vehicles to access donor support. As all pro-
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vided services were in need, those types of groups were therefore considered 
important to some degree by the respondents.  
Table 3-4: Community-based organizations or groups per municipality 




4 11 9 9 
Number of house-




62 68 65 74 
Source: group interviews by author in case study sites 
Four types of groups were formed by different actors and provided some sort of 
private or public service or other governance support: First, groups formed by 
donors to provide basic public services. These groups existed in all municipali-
ties and had been initiated during large-scale development projects, which were 
mainly financed by international donors. They included drinking water user 
associations, irrigation water user associations and two types of infrastructure 
development support groups.1 Second, groups formed by Kyrgyz NGOs or 
smaller international NGOs in the frame of programs in specified regions or 
municipalities,2 which aimed at economic self-help or gave the NGOs access to 
community members and simplified their information dissemination activities. 
The third type of group are locally initiated community-based groups – among 
them: (i) a social support group aiming to assist the elderly and handicapped; (ii) 
a cooperative providing machinery services to its members; or (iii) a so-called 
neighbourhood group (whose activities, however, were not clear to the respond-
1 Those groups were formed under a large-scale project which was implemented in all 
municipalities of the country. The program founded so-called Territorial Investment 
Committees (TIC) in almost all municipalities and subordinate Village Investment 
Committees (VIC), which were responsible for social and economic infrastructure 
developemnt. In addition, citizens were motivated to form micro-project groups which 
aimed at supporting specific income-generating activities among their members. However, 
villagers are not aware of this terminology and call the groups – according to the name of 
the implementing organization – “ARIS-groups”. According to World Bank data, 1661 VICs 
were formed. 
2 Among these were, for example, forage production support or microcredit groups by a small 
New Zealand NGO in Municipality Bulak. 
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ents). The fourth type is traditional groups, such as elders’ councils or courts, 
which existed in three of the four municipalities. 
Respondents considered many of these groups important or very important for 
community development. Existing groups were evaluated differently based on 
their outreach. In all municipalities, groups who served only their direct mem-
bers or very small groups of people (like a machinery cooperative which seems 
to operate only one tractor, women’s microcredit groups or sewing groups) were 
not considered very important. Given the lack of functioning drinking water 
facilities, impassable streets and dysfunctional schools, drinking water user as-
sociations and infrastructure development project groups (linked to international 
organizations) were in all cases considered very important.3 Next most im-
portant, across all municipalities, were health and veterinary service organiza-
tions.4 There were very different opinions on the importance of traditional courts 
or councils. In Municipality Bulak, the traditional court was considered not im-
portant at all, in Municipality Kyzyl Suu it held an intermediary position, while 
in Municipality Bolshevik, the traditional court was considered very important.
3 There was, however, very little enthusiasm among the population to participate in these 
groups – particularly in the drinking water or infrastructure development groups. Follow-up 
interviews with group members showed, however, that there was a widespread problem with 
mobilization of group members for any of these groups. In most cases, the members – in 
particular those who had some responsible positions withing these groups – were frustrated 
due to a) little engagement of the remaining community, b) no compensation for their 
service to the community, and c) even hostility when they demanded some community 
contribution, either financially or in terms of work, as well as limited success of the projects. 
In all municipalities, there were reports of stolen construction material, wrong planning, 
massive problems in collection of community contributions, etc. 
4 The respondents also named service provider organizations run by professionally trained 
staff – such as health or veterinary service providers – as a group. Health services are 
usually not provided by “community-based” groups. However, in Kyrgyz terminology, the 
health provision points are called “family group practitioners” which might have motivated 
respondents to consider health service providers a group. The same happened for veterinary 
service providers, who usually had veterinary assistants. It seems that the respondents 
considered activities in which more than one individual was involved to be carried out by a 
group. 
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Table 3-5: Number and type of organizations and community-based groups in each of the study municipalities 
Respondents’ assessment 
of importance Ala Too Bulak Kyzyl Suu Bolshevik









Drinking water committee 




Drinking water committee 
Infrastructure development group 
Irrigation water 




Of some importance for 
municipality 
Training group 14 
















Credit group 1 
Credit group 2 
Assistance to the handicapped 
Number of groups 4 11 9 9 
1 This is a simplified name for a so-called Territorial Village Investment Committees (TIC) founded by a World Bank financed development 
program called Village Investment Project (VIP I) 
2 Function is conflict resolution. 
3 Function is to support what respondents called “cultural events”. 
4 Respondents were not able to specify the actual content of the trainings provided in any of Training groups 1 to 3. 
5 Respondents were not able to specify the activities of this group. 
6 Function is social support to the elderly and poor. 
7 Some respondents were of the opinion that this cooperative exists on paper only. 
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Table 3-6: Service providers not organized in any form of community-based group 
Ala Too Bulak Kyzyl Suu Bolshevik 
Health care point 




NGO provides training 





Legal advisory service 
Veterinary service 
provider 
NGO provides training 
courses (no specific 
group) 
Milk collection service 
Number of service 
providers 1 1 3 6 
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3.3.3 Non-governmental Organizations 
The section above already pointed to the importance of donors’ activities at 
municipality level. International and Kyrgyz NGOs were major partners of the 
village governments. They supported municipalities with training on business 
development and agriculture (see Table 3-6). Some large-scale projects were 
financed by consortia of donor organizations, including the World Bank, ADB, 
the UNDP, DFID and many others. Among the large programs, the most im-
portant was the Village Investments Project (VIP) which had – since its start in 
2006 – supported all study municipalities in developing social and economic 
infrastructure. The VIP had financed and facilitated the improvement of com-
munity water points (Municipalities Ala Too, Bulak, Kyzyl Suu, Bolshevik), 
health facilities (in Municipalities Bulak, Kyzyl Suu, Bolshevik), roads (in Mu-
nicipalities Bulak, Bolshevik), school renovation (in Municipalities Ala Too, 
Bulak) and renovation of community meeting halls (in Municipalities Bulak, 
Kyzyl Suu, Bolshevik).  
The NGOs played a key role for the establishment of most of the community-
based groups mentioned in the previous Section 3.3.3. One important example is 
the World Bank’s Village Investments Project (VIP), which is implemented in 
the entire country by the Kyrgyz Community and Development Agency (ARIS). 
The Village Investments Project requires the establishment of several communi-
ty-based groups in charge of project development, implementation and supervi-
sion. They are also responsible for mobilization of the communities’ financial 
contributions. The project concept requires municipalities to contribute 25% of 
the project costs in terms of labor and make a financial contribution of at least 
3.75% in cash. World Bank staff describes the local structures for VIP-
implementation as follows:  
“Villages elect village investment committees (VICs) that in turn elect their 
representatives to the local investment committee (LICs) covering the entire 
community. The LIC comprises at least one member from each VIC plus an equal 
number (minus one) of members from the formal institutions of local government (the 
mayor and a number of council members). […] The villages and then the communities 
agree on a local development vision, identify their priority problems, and propose 
micro-projects to address these. Each micro-project proposal is developed and 
advocated by a micro-project group, citizens volunteering to lead this activity. 
Participatory planning meetings are held, where micro-project proposals are discussed, 
prioritized and refined. […] Through a series of meetings, discussions and votes the 
communities then agree on a community development plan and an annual community 
investment plan which is formally approved by the community council. […] Micro-
projects are then implemented by the community under the leadership of the micro-
project groups” (World Bank 2005: 2). 
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Nationwide NGOs were complemented by several – sometimes small – interna-
tional NGOs (e.g., New Kyrgyzstan New Zealand Trust, which ran a small-scale 
goat-breeding and forage production project in Municipality Bulak) and local  – 
but nevertheless externally funded Kyrgyz NGOs (such as the Rural Advisory 
Service1, which provided advisory services in Municipality Bulak, or the organ-
ization “Legal Assistance to Rural Citizens”,2 which provided legal advice to 
farmers in Municipality Bolshevik). It is important to note that the high depend-
ency on donor support had strong implications for the Local Self-government’s 
role: in order to mobilize resources for the municipality, they acted, to different 
degrees, as negotiators between their municipalities and outside donors, hoping 
to bring services and infrastructure to the villages.  
1 “Rural Advisory Services (RAS) is a NGO, created by the World Bank, the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the Swiss Agency for Development 
Cooperation (SDC), as a part of the Kyrgyz-Swiss Agricultural Project (KSAP), which was 
funded by SDC and implemented by HELVETAS (Swiss Inter-cooperation Kyrgyzstan) 
from 1995 to 2010.” (Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services n.d) 
2 “The Legal Assistance to Rural Citizens (LARC) was established under a project funded by 
USAID and SDC. It provides legal services to rural populations, especially in the matters of 
land ownership in line with agricultural reforms. The project eventually led to the creation of 
the Kyrgyz LARC Public Association (PA).” (Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services n. 
d.) 
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Figure 3-6: Types of service provision organizations and groups in each study municipality based on group interviews 
Source: Group interviews in case study municipalities; the letter indicates the case study municipality (A: Municipality Ala Too; B: Municipality 






Donor-initiated public service provision groups 
(A; B; C; D) 
Infrastructure 
Drinking water 
Locally initiated self-help 
groups  
(B; C; D) 
Machinery 
Agricultural processing  
Agricultural marketing 
Donor-initiated self-help groups  
(A; B; C; D) 
Handicraft training 
Micro-credit 




Professional public service providers  
(A; B; C; D) 
Health service 
Veterinary service 
Donor client groups 
(B; C ?) 
Agricultural extension 
Trainings (not specified) 
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3.4 Power resources 
In this section, I explore power resources the different groups of actors at munic-
ipality level hold. The data used for the analysis were collected in the field. It 
was attempted to fill data gaps with information from the Kyrgyz Statistics 
Committee. 
3.4.1 Land rights allocated to municipality residents 
De-collectivization experience. Ownership rights for most of the agricultural 
land have been transferred from collective farms to private households. In all 
municipalities, the land reform program was finalized between 1995 and 1999. 
Farm dismantling and land distribution followed the same procedure in each of 
the municipalities. Prior to de-collectivization, the inhabitants of the entire mu-
nicipality worked on the local kolkhoz. All municipality residents born before a 
defined date received rights to a share of land. The amount of land each person 
received depended on the available total area of agricultural land, which was 
divided by the number of claimants. In this way, all residents received the same 
share of irrigated and non-irrigated land. If available, natural grassland was dis-
tributed to every person. The share of land distributed to each person in every 
family is shown in Table 3-7. The land holders hold full private property rights 
to land. Selling and buying land is allowed.  
Table 3-7: Land share distribution per person 
 Municipality 
 Ala Too Bulak Kyzyl Suu Bolshevik 
Year of distribution 1996 n/a 1995-1996 1999 
Irrigated land (ha) 0.43 0.9 0.5 0.11 
Non-irrigated (ha) n/a 0.2 0.9 0.04 
Natural grassland (ha) n/a n/a 0.1-0.18 n/a 
Source: Municipality statistics and interviews; n/a = no information available 
In the study villages, land distribution to families was actually organized by 
heads of clans. In one case, a lottery helped to allocate the land plots to the 
farmers. In Municipality Kyzyl Suu, land distribution went through three phases, 
during each phase land plots of different size were distributed. 
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Almost all interview partners recall the distribution process as fair and equal.1 
This is not surprising in Municipalities Ala Too and Bulak, where land is rather 
abundant, but a surprise in Municipalities Kyzyl Suu and Bolshevik, where 
farmers compete for farmland and where land scarcity has already led to severe 
regional conflicts.  
3.4.2 Municipality-level budgets 
Municipality administrations possess authority over municipality-level budgets. 
The municipal administrations are entitled to collect five types of tax for their 
own budgets. According to municipality administrators, the revenue from own 
resources comes from business tax, vehicle tax, land tax, property tax and rent 
from the Land Redistribution Fund. Land and property tax seem to provide the 
largest share to local budgets. In one municipality, fees for street cleaning were 
also collected.  
Besides own tax collection, financial transfers from the central government to 
local ones constitute the largest share of the municipality budget. All municipali-
ty administrations depended on grants from the central government. Local budg-
ets vary between about 4.4 million KZS in Municipality Bulak and 19.6 million 
KZS in Municipality Bolshevik (Table 3-8). Only about 10 to 20 percent of the 
municipality budgets was funded by locally collected taxes and fees (Figure 
3-7).  
Table 3-8: Municipality budget (in Kyrgyz Som) 
Ala Too Bulak Kyzyl Suu Bolshevik 
Total revenues 7,163,900 4,440,000 n/a 19,647,300 
Revenue from local taxes 491,900 409,500 n/a 4,789,800 
Source: Municipality statistics and interviews with municipality staff, no data for Municipali-
ty Kyzyl Suu available due to absence of financial officer during period of data collection 
3.4.3 Municipality property 
Municipality governments have received management rights to municipality-
level property. Table 3-9 lists the structures and buildings owned and also shows 
the respondents’ perception of their functionality. The data show that most mu-
nicipality-owned infrastructure requires moderate or major repairs. The worst 
conditions were reported in Municipality Bulak, where 80 percent of all munici-
1Only two of the respondents reported to have experienced unjust treatment during land 
distribution. This would mean that no significant rent-seeking occurred during the land 
distribution process. This finding is in stark contrast to the generally high levels of 
corruption observed in the country. 
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pal property required repair. The best situation was found in Municipality Bol-
shevik, where only 58 percent were damaged. Hence, in none of the municipali-
ties did leasing of municipality property generate any income. 
Figure 3-7: Source of municipality revenue (percent) (2008) 
Source: Municipality statistics; interviews with municipality staff, no data for Municipality 












Ala Too Bulak Bolshevik
Budget of LSG from
own resources
Budget of LSG (total)
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Table 3-9: Availability and status of municipal property 
Ala Too Bulak Kyzyl Suu Bolshevik 
Preschool … … … 1 
Primary school 2 3 2 2 
Secondary school 2 2 2 2 




1 … … … 
Paved roads … … 2 1 
Water pumps 1 2 3 2 
Irrigation channels 2 2 3 2 
Community hall 1 … 1 … 
      1 = operational, 2 = moderate repair required, 3 = major repair required, … =  not available 
Source: group interviews in case study sites held by author 
92  Chapter 3 
 
 
3.4.4 Land redistribution fund 
The municipalities own a share of agricultural land called land redistribu-
tion fund (“land fund”). As outlined above, they hold the right to lease this 
land to municipality residents. Hence, land lease, besides property tax, is a 
major local source of budget revenue. The size of the land fund determines, 
to a large degree, the potential municipality budget revenues. 
 
 
Figure 3-8: Size of Land Redistribution Fund (hectare) (2008) 
Source: Municipality statistics 
However, land lease income varies in the municipalities, depending on the 
size of the land fund and the agro-ecological conditions, which impact 
demand for rental land and rental fees (fixed by the central government). 
The case study found that unlike the south-western regions of the country, 














Ala Too Bulak Kyzyl Suu Bolshevik
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Respondents in the two northern municipalities claimed not to be very 
interested in crop production. The region is traditionally dominated by 
animal husbandry, so crop production is not a major activity. Besides tradi-
tional orientations – which determine the available knowledge – other rea-
sons for low interest in renting farmland are: inadequate and unreliable 
irrigation, adverse climatic conditions (short vegetation period, frequent 
hail storms), lack of transport infrastructure, expensive inputs, lack of ma-
chinery (late tillage, low harvests).50 In the lowland Municipality Bolshe-
vik, in contrast, group discussion participants estimated that 70 percent of 
citizens rented land from the municipality administration. Such different 
demand also caused big differences of rental fees: in Municipality Bolshe-
vik, the yearly rent, set by the government, was reported as at least 2500 
KZS/ha, compared to only 480 KZS/ha in the highland Municipality Bulak. 
3.4.5 Pasture 
Information on pasture areas was very difficult to acquire, as the inter-
viewed municipality administrators did not possess accurate maps of those 
pasture areas used by municipality members. In general, the municipal 
pasture was the area of the former local kolkhoz. Until the time of data 
collection, there had been no update and clear demarcation of the municipal 
pasture area. Also, only a share of pastures, the winter pastures located near 
the villages, were under jurisdiction of the municipality administration. 
Those pasture areas located further were officially managed by district and 
regional authorities. Local administrations did not possess accurate infor-
mation on these areas. However, the available, incomplete, municipality 
statistics suggest that the largest pasture areas were in the northern Munici-
palities Ala Too and Bulak, while Municipalities Kyzyl Suu and Bolshevik 
– where livestock production also played a smaller role – had smaller pas-
tures. 
3.5 Accountability 
3.5.1 Local government – local state administration 
Decentralization does not seem to have changed hierarchical relationships, 
as already discussed in the literature review in the previous chapter (Chap-
50 Little motivation for using land for crop production was confirmed by the only 
reliable source of land use information found in Municipality Bulak, where a land 
use plan had been developed with assistance of an international NGO. In 
Municipality Bulak, only 202 ha of the land fund’s 919 ha were leased. Of this, 88 
percent were grassland used for producing much-demanded forage. 
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ter 2). The respondents reemphasized the supervisory role of the state ad-
ministrative bodies. When asked about the relationship between the district 
administration and the municipality government, all municipality admin-
istrations described hierarchical relationships with the Local State Admin-
istration (LSA), in which they received orders from the LSA which they 
willingly executed. Municipality administrators seem not to have acquired 
much confidence in their autonomous role as local policy decision makers. 
When asked for their main tasks, the secretary of Municipality Ala Too, 
who represented the absent head of the administration, strongly emphasised 
that all activities of the municipality administration strictly followed in-
structions by state administrations and legal provisions. They described 
their own tasks very vaguely and claimed to execute all legally transferred 
tasks in “according to the law”: 
“You know, the relationship with the state administration is good. We cooperate. 
They [the district administration’s staff] provide us with the laws and we do eve-
rything according to the law. When there is a new law they inform us and we exe-
cute it” (Secretary of Municiaplity Ala Too). 
The details of this relationship were explained as follows: 
Interviewer:  “How do they [district authorities] inform you about new 
laws?”  
Respondent: “We go there regularly anyway – once a week – and they tell 
us what to do” (Secretary of Ala Too). 
 
It is unclear if the municipality administrations feared job loss or any other 
pressure from the LSA, as the interviewees avoided describing details of 
their relationship to higher administrations. 
The central government held the municipality administrations accounta-
ble by directly allocating what could be called donations. The municipality 
administration received technical equipment, such as agricultural machin-
ery or cars, directly from the central administration.  
For lack of transparent allocation mechanisms, municipality administra-
tors were forced to personally apply for such gifts to their community or 
their administrations. Municipal administrators therefore invested much 
time for travel – not just to the district administration, but also to state min-
istries, where they applied for support to the municipality. Municipality 
administrators hesitated to explain what exactly they discussed on those 
trips. The head of Municipality Kyzyl Suu, however, reported about his 
attempts to improve availability of agricultural machines: 
“We have heard that soon, there will be some tractors – I think from China – com-
ing. I was therefore already three times in Bishkek to discuss with people in the 
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ministry. I will try to get one of these tractors for our village. I hope that we will 
get some support” (Head of Municipality Kyzyl Suu).51 
 
This short report by the Head of Municipality Kyzyl Suu indicates that 
direct interaction and personal relationships to decision makers are im-
portant prerequisites for access to support. Further, it shows how the gov-
ernment remains a key distributor of technology and other items required 
for local economic development.  
3.5.2 Local government – donors 
While the village governments had received access to independent budgets, 
these budgets, as was shown in Section 3.4.2, did not allow them to create 
own development projects but required the village governments to seek 
external funding. Sources for funding were mainly international NGOs. 
Local governments worked closely with donors and fully depended on 
them for funds to provide basic agricultural services and other services.  
All municipalities participated in major, nationwide donor programs in 
cooperation with the Kyrgyz Government. In three of the four municipali-
ties, smaller donor organizations carried out different activities, depending 
on the municipality administrators’ engagement and success in terms of 
mobilizing external support. 
Access to additional support seemed to depend on the ability of the head 
of the municipality to attract external funding. The heads of Municipalities 
Bulak and Kyzyl Suu were particularly aware of this situation and were 
very engaged in establishing contact with external donors. In Municipality 
Kyzyl Suu, for example, an entire wall in the municipality administration 
office was covered with local and international donor contacts. The number 
of donor organizations which operated in these municipalities evidenced 
their engagement. 
Municipality administrations could not always hold donors accountable. 
In Municipality Bulak, a donor-initiated infrastructure project had not been 
adequately implemented. Of the planned 15 water pumps, only 3 worked, 
and large parts of the central village remained without drinking water – 
even though citizens had contributed the prescribed amount to the project 
costs. In this specific case, the municipality administration was of the opin-
ion that planning problems had led to the failure of a drinking water pump 
rehabilitation and construction project. The municipality administration 
                                                 
 
51 This strategy seems to have been succesful, as the author, during her next visit to the 
municipality witnessed the arrival of a new tractor in the villlage, which was highly 
welcomed by the population. 
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expressed great frustration that they did not possess any means to enforce 
the appropriate repairs and execution of the project. 
3.5.3 Local government – citizens 
At the time of data collection, municipality mayors had been elected and 
were confronted with high expectations from the electorate. All interview-
ees remembered the pre-independence period for its prosperity and great 
improvement of living conditions. They therefore expressed dissatisfaction 
with the current living conditions, which they considered to have drastical-
ly deteriorated. A respondent in Municipality Bolshevik – the only munici-
pality with paved streets – reported angrily while referring to the now pot-
holed road: 
“In Soviet times we had cars that came here and cleaned the streets. Now with 
those holes and lack of repair it looks like Iraq here!” (Host family member in 
Bolshevik) 
Citizens considered the municipality administrations responsible for 
providing all municipality services to which they had had access during the 
Soviet period and therefore blamed them for the decrease in service availa-
bility and derelict infrastructure, as well as for all sorts of increased costs. 
Hence, there was a widely held belief that the municipality administrations 
performed inadequately.  
Municipality administrations, indeed were observed to experience great 
difficulties holding citizens accountable and enforcing regulations and 
agreements. In Municipalities Ala Too and Bulak, for example, citizens 
dug irrigation channels that crossed agricultural land owned by others. In 
Municipality Ala Too, I observed a wealthy livestock owner family herd 
their own horses on the communal winter pasture during the summer sea-
son which was by neighbours considered to negatively affected the produc-
tivity of the precious winter pasture, endangering the availability of winter 
forage for the entire village. Also, in all municipalities the administration 
reported of problems with enforcing tax payments or various individual 
contributions by households to community-wide projects, e.g. for the na-
tionwide drinking water project or the Village Investments Project, or en-
forcing collective work for cleaning silted irrigation channels.  
The relationships between municipality administrations and citizens de-
pended on village history, family relationships and personal attitudes of the 
mayors and their staff. In Municipality Ala Too, there was a deep divide 
between the supporters of the previous head of the municipality (who had 
been forced to leave his office after allegations of selling kolkhoz machin-
ery for his individual benefit) and the supporters of his successor. In this 
municipality, many reported of specific support going to the current 
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mayor’s family, who also represented the municipality’s economic elite. 
Those who did not belong to the network of the current mayor felt disad-
vantaged: 
“They [the municipality administration] do nothing for us – it’s like a mafia. They 
only serve themselves!” (Municipality council member in Ala Too) 
In Municipality Bulak, the municipality administration struggled with the 
economic village elite: 
“He [the major] is a good man, but has no power against the rich” (Citizen inter-
view Municipality Bulak). 
Fieldwork suggests that the village councils lack oversight over the munic-
ipality administration. Municipality councils could not hold municipality 
administrations accountable. While there was some variation, the relation-
ship between citizens and the municipality councils was very bad in all 
study cases and according to all respondents without exception.  
The councils were considered powerless by all respondents who gave spe-
cific information on the council. The work of the councils – whose tasks 
were fully unclear to the interviewed respondents – was therefore evaluated 
very negatively. In none of the villages was the local council described as 
having effective influence over the activities of the administration. Most 
citizens had great difficulties recalling the names of the municipality coun-
cil members:  
Interviewer:  “What do you think of the work of the municipality council?” 
Respondent: “I have never heard of any of their activities” (Citizen inter-
view Municipality Ala Too). 
However, in most cases, the municipality administrations cooperated tight-
ly with those members of the community who got engaged. Hence, in al-
most all municipalities, good relations between community-based groups 
and the municipality administration were reported.  
3.6 Decentralized service provision 
3.6.1 The provision of agricultural services 
The following section documents the availability of agricultural services at 
each study site and the different roles providers had in service provision. It 
concludes with an assessment of citizen service satisfaction based on ser-
vice user perceptions. For many details, particularly for payment regula-
tions, specific information was difficult to access, because service users 
were not able to distinguish between specific service fees and taxes. Who 
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charges fees for what specifically was often completely unclear to the 
farmers. 
A comparative description of different services requires some generali-
zations. The findings are summarized in Table 3-10. It combines respond-
ent information on service provision locations and the payment regulations 
for each service. Service payment regulation was chosen as the descriptive 
variable, as this allows to display information on all parties involved in the 
provision of the respective service. If payment for services is private only – 
which is indicated in the table by “Pr”, then there is no further subsidy or 
support for that service. If payment for the service is indicated by “Pu, 
NGO”, then the service is paid jointly by the state and an NGO; for exam-
ple, the service might be provided by NGO staff or the NGO might support 
maintenance or construction of infrastructure necessary to provide the ser-
vice, e.g. an irrigation channel.  
The agricultural service provision analysis shows that (i) eight agricul-
tural services are available and accessible to farmers; (ii) not all services 
are available in all municipalities; (iii) services are provided by different 
actors, sometimes jointly; (iv) gaps occur in the provision of services which 
were privatized.  
The services are financed by four main providers: local state authorities 
and Local Self-governments (“Pu” for public), international and local 
NGOs (“NGO”), private service users (“Pr”), local service user groups 
(“Pr*”), or by cooperation of two or more of these actors. Most services are 
provided at the municipality level (“M”), some at the district and regional 
level (“D” or “R”) and some are not available at all (“…”).  
Some services were available at all study sites – either directly in the 
study municipalities or at the nearest district centres – and provided by the 
same service provider (group), using the same payment scheme. Especially 
pasture and land administration, herding services and veterinary services.  
• Pasture and land administration documents were issued by the munici-
pality administration (“M”). The documents had to be complemented by 
further registration at the State Property Registry located at district lev-
els (“D”). Only in Municipality Bulak was land reportedly registered di-
rectly at the district administration, because one resident of the munici-
pality worked there and some land renters referred directly to him for 
land registration issues. Service payment was therefore shared between 
state bodies who provided staff for these services (“Pu”) and payments 
by farmers (“Pr”). 
• The state-subsidized procurement of agricultural inputs was also availa-
ble in three of the four study municipalities. Municipality administra-
tions distributed a limited amount of seeds to crop producers. Hence, the 
service costs were shared between state bodies (“Pu”) and farmers 
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(“Pr”). Why in Municipality Kyzyl Suu subsidized inputs were accessi-
ble only through the district administration could not be clarified. 
• Besides, non-subsidized inputs – criticized for high costs – were availa-
ble from input retail traders in all district centres. The inputs are paid by 
private farmers who purchase them. 
• Herding services were provided across all study sites in the same fash-
ion. The livestock owners who used the village-adjacent pasture formed 
a group out of which one member was responsible for daily herding on a 
rotational basis. The service costs were therefore carried by livestock 
owners (“Pr”). In Municipality Bolshevik, such herding did not exist, 
because this municipality, located in the crop-dominated lowlands, had 
no direct access to sufficient village-adjacent pastures and animals were 
attended throughout the year by hired herdsmen on pastures several 
dozens of kilometers away from the municipality. 
• Herding services during summer on remote pastures were offered by 
private herders and paid by livestock owners (“Pr”). During the summer 
grazing period from May to October, herders attended a larger group of 
animals belonging to small-scale livestock owners. The herders were 
paid a fixed fee set by the municipality administration.  
Heterogeneity of a service which existed in all municipalities was observed 
in the veterinary service sector: 
• Veterinary services (basic vaccination for five selected diseases) were 
provided in all municipalities. At the study sites, different service pro-
viders offered this service: in Municipality Bulak, a private veterinarian 
and veterinary para-professionals52 in the other municipalities. For the 
five mandatory vaccinations – which were subsidized by the state – 
livestock owners paid a very moderate fee directly to the service provid-
ers in charge of vaccination. The fee for vaccination was fixed by the 
district divisions of the State Veterinary Department, which also provid-
ed the vaccines. The service providers were also in charge of blood tests 
for brucellosis, for which they took a service fee. It was difficult to ex-
plore the actual payment mechanism. Some irregularities and opaque 
payment regulations were obvious: at least in Municipality Kyzyl Suu 
                                                 
 
52 “Veterinary paraprofessional: means a person who … is authorised by the veterinary 
statutory body to carry out certain designated tasks (dependent upon the category of 
veterinary para-professional) in a territory, and delegated to them under the 
responsibility and direction of a veterinarian…”. (World Organization for Animal 
Health 2010: n.p.) 
100  Chapter 3 
 
 
and Bolshevik it seems that the service providers charged service users 
also for the costs of the subsidized vaccines.  
• A slightly wider range of vaccines and veterinary drugs was only availa-
ble in Municipality Bulak. The local private veterinary clinic purchased 
drugs from a veterinary wholesaler in Bishkek. It is unclear to which ex-
tent the clinic sold the subsidized vaccines. However, livestock owners 
paid privately for these drugs. 
Privatized services were found to be insufficient. They were either absent 
or provided by NGOs, commercial service providers or privately, by means 
of self-help:  
• Credit services were provided either by private banks (located in the 
district capitals) or NGOs who supported the municipality with self-help 
programs which motivated the formation of community-based groups. 
In Municipality Ala Too and Bolshevik, credit services were available 
only from private banks. Service costs are therefore carried by private 
actors (“Pr”). In Municipalities Bulak and Kyzyl Suu, the service was 
provided by NGO-initiated self-help groups. Since NGOs supported the 
initiation of these groups through training and kept them operating 
through continuous staff support and advice – for which the service us-
ers did not pay – the service costs were carried by “NGO” and “Pr”. 
• Rural advisory services were – if provided at all – only available from 
NGOs. These services existed only in Municipality Bulak and Kyzyl 
Suu and were fully financed by the supporting organisation. The service 
costs were therefore paid by “NGO”. However, there was little 
knowledge of these services and they seem not to reach the entire mu-
nicipality. In Municipality Bulak, two providers of agricultural advice 
operated: first, a small international NGO which sporadically donated 
seeds and offered training, when the trainers were in the country – about 
once a year. The donor-supported rural advisory service also seemed to 
hold sporadic trainings. It was also reported that agricultural advice was 
available in the district capital of Municipality Ala Too. However, none 
of the respondents ever had direct contact with this service provider. 
A further example of an insufficient service was irrigation, which was una-
vailable in Municipality Kyzyl Suu and very dysfunctional in the remaining 
municipalities: 
• Irrigation services were available in three of the four municipalities. 
Different payment schemes were used. In Municipality Ala Too and 
Bolshevik, the irrigation fee was paid by land owners (“Pr”). In Munici-
pality Bulak, irrigation seemed to have been paid by the municipality 
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budget (“Pu”). The municipality administrations had received funds to 
restore the irrigation infrastructure from the Village Investments Project 
run by ARIS, which was already discussed above. To acquire these 
funds, land users had to contribute collective labour to the restoration. 
Service costs for infrastructure were therefore shared between “Pr” and 
“NGO”. Municipality Bolshevik was the only location were a Water 
User Association (WUA) existed and actively managed the irrigation 
system. In Municipalities Ala Too and Bulak, these organizations exist-
ed only on paper. Appointed water managers (murabs) distributed water 
during the irrigation season.  
• The absence of organized irrigation services in Municipality Kyzyl Suu 
resulted from a full breakdown of the irrigation system. The location of 
the municipality residents’ fields next to a river allowed that land own-
ers dug – in a non-organized manner – irrigation ditches between the 
river and their fields.  
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Table 3-10: Local-level agricultural service provision 
Service  Municipality 
Ala Too Bulak Kyzyl Suu Bolshevik 
Agrarian Policy 
Concept 




M M … M 
n/a  
(water basin level) 
Management Payment  Pr Pu Pr Pr Pr* 
Infrastructure Payment  NGO, Pr NGO, Pr Pr NGO, Pr Pr*, NGO, Pu 




D D D D n/a 





provider M M D M M 
Payment  Pr, Pu Pr, Pu … Pr, Pu Pr, Pu 
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M M M M n/a 
subsidized vaccines 
only Payment  Pu, Pr Pu, Pr Pr Pr Pu, Pr 
curative services and 
extended vaccination Payment   (P), Pr, NGO   Pr 




M (M), D M M M, D 





provider M, D, R M, D, R M, D, R M, D, R M, D, R 







D M M … n/a 
 Payment  … NGO NGO … Pr, NGO 
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D, M M M D, M n/a 
 Payment  Pr, Pr*, NGO Pr*, NGO Pr*, NGO Pr, NGO, Pr* Pr, Pr* 
Herding service 






M M M M n/a 
 Payment Pr Pr Pr Pr n/a 
Herding service 







M M M … n/a 
Payment  Pr* Pr* Pr* … n/a 
Location of service provider: M = Municipality; D = District; R = Region; n/a = not specified; Payment: P = Private farmer / 
service user; Pu= Public budget; NGO = Local or international NGO; Pr* = Service user group / self-help group  
Source: service user interviews, group interviews, municipality administrator interviews 
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3.6.2 Formal rules versus local practice 
The right-hand column in Table 3-10 displays the service provision schemes 
proposed in the Agrarian Policy Concept and the law On unions (associations) 
of water users (2002) in a simplified form. A comparison of the service provi-
sion prescribed in these documents and the empirical information shows that a 
number of services are not provided according to legislation (see a detailed out-
line of the task distribution in Section 2.4.1). This mainly refers to privatized 
services and community-based irrigation service provision. 
The provision of private agricultural services is only in its infancy. Of those 
services for which private provision was planned – input provision, veterinary, 
credit, and agricultural extension – support by donors or the state was necessary 
in all cases.  
First, at all study sites, agricultural inputs (seeds and nitrogen fertilizer) were 
only available at agricultural markets in the district capitals. Many respondents 
considered market prices too expensive and relied on the distribution of subsi-
dized seeds by the municipality administration. The resulting service gaps either 
remained or were partly filled by NGO service providers. Second, although 
private veterinary services were planned in three of the four villages, there was 
no professional private veterinary service which provided the full range of ser-
vices. The para-veterinarians in Municipality Ala Too, Kyzyl Suu and Bolshevik 
delivered only the prescribed minimum of vaccinations according to the orders 
of the State Veterinary Department. An exception was the veterinary service in 
Municipality Bulak, staffed with a fully trained private veterinarian who provid-
ed a range of services far beyond the regular minimum vaccination. He received 
financial support from several sources: two NGOs (one had contracted him with 
providing additional veterinary services to the municipality and a second one 
had provided a refrigerator) and the municipality administration (which co-
financed his assistant from the municipality budget). Third, the Agrarian Policy 
Concept allocates credit provision to private banks. In two municipalities, banks 
in the nearby district capitals were reported to provide credit. However, in all 
municipalities credit at affordable rates was available from NGO-supported self-
help groups. These groups were organized under poverty-eradication programs, 
because lending conditions of private banks were not adjusted to the low agri-
cultural incomes of most respondents at the study sites. Fourth, a private agricul-
tural extension service as envisaged in the Agrarian Policy Concept was not 
available in any municipality. In two of the municipalities, the service was of-
fered by NGOs. In the two remaining ones, no access to agricultural extension 
services existed at all.  
A second important deviation between prescribed provision responsibility and 
actual practice is the absence of community-based groups – in other words, Wa-
ter User Associations – for the provision of irrigation services. In three of the 
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four study municipalities, irrigation management was not organized by Water 
User Associations as prescribed by the law On unions (associations) of water 
users. Water User Associations existed only on paper. Water users were not 
involved in irrigation management, but the municipality administrations deter-
mined a water manager who was in charge of water distribution (Municipality 
Ala Too and Bulak). In addition, access to irrigation water was achieved by 
means of self-help, including irregular, individual digging of irrigation channels 
(observed in Municipality Ala Too and Bulak). In Municipality Kyzyl Suu, irri-
gation water use was not coordinated or specifically provided in any way, since 
the municipality’s fields were located next to a river and irrigation water was 
drawn individually directly from the river. An exception is Municipality Bol-
shevik, where a Water User Association existed. This, however, was not a fully 
functioning community-based organization, but the renamed irrigation depart-
ment of the former local collective cotton farm from the Soviet period. Two of 
the former collective farm’s engineers had, under the new name of “WUA” 
(Water User Association), remained in office and sought to maintain irrigation 
water services for the community. Reportedly, they did this without sufficient 
funds, received very low wages and faced continuous struggle with water users 
who rejected irrigation fee payments. 
A third deviation from the Agrarian Policy Concept until 2010 is the lack of 
several mentioned services: in none of the study sites were pesticides, artificial 
insemination, machinery services,53 improved livestock breeds or improved 
seeds available. 
3.7 Service evaluation 
Table 3-11 shows service user satisfaction on a Likert scale. Adapted to school 
marks in Kyrgyzstan, the scale ranges from 5 for “very good” to 1 for “very 
bad” or “not available”. The service ranking was carried out during group inter-
views held in each municipality.  
During the rating, best average results were found for for dairy cow herding 
with an average of 5 (“very good”), which is closely followed by veterinary 
services. Worst average ratings were given for irrigation and credit services. 
Best individual rates received veterinary services in Bulak, and agricultural 
training in Bulak and Kyzyl Suu. Worst individual ratings were given for irriga-
tion in Municipality Kyzyl Suu and Bolshevik, agricultural training and credit 
services in Municipalities Ala Too and Bolshevik. The available data allow the 
                                                 
 
53 In Municipality Kyzyl Suu, it was reported in a group discussion that a machinery 
cooperative existed, but asked for specific service providers, respondents did not refer to this 
cooperative anymore. It is therefore likely that this service was provided only to members of 
the cooperative and not further acknowledged. 
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identification of two “best” or “worst” performing municipality in terms of ser-
vice quality. Two of the municipalities (Bulak and Kyzyl Suu) reached the same 
rating of 3.4, which was followed by a rating of 2.9 for Ala Too and 1.6 for 
Bolshevik. 
However, the average service ratings in each study site are misleading and do 
not allow conclusions on the general quality of service provision in the specific 
municipality because there is a strong variation in the evaluation of most ser-
vices, for example irrigation, agricultural training and credit services (with a 
width of five and four grade points) across the study sites. Only for dairy cow 
herding, which was rated “very good” in all sites (where it was provided), there 
was no variation. 
Table 3-11: Service users’ service quality evaluation 






Irrigation 3 4 1 1 2.3 
Agricultural inputs 3 2 2 3.5 2.6 
Veterinary service 4 4 5 3 4 
Pasture administra-
tion n/a 3 3 n/a n/a 
Agricultural training 1 5 5 1 3 
Credit services 1 4 3 1 2.3 
Herding service (on 
summer pastures) 3 4 n/a n/a 3.5 
Dairy cow herding 
service (self-help) 5 5 5 … 5 
Average grading 
for service provi-
sion to municipality 
2.9 3.4 3.4 1.6  
5 = very good; 4 = good; 3 = average; 2 = bad; 1 = very bad or not available; 
n/a = no information provided during group interview 
Source: group interviews in case study municipalities 
 
Also, do the average service ratings not allow generalizations because of strong 
variation between the study sites. Greatest grading differences across the study 
sites occur for irrigation services, credit services and agricultural trainings. Mid-
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range differences are found in agricultural input provision, veterinary service, 
and summer herding services. There are two possible explanations for the local 
difference in rating for the same service. First, the different ratings between the 
study sites might result from the fact that several services are provided in very 
different ways and by service providers with very different characteristics. For 
example, credit services are provided both by private banks at very high interest 
rates but in some study sites also by NGOs engaged in poverty eradication at 
comparatively low interest rates. Hence, the mode of service provision, mainly 
determined by the external service provider, plays an important role for service 
satisfaction.  
Second, differences in service ratings might also be impacted by different ser-
vice evaluation criteria of the service users. In Municipality Bolshevik, for ex-
ample, irrigation service was, based on my observations, compared to all other 
study sites best working by far. Participants in the Bolshevik group discussions, 
nevertheless, rated that service very bad. This can be explained by a high stand-
ard of irrigation services which the respondents knew from the pre-
independence period when the municipality was part of a large-scale and highly 
productive cotton production sovkhoz (state farm). Then, irrigation was very 
well managed and compared to that respondents perceived the current quality of 
irrigation very bad. 
In several cases, grading during the group interviews differed from quality as-
sessments during individual household interviews, from information given by 
local administrative staff and, again, from the author’s observations. During an 
interview at the municipality administration in Bulak, for example interviewees 
reported of frequent problems with the absence of animal owners who were in 
charge of herding the local herd of dairy cows. Nevertheless was that service 
rated “very good” by the members of the group interview. A similarly puzzling 
observation was made in Municipality Ala Too where the local veterinarian 
appeared to possess barely any qualification and had only sporadic access to 
vaccines. Respondents nevertheless rated the provided veterinary services 
“good”. 
This suggests that service evaluation is strongly driven by individual evalua-
tive criteria by the participants of the group interview session during which the 
rating was performed. Those individual evaluative criteria might not be always 
service quality but for example amount of service fees or personal relationships 
with the service provider.  
3.8 Discussion and Conclusions 
A multiple case study explored the impact of decentralization on municipality-
level availability and provision of agricultural services. It first explored the way 
how decentralization impacts actors’ accountability relationships, access to 
power resources and distribution of agricultural service tasks; and second, the 
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availability and provision modes of agricultural services at municipality-level; 
and service user satisfaction. The study finds that local governments’ activity 
and the ability of municipality administrators to mobilize external funding, is the 
most important governance factor which impacts agricultural service availabil-
ity.  
My data show that a large number of agricultural services, which the Kyrgyz 
government has considered as important drivers of agricultural development in 
its Agrarian Policy Concept, are not or only insufficiently accessible to many 
farmers in the four study sites in rural Kyrgyzstan.  
The Agrarian policy concept envisaged four groups of agricultural service 
providers (private enterprises, public administrations, community-based groups 
and international donor organizations). Public administrations at municipality 
level were only responsible for pasture and agricultural land administration 
functions and the distribution of subsidized inputs provided by the central gov-
ernment. Private service providers for which the government had considered an 
important role did almost not exist and their services, such as agricultural inputs 
and extended veterinary services including for example artificial insemination, 
were only demanded and used by a small group of best-off farmers. Important 
service providers to the agricultural sector were national and international NGOs 
which supported the creation and operation of micro-finance institutions, pro-
vided agricultural extension services, co-financed veterinary services and sought 
to improve community-based irrigation management. Donors often operated 
through community-based groups they had formed. Those groups, which existed 
in larger number, seemed to fail to reach the broader community and several of 
those groups existed on paper only (water user associations) or did not operate 
independently from the donor organization (agricultural extension groups). Lo-
cally organized community-based groups existed for daily herding of dairy cows 
only. Therefore, important service providers, usually NGOs, were located out-
side of the municipality. These organizations sought to replace private service 
provision (which government and donors had envisaged, but which had not 
developed). 
Municipality administrators had a strong interest in mobilization of support 
services to the agricultural sector but only an indirect impact on its provision. 
While village governments had received access to independent budgets, those 
budgets, did not allow them to create own development projects but required the 
village governments to seek external funding. My findings show, however, that 
municipality administrators sought to indirectly impact service availability. 
They tried to mobilize self-help, which reportedly often failed, and tried to mo-
bilize external support from the central government and donors to the municipal-
ity. Heads of the village governments considered it among their key tasks to 
personally contact funding organizations – including different branches of gov-
ernment – to procure resources or equipment from the government.  
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The municipality staff had therefore an important role as negotiators between 
their municipalities and higher administrative bodies, outside donors and pro-
grams, bringing services and infrastructure to the villages. The lack of transpar-
ent allocation mechanisms – at least for central government donations – requires 
the municipality heads to personally address governmental bodies. This led to 
regular travels to different state bodies and high dependence on decisions by 
specific governmental actors. It is an assumption that this dependency is an ef-
fective mechanism by which outside political actors can hold local level admin-
istrations accountable.  
A key finding of this study is therefore that good relationships with important 
decision makers located outside of the village, which are typically established by 
the head of the municipality administration might play the most important role 
for service availability in a rural municipality. The field work suggests that 
much of a community’s success in attracting services and infrastructure depends 
on the municipality head’s ability to attract external funding. 
There is evidence that the characteristics of the service provision transaction, 
the associated transaction costs and the perception of the scope of benefit fore-
gone determines the availability of services. In the study there was only one 
service which was fully independently from outside assistance organized by 
municipality-level actors alone. This service – collective herding of dairy cows 
on village adjacent pastures – has specific characteristic: a) relatively low trans-
action costs (low technical complexity of service provision, low degree of expert 
knowledge needed, no need for the construction of physical infrastructure and 
financial investment) and b) high benefit foregone to the service users (high 
dependency on subsistence milk production). Other equally important services 
such as irrigation were not successfully locally provided because initial invest-
ment costs are high and farmers perceive the benefit forgone relatively low giv-
en that many farmers lack means to purchase chemical inputs, do not have ac-
cess to machinery and marketing options and experience, particularly in the 
highlands, insecurity of weather conditions. A resulting conclusion is that low 
transaction cost and high benefit foregone lead to local level service provision.  
Some of the findings are new but not a surprise. Little impact of local admin-
istrations on direct agricultural service provision in Kyrgyzstan could be ex-
pected from the literature which has already discussed the limited financial basis 
of those administrations. It is also not a surprise that private service providers 
have not emerged in those small, remote and low income rural municipalities. It 
is a new finding that basically all agricultural services that are not public (in 
other words land and pasture administration and basic veterinary control) or the 
already mentioned herding services are either complemented with or fully pro-
vided by donor support. 
Case studies are difficult to generalize. This also holds for this study. The 
findings are valid only for specific contexts such as those found in the four study 
sites in Kyrgyzstan. It is however likely, that those contextual factors, that are 
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characteristic for poor rural regions, hinder successful service decentralization 
also elsewhere. 
The choice of methods was adequate to the complex and so far under re-
searched field of study. The study confirms the value of an in-depth qualitative 
approach in order to allow meaningful data interpretation. Only the mix of par-
ticipatory ranking with individual interviews, a review of statistical information 
in combination with own observations prevented false conclusions on service 
quality. It is an important observation that service quality ratings by service 
users would have, without further data triangulation, led to wrong assumptions 
on the quality of service provision. Only the combined interpretation of service 
rating information and information from interviews showed that respondents 
used a broad set of subjectively important evaluation criteria which were not 
directly linked to the ‘objective’ service quality.  
The findings have some theoretical implications. Different from initial as-
sumptions to find municipalities in which services are better available than in 
others, it occurred that in the study sites there were no municipalities which 
were comparatively better off in terms of service availability.  
First, under the given circumstances (low agricultural incomes, very limited 
local resources and little interest in self-help activities) local governance factors 
do not seem to independently determine agricultural service provision. The field 
work leads to a very interesting hypothesis according to which the most im-
portant factor of local governance for local service provision and local service 
access is the municipality head’s ability to attract external funding. An in-depth 
exploration of this relationship might be an interesting line of further research. 
Second, the absence of municipality-level service providers hinders positive 
decentralization effects to unfold. Because the main service providers are com-
munity-based groups which are formed by and accountable to the external ser-
vice providers (mainly donor organizations), there is only very weak accounta-
bility relationship between service users and service providers. Instead, the rules 
according to which service provision is evaluated (and decided about its contin-
uation) are externally designed and do not necessarily reflect service users’ 
evaluative criteria.  
Third, service users’ ability to assess service quality is impacted by service 
expectations which are not always based on state-of-the-art scientific or profes-
sional knowledge but on experience, instead. This might lead to assessment 
criteria which differ from professional standards and can result in over- or un-
derrating of service quality. In the study cases the experiences made during the 
Soviet period and thereafter seem to have formed most expectations used for 
service evaluation. The service provision conditions during the Soviet period, in 
other words fully subsidized public provision of services, lead to a) a very lim-
ited acceptance of services fee payments and b) a high demand for publicly pro-
vided services, by a state organization or the municipality administration. Be-
sides, service users’ service evaluation is also impacted by the quality of 
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services available in the past or outside sources of knowledge on service quality. 
As outside knowledge is generally not available, local experiences with services 
which are mainly of low or very low quality impact quality evaluation. Hence, 
service users are not able to critically assess some of the services, particularly 
those they had never been provided in an adequate way. Striking was the exam-
ple of irrigation in Municipality Bulak where some service users considered two 
days of access to irrigation water during vegetation period for they potato fields 
appropriate.  
My findings call the general superiority of service users’ ability to judge local 
services quality into question if service users’ possess access to only limited 
information. They therefore possess incomplete knowledge. Service decentrali-
zation might, under such conditions, lead to service quality decay because 
knowledge gap at the side of service users hinder them to assess service quality. 
The theoretical implication is that service user evaluation might lead to low 
quality standards for service provision if service users do not have access to 
state-of the art knowledge on service quality and cannot use this information for 
evaluation. 
Fourth, many of the proposed benefits of decentralization are based on the 
premise that it brings local decision makers closer to the constituencies they 
serve. Implicit in this are assumptions about the nature of information available 
to local decision makers, the presence of effective channels for the public to 
express preferences and concerns, and the incentives that motivate decision 
makers to respond. Each of these assumptions leads to specific conclusions re-
garding the benefits of decentralization; taken together, the resulting argument is 
compelling: local decision makers have access to better information on local 
circumstances than central authorities, and they use this to tailor services and 
spending to local needs and preferences; the public provides input to local deci-
sion-making processes and holds local decision makers accountable for their 
actions; and administrative autonomy creates space for learning, innovation, 
community participation and the adaptation of public services to local circum-
stances. (Khaleghian 2004) However, those theories do not apply to the ob-
served processes in Kyrgyzstan.  
The study has revealed the important role donor-driven reforms play for de-
centralization reforms in the Kyrgyz agricultural sectors. Implementation of 
donor-programs by means of community-based groups is one of the key strate-
gies employed. It has also shown that specific and in-depth studies on the donor-
municipality relationship inherent in decentralization in Kyrgyzstan in order to 
understand the specific outcomes of decentralized service provision are needed. 
Hence, the following sections study the most recent major donor-driven agricul-
tural service support program in Kyrgyzstan: An approach to implement com-





4 Improving the sustainability of pasture use in Kyrgyz-
stan. The impact of pasture governance reforms on live-
stock migration1 
4.1 Introduction 
Agropastoralism is a key agricultural activity in Kyrgyzstan (41°00'N; 75°00'E). 
An average altitude of 2,750 meters (Fitzherbert 2006: 2.2) and about 9.1 mil-
lion hectares of natural pastures make transhumance the most important live-
stock production system in the country. Over the past 50 years, the procedures 
and responsibilities for the allocation of usufruct rights to pastures have experi-
enced considerable modifications. As a consequence, herders’ migration patterns 
changed. Prior to independence in 1991, large-scale livestock production was 
managed by kolkhoz (collective farms) and sovkhoz (state farms), which orga-
nized annual migratory livestock movements. Winter grazing locations were 
pastures or harvested crop fields close to settlements at lower altitudes. Between 
May and October, herders travelled to summer pastures at altitudes of about 
1500-2500 m asl (Farrington 2005) or higher (Fitzherbert 2006). On their jour-
ney during spring and autumn, they passed pastures at intermediary altitudes. 
Migration of livestock was compulsory and strictly enforced by kolkhoz man-
agement (Wenzel 2004). After independence in 1991, the kolkhozes and sov-
khozes were dissolved and the pasture use management structure became fun-
damentally altered.  
In the post-Soviet era, formal procedures for allocation of usufruct rights to 
pastures have significantly changed twice. In 2002, reform legislation intro-
duced individual pasture lease rights. This reform was influenced by classical 
property rights theory (Demsetz 1967), according to which the commons are 
considered open-access areas and are subject to inevitable overexploitation by 
free riders (Hardin 1968). In 2009, a new law introduced a system of communi-
ty-based natural resource management, under which pasture access is to be man-
aged by local user groups. This reform followed a new “policy consensus” 
(Mosse 1997, see also Agrawal 2001; Blaikie 2006; Pincus 2001), which builds 
on common-pool resource theory influenced by the works of Wade (1988) and 
Ostrom (1990). This theory acknowledges the possibility of sustainable self-
governance of common-pool resources by user groups if specific success factors 
                                                 
 
1 This chapter is a slightly revised version of Crewett (2012) published in Mountain Research 
and Development 32 (3), 267–274.  
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that prevent free riding and allow for community participation are met (Agrawal 
2001; Dietz et al. 2003; Gruber 2010; Ostrom 1990). 
4.2 The debate on migration 
Different legislation can have different effects on the mobility of agro-pastoral 
households. The post-Soviet pasture legislation in Central Asia has had different 
impacts on households’ migration decisions. Important factors were found to be 
local conditions, such as grazing pressure, household economic status (Farring-
ton 2005; Kerven et al. 2004; Kerven et al. 2011; Robinson et al. 2010; 
Steimann 2011; Steimann 2012), and local administrative practices (Behnke et 
al. 2005; Dörre 2012). However, post-Soviet pasture management reforms are 
generally seen as having limited livestock mobility (Robinson et al. 2003). In 
particular, privatized pasture use has been discussed as an obstacle to migratory 
movements, as it is seen to lead to a permanent fragmentation of pastures that is 
inconsistent with the flexible use patterns of mobile herders (Robinson et al. 
2010). This argument has also influenced the debate on the Kyrgyz pasture leg-
islation. 
During the debate on the second pasture reform in Kyrgyzstan, international 
policy advisers and the Kyrgyz government held the view that the 2002 legisla-
tion had hindered sustainable pasture use. Since independence, the decreasing 
number and range of seasonal livestock movements, along with overstocking 
near villages and underuse of pastures located at greater distance from the set-
tlements have been reported (Schillhorn van Veen 1995; Wenzel 2004; Fitzher-
bert 2006; World Bank 2004). According to official data from the MAWRPI, 
this has led to worrying conditions in the pastures: severe degradation was regis-
tered on 25 percent of all pastures (MAWRPI et al. 2008: 9). Data for 2005/2006 
from the Kyrgyz State Agency for Registration of Rights for Immovable 
Property (GosRegist) indicate that 27 percent of the pastures contain large 
amounts of inedible species, 19 percent are eroded, and 33 percent are substan-
tially degraded (USAID 2007: 3). 
Administrative procedures are believed to be complicated and to cause high 
transaction costs for potential leaseholders. International policy advisers and the 
government have identified the formal pasture law with its fragmentation of 
administrative control over pastures as the “root of the degradation problem” 
(MAWRPI) et al. 2008: 6; World Bank 2007a; see also World Bank 2007c: 53). 
Impractical and slow administrative procedures, unclear administrative respon-
sibilities, and expensive fees have been discussed as the main causes for aban-
donment of summer pasture use (World Bank 2007, 61). However, the case 
study reported on here does not support this view.  
This chapter has two objectives: First, it studies the impact of the 2002 lease-
based pasture law on migration decisions. Second, in consideration of those 
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findings, it discusses the likely effects of the 2009 community-based reform 
approach on migration. 
4.3 Methods and case study selection 
An exploratory single case study (Yin 1993) was conducted in Bulak municipal-
ity in Naryn Oblast (Region) in order to assess the linkage between administra-
tive practices, working rules for pasture access, and herders’ mobility. The case 
study location was selected from a set of five municipalities in which group and 
individual interviews were held and municipality data were collected during a 
preliminary study in 2008. Two of the communities had a comparatively strong 
focus on agro-pastoral livestock production and a large pasture area endowed 
with all three pasture types (winter, intensive, and summer pastures). Of these, 
Bulak was selected because its remote summer pastures were not located near 
big roads, which was assumed to affect migration decisions (for example, by 
reducing income opportunities from trade), but roads to the remote pasture areas 
were traversable. Bulak, located about 2,300 meters above sea level, is part of 
the Northern Mountain region of Kyrgyzstan, which is characterized by high 
altitude, remote location, and high livestock numbers (Schuler et al. 2004: 2-6). 
One third of the Kyrgyz pasture area (30.4 percent) is located in Naryn Region 
(Oblast); due to a low population density, the pasture availability per pastoralist 
is 44.86 ha (Kulov 2007: 4), the highest in the country.  
The grazing area of Bulak municipality includes 17,369 ha of village-adjacent 
pasture and 39,710 ha of remote pasture. Of this, 89 ha of village-adjacent pas-
ture and 3,980 ha of remote pasture were officially rented out in 2009 (data ob-
tained from the office of the Kyrgyz State Agency for Registration of Rights for 
Immovable Property (GosRegist) in At Bashy and municipality statistics 2009). 
In addition, 2,147 ha of intensive pasture were rented out by the Leskhoz (State 
Agency for Forest and Environment) as part of the state forest fund. Group in-
terview data and individual interviews indicate high livestock dependency, as 
crop production is particularly limited because of unfavorable climatic condi-
tions, a lack of agricultural machinery, and a collapsed irrigation system.  
Livestock mobility in Bulak follows the same rotational migration principles 
that have been described for other livestock-dependent communities in Kyrgyz-
stan (Schoch et al. 2010; Steimann 2011; Farrington 2005). In 2008, the village 
had 3,504 inhabitants in 740 households, of which 36 percent were officially 
classified as poor.  
The analysis builds on triangulated data from a content analysis of transcripts 
of individual interviews and recordings, pictures and documents prepared during 
group interviews, documents obtained from municipality administrations and the 
State Agency for Registration of Rights for Immovable Property (GosRegist) 
offices, and maps produced by the Kyrgyz State Cartographic Institute (Gos-
kartografia). Between June 2008 and October 2009, 29 semi-structured inter-
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views were conducted with livestock owners (N = 25) and administrators from 
the municipality, Leskhoz, and GosRegist (N = 4). The semi-structured ques-
tionnaires focused on effective working rules for pasture use and access under 
the 2002 legislation, that is, rules that are “actually used, monitored, and en-
forced when individuals make choices about the actions they will take” (Ostrom 
1990: 51). Interviews were conducted by the author and simultaneously translat-
ed into the Kyrgyz language. The transcripts of the interviews were analyzed by 
means of qualitative content analysis with inductive and deductive coding 
(Mayring 2004). The data analysis technique was a stepwise constant compari-
son method used for analysis of and comparison between interviews and docu-
ments (Glaser 1965; Strauss and Corbin 1998; for a detailed description of the 
method applied, see Boeije 2002). Examples for code assignment during the 
analytical coding process are presented in Table 4-2.  
Table 4-1: Case study data 
Population (2008) 
No of households 














Pasture endowment (ha)(2009) 






Sources: municipality statistics 2008, GosRegist data 2009, own calculations 
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Table 4-2: Coding examples for text segments from interview transcripts 
Respondent statement  Coding categories 
“In the past, we had our animals in [the summer 
pasture] Zhany Zher but when this [closer 
spring/autumn] pasture was available it was much 
better to take this”. (contract-holder) 
Contraction of amplitude of migration 
Preference for near pasture 
“After the collapse [of the Soviet Union] everyone 
started to try to get [pasture] land near the vil-
lage.“(contract- holder) 
Preference for near pasture 
Rush for lease 
“Now you cannot use this pasture without lease 
agreement anymore.” (non-contract holder) 
Assess depends upon possession of lease contract 
High demand for pasture contract/Rush for lease 
Preference for near pasture 
“All the closer pastures are rented. Not everyone 
can use these pastures. But there is enough other 
place where you can go.” (non-contract holder) 
Access depends upon lease contract 
High demand for contracts 
Preference for near pastures 
Choice between contracting and not contracting 
“Why did you chose that remote section of the 
pasture when you made the contract?” Respond-
ent: “Because it was the only part that was still 
available for rent. All the rest was already rented 
to someone else. ” (contract-holder) 
Choice between contracting and not contracting 
High demand for lease contracts/Rush for lease 
Preference for near pastures 
Remote pasture use as second best option 
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“Actually everything is rented on our pasture. We 
tell everyone not to come [to our pasture] (contract 
holder) 
 Self-enforcement of maximum stocking rate 
High demand for lease contracts 
Pasture on high demand 
“Rich people [who were described as contract 
owners earlier during the interview] use some part 
of the pasture and say: 'This is our pasture. Go 
away!' Sometimes they beat our animals.” (non-
contract holder) 
 “Wealthy occupy pasture” 
Self-enforcement of maximum stocking rate 
 
„It is better to make a lease agreement for a pas-
ture which is closer to the village, such as [the 
relatively closer intensive pasture] Itchké, than to 
go to [the relatively far summer pasture] Ak-Say 
for free. Ak-Say does not cost any rent. I was a 
herdsmen at Ak-Say for 40 years on that pasture. 
But I think Itchké is better, also with respect to 
quality. The pasture is easy to be reached by car 
and only two hours by horse.“ (contract holder) 
 Preference for near pasture 
Abandonment of migration 
Summer pasture use abandoned for intensive pasture use 
Preference_pasture quality 
Preference_convenient access 
“We came to Zhany Zher because of health prob-
lems of my father. It is not so high as Ak-
Say.”(contract holder) 
 Preference_access medical services 
Preference_lower altitude 
Preference for near pasture 
Source: own representation  
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4.4 The first pasture reform approach: 1999-2009  
According to the Land Code (1999) and the Law on Management of Agricultur-
al Land (2001), pastures are the property of the Kyrgyz state. Pasture rental 
became possible under the Law on Procedures of Allocating Pastures for Lease 
and Use, which was adopted by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on June 
4, 2002. The law introduced a new administrative management scheme for pas-
tures based on functional categories. Winter pastures were classified as village-
adjacent pastures, spring and autumn pastures as intensive pastures, and summer 
pastures as remote pastures. Administrative control for each pasture category 
was assigned to a different state body: village-adjacent pastures to municipality 
administrations, intensive pastures to district administrations, and remote pas-
tures to regional administrations. In addition, larger parts of the pasture fell un-
der the authority of the state agency for environment and forestry (Leskhoz). 
4.4.1 Working rules for pasture use and access since 2002 
In the Kyrgyz pasture sector, common practice or working rules regularly devi-
ate from formal administrative rules (Dörre 2012; Steimann 2011; Steimann 
2012). The following section therefore looks at effective pasture use and access 
rules under the 2002 pasture governance reform and their impact on migration 
decisions. The analysis shows that administrative hurdles were not the main 
reason for the abandonment of long-distance migration.  
In effect, two types of pasture existed, each with a different access mecha-
nism: 
• heavily used village-adjacent winter pastures, relatively close autumn/spring 
pastures, and relatively close summer pastures, the use of which required a 
formal lease contract 
• more sparsely used remote summer pastures and relatively distant intensive 
pastures, which did not require a lease contract. 
In practice, formal pasture lease was not a general precondition for pasture use, 
as rent payments were not systematically enforced on all pastures. Particularly 
on remote pastures, no systematic, effective administrative enforcement of the 
legislation was in place. Therefore, herders were not forced to carry out difficult 
administrative procedures to get access to pasture land.  
Intensive use of pastures near the village was preferred to migration to remote 
summer pastures. While variations existed in the chosen livestock migration 
strategy, herders expressed a strong preference for summer grazing as close to 
the municipality as possible. Instead of the seasonally differentiated pasture 
selection of the Soviet period, many herders chose pastures for their proximity 
to the settlement. The prescribed migration dates, which were annually an-
nounced by the municipality administration, were not being followed by many 
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herders. As a result, many of the areas that were spring and autumn pastures 
during the Soviet period had become summer grazing locations. 
Thus, there was a high demand for nearby pastures. Most intensive pastures 
were reported to be fully used, and herders perceived all intensive pastures to be 
rented out. While pastures in low demand were often accessible without an 
agreement, access to pastures in high demand depended on the ability to obtain a 
lease.  
The interest in pasture leases increased over time. While the demand for pas-
ture leasing was very low shortly after introduction of the reform, and only a 
few rich herders aimed to secure pasture rights for the best grazing locations, the 
observation of a growing number of contract holders and the common practice 
of excluding non-contract-holders has led to the perception that a contract is 
necessary to get access to a pasture and has increased demand for pasture leases.  
4.4.2 The impact of administrative practices 
Contracting for pasture was considered rather complicated. It involved – de-
pending on whether responsible staff were present, which was not always the 
case – two or more visits to administrative bodies in the district capital. The 
conclusion of a lease was in one case described as having taken up to six 
months.  
However, none of the interviewees mentioned difficulties during the adminis-
trative process as a reason for not concluding a pasture lease. Also, respondents 
were aware of the official leasing procedure. The district administration seemed 
to follow a uniform procedure. There were no differences in descriptions of the 
lease application procedure by contract holders in Bulak, and GosRegist1 staff in 
At Bashy, and a discussion by Steimann (2011) in a case study in the same dis-
trict. Hence, no difficulties in locating the leasing authority were mentioned. 
None of the interviewed leaseholders considered rental fees, which are fixed 
by a state commission, to be expensive and a reason for not concluding a lease. 
In 2009, official fees in the study area were US$ 0.06 per hectare per year for 
remote pastures and for village-adjacent pastures. For intensive pastures, re-
spondents reported paying from US$ 0.2 to US$ 0.4. The pasture allocation 
rules that emerged under the 2002 law were only quasi-lease-based, as the rental 
fee was set by the administration. The fees were considered so low that a herder 
chose to abandon the use of a remote pasture free of charge in favor of nearer 
pasture plots that required lease payments. The cost of using the closer pastures 
was preferred to the cost and inconvenience of long-distance migration. 
Even the small yearly rent payments were not strictly enforced, due to the in-
sufficient staff capacity of GosRegist. Many herders did not pay their rent regu-
                                                 
 
1 Kyrgyz State Agency for Registration of Rights for Immovable Property 
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larly, or paid only part of it. Rent payment on Leskhoz lands was also sporadical-
ly enforced, as several respondents who used what they believed were Leskhoz 
pastures neither had a lease nor paid a fee. 
Given the low lease fees and sporadic enforcement, the administrative lease 
procedure did not constrain use of highly desired pasture plots. Rental and ad-
ministrative fees and procedures did not prevent herders from concluding a 
lease. Instead, interviewees discussed two reasons for not concluding a contract: 
First, a pasture lease was sometimes not considered necessary. This was the case 
on most remote pastures and on some of the more distant intensive pastures, 
which could be used without a formal rental agreement due to the lack of com-
petition for pasture use and low degree of administrative enforcement. Second, a 
desired pasture lease was sometimes unavailable because the pasture already 
was (or was perceived to be) rented. This occurred because GosRegist staff lim-
ited the number of leases issued for each pasture area according to a predefined 
official stocking rate. Hence, many herders were not able to establish a formal 
lease for their preferred pasture plot and were forced to use or rent a plot farther 
away from the village.  
It is noteworthy that leases were mainly discussed as a means to defend pas-
ture use rights against other pasture users, whereas establishment of pasture 
leases by administrative order was rarely mentioned. Many respondents reported 
that leaseholders actively excluded non-contract-holders from access to their 
rented plot. The respondents therefore shared the view that only contract holders 
could access pastures near the village and that this had increased the demand for 
pasture leases. 
In the case study municipality, the contract was a mandatory means to in-
crease the probability of uncontested use rights to a pasture in high demand. It 
was not required in order to establish legal rights to the use of pasture in general, 
as state administrative bodies did not systematically enforce rent payment on all 
pastures. Pasture leasing was an optional means to establish access rights to 
relatively nearby pastures. Leases had become an important means of securing 
usufruct rights to intensive pasture plots.  
In the case study area, non-administrative factors were the main reasons for 
herders to abandon long-distance migration. Herders were strongly interested in 
keeping travel distances to the grazing areas short. The case study revealed that 
factors affecting migration decisions included lack of access to services; high 
individual migration costs, which were further increased by a decay of infra-
structure; perceptions of sufficient pasture quality on nearer pastures; and the 
breakdown of formal and informal enforcement mechanisms for long-distance 
migration, including pleas by the local administration. In addition, the lease of 
intensive pastures limited motivation for summer migration by those who held 
contracts or felt secure in their use rights to specific plots. As no effective sea-
sonal use restrictions for the different pasture types existed, renters, mainly 
those with smaller herds, remained stationary throughout the grazing season. 
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4.5 The second reform approach: community-based management 
The analysis of the Bulak case showed no direct relationship between high ad-
ministrative costs that accrue to pasture users and the abandonment of herders’ 
long-distance mobility. While this finding needs to be confirmed by further 
research, including multiple case studies and additional quantitative studies, one 
might develop a hypothesis on the effectiveness of the community-based pasture 
governance reform that is currently being implemented. 
On January 26, 2009, the government of Kyrgyzstan issued the Law On Pas-
tures (N 30), which shifted responsibility for managing pastures to new commu-
nity-based user organizations and abandoned the earlier fragmented system of 
state authority. According to the new law, all pasture users are to form pasture 
user unions (PUUs), who elect their own executive bodies, called pasture user 
committees (PCs)2. These bodies are authorized to govern the use of pastures 
independently from state administrative control. The PUUs hold a bundle of 
rights. Under Article 6, Section 5 of the new law, the Pasture Committees have 
the right to (1) develop and implement a community pasture management plan 
and an annual pasture use plan, (2) issue pasture use right certificates (pasture 
tickets) and collect payments for pasture use, (3) resolve disputes among pasture 
users, and (4) and carry out investments in pasture infrastructure and mainte-
nance.  
If fully implemented, the 2009 law could solve what has been identified as the 
administrative fragmentation problem. However, based on the case study, one 
might hypothesize that the localization of pasture administration in municipal-
level Pasture Committees and the envisaged simplification of access procedures 
might not be sufficient to increase livestock mobility. The case study suggests 
that administrative hurdles, including the need to travel to administrative offices 
outside of the municipality, were not among the key reasons for the contraction 
of seasonal livestock movements. It also showed that herders adhered neither to 
what can be considered traditional seasonal migration rules nor to pleas by the 
municipal administration.  
The findings of this exploratory case study therefore suggest that in order to 
increase flock mobility under the 2009 reform legislation, investments in infra-
structure are key. At the same time, specific migration rules with effective en-
forcement and sanction mechanisms might be needed. Unfortunately, the current 
legislation lacks provisions for enforcement of seasonal migration and does not 
include regulations establishing sanctions. This causes a particular challenge 
associated with the control function of Pasture Committees.  
                                                 
 
2 In the published version of this chapter, Crewett(2012), the Pasture Committees are called 
Pasture User Committees (PUCs). For simplified reading I have used the abrreviation 
Pasture Committee (PC) throughout this book. 
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The case study shows that herders have limited interest in traveling to remote 
pastures due to inconvenient access and absence of services. Hence, Pasture 
Committees might find it difficult to enforce migration rules and particularly to 
withstand pressure from local groups or individuals who might have an interest 
in avoiding migration (for example, influential herders who prefer to use already 
secured pastures near settlements). Outside assistance might be needed to sup-
port the effective implementation and enforcement of migration rules and pre-
vent local pressure group influence. Therefore, rule enforcement might better be 
backed by a body located outside of the village, such as an umbrella organiza-
tion of PUUs at the district or regional level. It could serve as a control body – 
independent of municipality-level pressure group influence – that could effec-
tively control seasonal migration rules. However, such shift of monitoring im-
poses potential risks of providing new opportunities for rent-seeking, problems 
of scale and might lead to high transaction cost. However, the mere shift of ad-
ministrative responsibility to the municipal level, without the establishment of 






5 Introducing decentralized pasture governance in Kyr-
gyzstan. Designing implementation rules1 
5.1 Introduction 
In 2009, a law “On Pastures” was implemented in the Central Asian Republic 
of Kyrgyzstan (henceforth Kyrgyzstan) that prescribed a form of Community-
based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). That law signified a drastic 
reform of property rights over pastures, as it shifted pasture management author-
ity from state administrations to the municipality level and replaced individual 
leasing, which had been in place since 2001 (Crewett 2012; Dörre 2012; 
Steimann 2011; 2012), with collective ownership. Hence, pasture management 
responsibility and the right to allocate pasture-related usufruct rights are now 
held by newly formed community-based Pasture User Unions (PUUs) and their 
executive bodies, called Pasture Committees.  
The design and the implementation of the Kyrgyz pasture management re-
form, of which the new pasture law is a sub-component, was strongly supported 
by the World Bank. As such, the implementation of this reform is an example 
for a specific process of institutional design which is common in donor-
dependent countries: in this context, implementation refers to the translation of 
externally designed rules into practice by members of an implementation net-
work, consisting of external and local implementers including administrative 
policy implementers, donor-agency policy implementers and civil society actors. 
Such complex processes of institutional design associated with CBNRM imple-
mentation are rarely studied in institutional research which mainly focuses on a 
review of the characteristics of emerging rules.  
The following chapter therefore explores the design of implementation rules 
through the course of donor-driven CBNRM implementation in greater depth. 
The chapter asks: How and by whom are implementation working rules for 
CBNRM in Kyrgyzstan being created? In order to allow for a detailed analysis, 
the study focuses only on the sub-process of the design of boundary rules that 
govern entry into those newly created executive bodies – municipality level 
Pasture Committees.  
Drawing on implementation research (Hill and Hupe 2002; Hill 2003; 
Maynard-Moody 1989) Section 5.2 adds an improved actor component to Kiser 
and Ostroms’ leveled approach to the study of nested institutions which allows 
for a better representation of agency in institutional analysis. Section 5.3 speci-
                                                 
 
1 This chapter is a slightly revised version of the article Crewett (2015b) which was accepted 
for publication and published online in Environmental Science and Policy 
(doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2014.12.009). The article is currently in press. 
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fies the case study setting and analytical methods. Section 5.4 disentangles the 
implementation action arena and shows how collective choice boundary rules 
emerge as a result of the interplay of multi-level, multi-phased decision making. 
In Section 5.7 the findings are discussed. 
 
Figure 5-1: Map of the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
Source: United Nations Cartographic Section (2011) 
5.2 Theory and analytical framework 
5.2.1 Levels of institutional analysis 
The remainder of the chapter explores how policy implementers design rules 
which govern the establishment of an organization. In institutional theory, rules, 
including norms, conventions and laws, are considered to impact actors behav-
ior. They do so either in the form of internalized shared beliefs which emerge 
from practice, repetition or normative injunction or from an “immanently nor-
mative disposition, that in circumstance X do Y” (Hodgson 2006: 140), but also 
take the form of externally designed constraints or prescriptions (North 1991). 
Such rules define the available positions within any an organization, for example 
the number of members, chairpersons, accountants, etc., who may or may not 
become a member or hold any other position within that organization, and by 
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which process individuals get access to any of these positions. Rules which 
specify the set and number of positions actors may, must or must not hold in a 
specific action situation are called position rules, and rules which define entry 
and exit conditions for the defined positions, including a) eligibility, b) the pro-
cesses that determine which eligible participants may or must hold a position 
and c) how an individual may or must leave a position are called boundary rules 
(Crawford and Ostrom 1995). 
In order to explore rule design during policy implementation, a process in 
which multiple stakeholders are involved, a leveled analytical approach is re-
quired. Kiser and Ostrom have proposed a framework for the study of vertically 
interlinked and nested rule design (Kiser and Ostrom 1982; Kiser and Ostrom 
2000: 57; Ostrom 1990, 1999, 2005). According to their model rule design takes 
place in rule making situations at different levels. At each of the levels the fol-
lowing three factors come into play: first, community, second the biophysical 
world and third, an already existing set of rules-in-use which has emerged at a 
previous level of rule design. Hence, rules for altering rules which define who 
may or must and how to change rules are designed at what is called deeper rule 
making or choice situations and are used at higher level choice situations. The 
framework proposes three dependent levels of rule design (from deeper to high-
er level: collective choice, constitutional choice or meta-constitutional choice 
situation) but acknowledges the possibility of a potentially infinite number of 
nested rule making situations (Ostrom 2005: 58). According to this model rules 
designed at a deeper level constrain rules designed at the following level:  
“This nesting of rules at several levels is similar to the nesting of computer languages at 
several levels. What can be done at a higher level will depend on the capabilities and 
limits of the software (rules) at that level, on the software (rules) at a deeper level, and 
on the hardware (the CPR)2” (Ostrom 1990: 50f). 
In order to explore institutional design during implementation two specifications 
are needed. First, the relational and vague definition of the potentially infinite 
number of nested rule making situations (Ostrom 2005: 58) requires a specifica-
tion of the transaction at the level of institutional choice. Second, policy imple-
mentation is in most cases multi-actor or network driven (Hjern and Porter 
1981). It is therefore necessary to specify what Kiser and Ostrom call the com-
munity. In order to acknowledge actor diversity3 I replace the community with 
what I call authorized decision makers – professionals at different levels of ad-
                                                 
 
2 Common Pool Resource 
3 Two key aspects are not acknowledged in Kiser and Ostrom’s approach: first, “the processes 
and mechanisms by which the individual is fundamentally altered” (Hodgson 2007:100) 
and, second, the impact of the important role of heterogeneity of actors on rule design 
(documented by Schlager and Blomquist W. 1998; Ruttan 2008). 
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ministration and other policy-implementing organizations who are legitimized, 
either formally or informally, to put new regulations into practice and are there-
by engaged in institutional design.  
5.2.2 Street-level bureaucrats as authorized decision maker  
Policy implementation is the post-legislative stage of decision making during 
which policies are turned into action. Implementation research has shown that 
implementation rarely resembles a series of consequential actions but rather “a 
process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those 
seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends” (Hill and 
Hupe 2009: 7 quote Barrett and Fudge 1981). I therefore employ a “bottom-up 
perspective on implementation” (Hill and Hupe 2009: 52) which highlights the 
role of lowest administrative level policy implementers, so called Street-level 
bureaucrats (SLBs), that is mostly public employees, but also staff of NGOs or 
other agencies who interact with non-organizational clients on a daily basis and 
whose task is to implement their agencies’ rules in practice (Lipsky 1980).  
SLBs purposefully alter the set of rules they are to implement as a reaction to 
their working environment: “the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the rou-
tines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and 
work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out” (Lipsky 
1980: xii). By definition, SLBs operate at the citizen-state interface character-
ized by a) relative proximity to clients, including a high frequency of client con-
tacts; b) ambiguous role expectations from the organization they serve4 and from 
clients; c) continuous resource and capacity constraints and d) insufficiently 
defined rules and regulations that fail to provide instructions for all upcoming 
tasks the SLB has to handle. Logged between the pressure to carry out a task 
impossible under the given constraints and the endowment of large room for 
discretionary decision making, they adopt what can be called a “cognitive regu-
larity” (Becker 2004) and develop specific patterns of cognition and behavior 
that aim at a limitation of their work load, maximization of the available re-
sources and maximization of client compliance with procedures prescribed by 
their agency. SLBs therefore adjust implementation working rules to their ca-
pacities and working conditions by means of routinization5 and also simplify 
their own mental model of their tasks (Lipsky 1980). 
                                                 
 
4 In the remainder of the chapter this organization is called agency.  
5 Lipsky (1980) limits “routines” to behavioural regularities, which is not coherent with much 
of the literature on the role of routines in organizations. Different from the literature, which 
looks into routines as an inherent characteristic of organizations, Lipsky’s routines are not 
the result of collective solutions to problems. Instead, they are more individual, though 
similar, choices which bureaucrats share. 
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Table 5-1: Using the grammar of institutions for the operationalization of 
analytical situations 
Level of analysis Transaction  
Operational Use of resource entry and resource management rules, including withdrawal rules 
 
Collective-choice 
Design of resource entry and resource manage-
ment rules, including withdrawal rights by Pas-
ture Committee members 
Use of entry rules to local governance bodies 
(Pasture Committee and PUU) 
 
Constitutional 
Design of entry rules to local governance bodies 
(Pasture Committee and PUU) 
Employment of rights associated with authority to 
transfer/devolve resource management rights to 
local governance bodies by policy implementers 
 
Meta-constitutional 
Design of rules that allocate authority to trans-
fer/devolve resource management rights to local 
governance bodies by law makers 
 
Source: own representation  
Table 5-1 allocates the implementation related transaction to the respective lev-
els of the Kiser-Ostrom framework. The table shows that the analytical focus is 
collective choice (boundary) rules which are being designed in the constitutional 
choice situation. 
5.3 Method and case study selection 
At the time of field research, which was conducted in September and October 
2009, ten months after the introduction of the pasture governance reform, no 
data on the process of Pasture Committee establishment was available. There-
fore background expert interviews and own observations during previous field 
work were used to identify three most different cases (Yin 1993) of Pasture 
Committee establishment (see Table 5-2). 
Pasture Committee establishment was ongoing in all study municipalities. 
The new law abandoned the previous deconcentrated governance of pasture 
administration according to which regional (oblast) administrations were re-
sponsible for leasing summer pastures, regional (rayon) administrations for 
leasing spring and autumn pastures and municipality administrations (ayil 
okrug) for leasing winter pastures (for examples of pre-reform pasture govern-
ance see Crewett 2012; Dörre 2012; Kerven et al. 2011; Steimann 2011, and 
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World Bank 2007a)6, what Kiser and Ostrom call the biophysical world, exhib-
ited similar characteristics in all study cases including – high altitude, abundant 
pasture resources and a large livestock population which is typical for the moun-
tainous regions of Kyrgyzstan (Scholz 1992; Schillhorn van Veen 1995; Schoch 
et al. 2010). In all cases resident families, except for the poorest of the poor, 
own livestock and use, either directly as herders or indirectly as users of herding 
services, pastures for grazing purposes. Therefore, vertical agro-pastoralism, 
with a migration season from May to October, is the main source of income. 
The cases were chosen for their difference in the two remaining analytical as-
pects of the analytical choice situation explored in Section 2.1: the authorized 
decision makers involved in the design and the boundary rules they had created 
(see Table 5-3).  
Table 5-2: Study case characteristics7 
Municipality Ala Too Bulak Kara Tash 
No of villages 3 1 3 
Altitude (masl) 2004 2400 2300 
Pasture resource (hectare) 11,000 57,300 52,200 
No of animals 
per household 
Large 
ruminants 3.1 5.8 6.1 
Small 
ruminants 
13 18.9 14.4 
Horses 1.7 3.0 2.3 
6 The 2009 law “On Pastures” replaced the pasture administration regulations of the land code 
(1999) and the Regulation “On Pasture Lease and Use” (2002) (see details in a review of the 
legislation by Dörre 2012). 
7 Please note that, as confidentiality was ensured to all municipality-level respondents, the 
names of the municipalities have been changed. Numbers have been rounded. In addition, 
pasture area data are highly unreliable as municipality information at that time were 
erroneous and incomplete. The given numbers therefore summarize information on the 
entire pasture area including summer, winter and spring/autumn pasture. For Ala Too no 
information on spring/autumn and summer pasture was available. However, a relative 
comparability of case studies is ensured as the heads of the agricultural departments of the 
municipality administrations and pasture users responded relative abundance of available 
pasture area.  
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Source: own compilation of statistical records from municipality administrations 
and official statistics. For municipality Ala Too only data on area of winter pas-
ture available. 
Sixteen semi-structured expert interviews (Bogner and Menz 2009; Bogner et al. 
2009) and narrative interviews8 (Schütze 1983; von Klobuczynski 1999; Küsters 
2009) were conducted at the national, district and municipality levels with poli-
cy implementers, municipality-level administrators, representatives of the mu-
nicipality-level administration, a nationwide operating NGO and all locally ac-
cessible Pasture Committee members. Qualitative content analysis (Mayring 
2004) was combined with stepwise constant comparison methods (Glaser 1965; 
Boeije 2002). The interviews were complemented by an analysis of the pasture 
law, the guideline developed by the implementing agency in 2009 (henceforce 
implementation plan), Pasture Committee membership lists, and municipality 
level statistics. 
Table 5-3: Case study selection  
Munici-
pality 
 Researcher’s perception of Pasture 
Committee formation process at 




Ala Too Actors Municipality administration Own field 
work  Boundary 
rule 
No community involvement 
Pasture Committee was dissolved  
Bulak Actors Municipality administration Own field 
work  Boundary 
rule 
Limited community involvement 
Pasture Committee was not dissolved  
Kara 
Tash 
Actors Local activists aided by an NGO as 




staff in  
Boundary 
rule  
Locally run Pasture Committee for-
mation 
Pasture Committee was not dissolved 
Source: own representation 
                                                 
 
8 In order to minimize question threat (Foddy 1993) narrative interviews were used in cases 
when a respondent seemed to feel the topic to be very sensitive. 
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5.4 Exploring the multiple actor action situation for boundary rule design 
Case study data showed that boundary rules were designed not only by the law 
making body, the Pasture Department of the Kyrgyz MAWRPI, who drafted the 
pasture law, but also by different authorized decision makers who created addi-
tional sets of boundary rules during the process of law implementation. For a 
better overview, all collective choice boundary rules are shown in Table 5-5.  
15 boundary rules were identified in total. Among those 4 rules (rules 1, 2, 4 and 
14 in Table 5-5) are provisions made in the pasture law; 4 rules (rules 8, 9, 13, 
and 15) are specifications of the law created by the implementing Community 
and Development Agency (ARIS); and seven rules (rules 3, 5,6,7,10,11 and 12) 
are locally designed by both types of SLBs: ARIS field staff – so called Com-
munity Development Support Officers (henceforth: ARIS Community Officers) 
– and municipality level administrators.  
5.4.1 Formal collective-choice boundary rules for Pasture Committee 
establishment in the new pasture law  
The law “On Pastures” was drafted by the Pasture Department of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Water Resources and Processing Industry of the Kyrgyz Republic 
in cooperation with the World Bank and was issued on January 26, 2009. It de-
volved pasture leasing rights from different administrative units to municipality 
administrations and entitled them to shift pasture allocation authority to commu-
nity-based Pasture User Unions (PUUs) and their executive bodies, called Pas-
ture Committees. Pasture Committees hold all executive rights including the 
right to allocate usufruct rights to pastures9 and to determine the amount of pas-
ture use fees to be paid by pasture users.  
Article 6 of the law defines Pasture Committee boundary and position rules: 
the number of Pasture Committee members has to be uneven, the majority of 
Pasture Committee members have to be pasture users, and the Pasture Commit-
tee must include members of the elected municipality council and the head of 
the municipality administration. Besides, Pasture Committee members are to be 
elected by the PUU in which all pasture users are members (see rules, 1, 2, 4, 
and 14). 
5.4.2 Collective choice working rules designed by municipality administrations  
A first Pasture Committee-establishment phase was kick-started by implementa-
tion orders which municipality administrations received from the district (rayon) 
administration offices in spring of 2009 (see Table 5-4, phase I). During that 
                                                 
 
9 The management implications associated with the governance reform are not discussed in 
this chapter. 
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phase municipality administrations experienced a situation which they described 
as very problematic for both higher administration, but also local pasture users, 
who expected them to end the confusion over pasture management authority 
which had grown during 2009. After media had reported about changes in the 
legislation and modified payment regulations, local pasture users expected high-
er administration to implement a law for which they did not possess implemen-
tation guidelines. Hence, in order to cope with citizen expectations the studied 
municipality administration used their discretionary power and designed their 
own boundary rules for Pasture Committee establishment.  
As will be shown in this section, all studied municipality administrations 
chose a similar coping strategy: they designed boundary rules which ensured the 
quick creation of Pasture Committees which – in their view – represented the 
relevant livestock business actors in the community, to ensure a qualified mem-
bership, and which they expected to cooperate well (see rules 5, 6, 7 and 10). 
In municipality Ala Too, the administration had initiated one constitutional 
meeting in July 2009, for which it had selected a group of large-scale animal 
owners whom they considered to possess expertise in the field and which in-
cluded the heads of all municipality villages. Other resource users were not in-
volved in Pasture Committee establishment and did not receive information 
regarding ongoing activities. The interviewed community members considered 
all participants of that meeting to also entertain particularly good relations with 
the municipality administration.  
In municipality Bulak, the administration pre-selected owners of large herds 
for a constituent meeting during which Pasture Committee members were elect-
ed. Municipality residents reported that poor pasture users who claimed an inter-
est in becoming members were considered ineligible for membership in the 
Pasture Committee as they were thought not to hold a stake in pasture use and to 
lack relevant expertise. 
In municipality Kara Tash, the administration had shifted Pasture Committee 
formation responsibility to a particularly active group of herders who created an 
interim Pasture Committee. The group consisted of small- and medium-scale 
livestock owners who were friends and neighbors of one of the three village 
chairmen in the municipality who, at the same time, was the largest livestock 
owner. Members’ selection criterion was described as “people whom we trust” 
and “people who can work”. Pasture Committee members claimed a community 
meeting to have taken place; however, interviewed community members were 
not aware of such public meeting.  
While the above mentioned process lead to a cut down on the participation of 
the broader community, the SLBs designed additional locally adapted institu-
tional innovations which increased the participation of particularly relevant pas-
ture users or service providers. In municipality Bulak representatives of the 
users of all separate mostly used grazing areas were purposefully included in the 
committee. In municipalities Kara Tash and Ala Too, they ensured the represen-
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tation of all municipality villages in the Pasture Committee, key opinion leaders 






Table 5-4: Phasing of implementation of new pasture law 
Municipality Ala Too Bulak Kara Tash 
Date of Pasture Com-
mittee establishment July 2009 July 2009 November 2008
1 
Phase I: Self-directed Pasture Committee establishment (January – August 2009) 
First phase implementer Local Self-government Local Self-government Local activists and Local Self-government 
Boundary rule by first 
phase implementer 
Individuals appointed by Local 
Self-government 
 
Elderly and wealthy pasture 
users, elected by group of 
selected wealthy large-scale 
livestock owners 
“Active” pasture users from 
community, whose engage-
ment was motivated by the 
village chairman 
Phase II: After arrival of implementing agency (September 2009) 
Second phase imple-
menter ARIS Community Officers ARIS Community Officers ARIS Community Officers 
Dissolution of existing 
Pasture Committee No No No 
                                                 
 
1 This Pasture Committee was founded as a scaling-up activity of a CBNRM program run by a Kyrgyz NGO. The activities of the NGO had 
already started prior to announcement of the new pasture law. 
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Revised boundary rule 
by second phase imple-
menter 
Addition of office holders 
(Municipality council mem-
bers; head of a local develop-





bers; head of a local develop-
ment group) 




Source: own representation 
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5.4.3 The implementing agency as designer of collective-choice boundary rules 
In autumn 2009, a second phase of Pasture Committee establishment started (see 
Table 5-4, phase II). ARIS management had, in cooperation with the main donor 
organization, provided their field staff with a formal implementation plan (see 
column B in Table 5-5) which they were to implement in cooperation with mu-
nicipality administrations. According to those rules, the Pasture Committee 
members are to be appointed during a municipality level PUU Foundation Con-
ference consisting of elected representatives from all municipality villages. All 
minority groups are to participate in the election of PUU representatives includ-
ing non-livestock owners and representatives of all social groups (including the 
elderly, youth, women, and the poor). In addition, municipality council repre-
sentatives are to be appointed during a municipality council session. If commu-
nity participation requirements are not met, Pasture Committee dissolution and a 
restarting of the Pasture Committee-formation process were prescribed. 
5.5 Collective choice working rules – routines designed by the 
implementing agencies’ Community Development Support Officers 
ARIS Community Officers experienced a situation typical for SLBs which was 
discussed in Section 5.2.2. They faced a mismatch between the tasks for which 
they were responsible and prescribed rules. The implementation situation the 
SLBs found at municipality level differed from the assumed situation based on 
which the implementation rules were drafted. Hence, ARIS Community Officers 
had to deal with two challenges typical for SLBS: first, at municipality-level 
they found a number of surprises in terms of outcomes of the first phase of Pas-
ture Committee establishment run by municipality administrations for which 
there were no specific regulations and second, they had to deal with rules which 
did not fit the requirements by their clients and their own capacity. As a result 
they faced performance expectations by their agency that were unrealistic to be 
fulfilled. 
First, all interviewed ARIS Community Officers considered the municipality-
run Pasture Committee establishment process from the first implementation 
phase largely non-participatory: none of the study municipalities had established 
a PUU, the formal body authorized for Pasture Committee member election, and 
mainly elderly, wealthy, male livestock owners who, in addition, possessed good 
relationships with the Local Self-government had become Pasture Committee 
members. Second, the prescribed starting point for Pasture Committee formation 
had not been fitted properly into the migration cycle of the pasture users, be-
cause of which the overwhelming majority of active herders in two of the study 
municipalities were on the summer pastures and not accessible by ARIS Com-
munity Officers at the time of Pasture Committee formation. Third, the pre-
scribed time plan allowed only six weeks’ time for Pasture Committee estab-
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lishment activities prescribed in the ARIS implementation plan which included 
running a household level information campaign, conducting five municipality 
level meetings in total and formally registering the Pasture Committee. In addi-
tion, the ARIS Community Officers viewed the Pasture Committee agency pre-
scribed establishment procedure critically. They considered its scheme, both too 
complicated and exceeding their capacity and that of those, usually few, com-
munity members who got engaged in community activities.  
ARIS Community Officers lacked power to successfully negotiate with their 
agency about a readjustment of task performance expectations. A request that 
their agency adjusts the time frame according to municipality-level needs was 
denied by the agency. Hence, they used their room for discretionary decision 
making and modified boundary rules in order to cope with critical cases. This, as 
interviews revealed, was accompanied by a modification of their own mental 
model of their task (see Section 5.6).  
As a consequence, ARIS Community Officers designed rules which violated 
some prescriptions in the implementation plan. Even though they were aware of 
the problem that preceding the ARIS Community Officers’ activities in each 
municipality, only one meeting had taken place during which the Pasture Com-
mittee had been established, and that the participants of those meetings had been 
hand-picked by the municipality administration, none of the ARIS Community 
Officers tried to ensure broader community participation in the Pasture Commit-
tee establishment process. They neglected community information, did not form 
a PUU and, most remarkably, did not dissolve the existing Pasture Committees 
(rule 15).  
Instead, ARIS Community Officers developed some routines which they rec-
ommended in all municipalities. They instructed the municipality administra-
tions to just readjust the composition of the Pasture Committees already formed 
and to add a certain number of municipality council members (rule 2) and the 
chairperson of a Village Development Committees (rule 3) – that is community-
based organizations which ARIS staff had formed during their first municipality 
level project1. 
The authors’ false perception on Pasture Committee dissolution in municipali-
ty Ala Too (see Section 5.3 and Table 5-1) resulted from the misinterpretation of 
a routine established by the SLBs: Ala Too municipality administration claimed 
to have – according to ARIS Community Officers instructions – dissolved the 
entirely non-participatory Pasture Committee they had formed in the first im-
plementation phase. However, the municipality administration re-established the 
Pasture Committee in the same composition. The only difference was that for 
the second Pasture Committee they appointed additional municipality council 
1 Village Investments Project I and II (see ARIS 2014 for further information on that project) 
138  Chapter 5 
 
members. The community was not better involved, neither informed about the 
Pasture Committee establishment process. 
Table 5-5: Boundary working rules designed by ARIS Community Officers, munici-
pality administrations and local pastures user compared to prescriptions 





Working boundary rules in 
Pasture Committee 
establishment phase I 
Working boundary 
rules in Pasture 
Committee 
establishment phase II 
  A B C D E 
 
Mandatory members in Pasture 
Committee are the following 
individuals/ representatives or 
the heads of the following 
groups…. 





OfficersAT, B, KT 
1 Municipality council members X X X X X 
2 Head of municipality administration  X X X
only AT  X 
3 Head of Village Investments Committee2     X 
4 Pasture users (majority of members) X X X X X 
5 Experienced pasture users   X X  
6 Large-scale livestock owners   X X  
7 Opinion leaders and honorable community members    X X  
8 Participation of members of different wealth groups   X  X  
9 
Participation of women and 
young people, vulnerable groups 
and non-livestock pasture users 
in Pasture Committee 
foundation process 
 X    
10 Livestock service providers   X X  
11 Residents from all municipality villages   X X X 
12 Users of all different grazing areas   X
only B X  
13 Minimum number of members  X   X 
14 Uneven number of members X    X 
15 
Dissolution in case of resource 
user exclusion during 
establishment 
 X   Xonly AT 
Source: own representation 
                                                 
 
2 For an outline of the role of the Village Investments Committee as part of the donor-driven 
Village Investments Project and the composition of that committee see Section 3.3.3 
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Column A: pasture law; Column B; ARIS implementation guidelines; Column C, D, E: mu-
nicipality level interviews with ARIS Community Officers; AT: Municipality Ala Too, B: 
Municipality Bulak, KT: Municipality Kara Tash 
In addition, they created easy to implement rules in order to cope with the ab-
sence of herders during Pasture Committee formation: ARIS Community Offic-
ers replaced absent herders with family members, often a male and senior rela-
tive (rule 7 and 5). They thereby enabled the progress of the Pasture Committee 
formation process according to agency requirements, but ignored the fact that 
the most active group of pasture users was not involved, because they were on 
the summer pastures.  
5.6  Drivers of institutional design 
The case study showed that the set of boundary working rules designed by ARIS 
Community Officers and the working rules designed by municipality adminis-
trators deviated only slightly across all studied municipalities. Hence, regardless 
of their room for discretion, representatives of the two groups of SLBs – ARIS 
Community Officers and municipality administrators – designed, independently 
of each other, the same routines. The designed rules lead to the conclusion that 
the main objective in rule design was to create rules which ensured achievement 
of what they perceived as their task. The case studies pointed at a very strong 
impact of the SLBs agency on the mental model of SLBs tasks. Under the given 
external constraints, agency rules and available resources (already discussed in 
Section 5.5) SLBs rationally design rules.  
The relevancy of task perception was best shown by an observed misunder-
standing between ARIS Community Officers and their agency that resulted from 
the agencies’ lip-service to community participation. During staff trainings 
ARIS Community Officers were instructed to ensure full community mobiliza-
tion. The denial of agency rule modification – in other words the modification of 
the implementation plan- in a way to support effective community participation, 
led ARIS Community Officers to modify their mental model of their task. As a 
result they considered their task as to ensuring quick Pasture Committee for-
mation with some participatory elements, instead of full community participa-
tion. The boundary rules they designed entirely served that newly created task 
perception. 
A second finding is, that, besides task perception SLBs pursued own objec-
tives in order to make their work easier: ARIS Community Officers aimed to 
achieve client (in this case municipality staff) compliance by proposing easy to 
implement rules, such as adding formal office holders to the Pasture Committee 
– which required only incremental changes of local practice by municipality 
administrations instead of insisting on a dissolution of the Pasture Committee 
and a restart of the formation process. 
140  Chapter 5 
 
Municipality administrations task perception was a result of implementation 
instructions by district agency who requested the establishment of Pasture 
Committees without participation requirements. They therefore endorsed the 
boundary rules proposed by ARIS Community Officers.  
In addition, administrative staff pursued their own objectives: focusing on cli-
ent (citizen) satisfaction and avoidance of local conflict. Hence, they employed a 
strategy for member selection – mainly appointment – which was neither partic-
ularly democratic nor participatory but which they considered an accepted and 
successful strategy which was reported by municipality level respondents to the 
usually ongoing practice for any type of citizen group formation in those munic-
ipalities. Besides they sought to improve citizen satisfaction by establishing 
participation rules which ensured not only the representation of influential 
community members but also aimed to establish a functional Pasture Committee 
by adding livestock sector experts.  
Both these rule sets complemented each other as no conflict of interest by 
SLBs was observed. ARIS Community Officers did not seek to achieve any 
other objective than Pasture Committee formation and lacked any personal in-
terest in its specific composition. Municipality administration – in contrast – 
aimed at functionality. Problems might have started to arise if ARIS Community 
Officers had more strongly insisted on minority involvement which might have 
led, in the eyes of municipality administrators, to less functional Pasture Com-
mittees. However, such conflict of interests did not emerge. 
5.7 Discussion and conclusion 
The introduction of a new pasture law in Kyrgyzstan has initiated the establish-
ment of municipality level governance organizations, so called Pasture Commit-
tees (Pasture Committees). The case study explored which and how local level 
policy implementers designed rules for the establishment of such organizations 
(boundary rules). The study identified two consecutive implementation phases: 
in the first phase, municipality administrations were in charge of boundary rule 
design. In the second phase, staff of an implementing state run, but donor fund-
ed, agency, called Community-development Support Officers (henceforth: ARIS 
Community Officers), led the establishment process. A result of the implementa-
tion strategy is that both types of actors exhibit characteristics of street-level 
bureaucrats (SLBs) and, accordingly, designed rules based on their own discre-
tion. Rule design was determined by task perception formed by interaction with 
their agency, the pursuit of their own (non-economic) objectives such client 
conflict avoidance. My findings reemphasise the relevance of implementers’ 
understanding of their tasks for policy outcomes (Hill 2003).  
Field work also showed that discretionary rule design by local SLBs has led 
to tailored rule design most appropriate to municipality needs. However, associ-
ated social benefits in term of equity were not and seem to depend entirely on 
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the policy implementers aims. It is important to note that such rule design is 
driven by local level mental models and preferences which might not coincide 
with external policy designers’ preferences. 
Institutional design cannot be reasoned by mono-causal explanation. Hence, it 
is difficult to identify one of the common grand theories of institutional change 
as a compelling explanation of rule design (for a summary of those theories see, 
Kingston and Caballero 2009; Milczarek 2002; Zikos and Thiel 2013). Even 
theoretical specifications for the post-socialist context (Allio et al. 1997) which 
see institutional change as a result of “realizations of opportunities for Pareto 
improvements“ (economic theory), strategic government actions aiming to satis-
fy the electorate (public choice theory) and the benefits that materialized as “the 
by-product of distributional conflict“ (distributional theory) (Allio et al. 1997: 
320) do not comprehensively explain the observed processes.  
It is particularly interesting to note that distributive bargaining (Knight 1992) 
which has frequently been found to be the most powerful explanatory approach 
to institutional change in the post-socialist context (i.e. Milczarek 2002; 
Theesfeld 2005) was not observed, even though competing rule sets were de-
signed by the different SLBs. The study thereby supports one of Lipsky 1980; 
1980) central claim: that SLBs institutional choice is, by definition, not deter-
mined by rent seeking. However, this finding might only hold for the specific 
implementation situations in which implementing actors lack information about 
and experience with the implemented policy which does not allow participants 
to anticipate direct economic benefits from specific rule sets or where such ben-
efits are considered very small.  
Transaction cost reduction occurs but is not the driver of institutional change. 
SLBs, in their desire to cut down their work load and ensure client compliance, 
creatively design rules that are easy to implement, control, enforce, and are 
therefore by definition transaction cost minimizers. However, the reduction of 
transaction cost is the indirect effect they achieve in their search for limitation of 
their own work load and task performance improvement.  
The data finds boundary rule design to be a result of a pragmatic rational most 
appropriate but also consequential logic (March and Olsen 2006). SLBs rule 
design acknowledges task perception, based on their agencies objectives, their 
own capacity and local level working conditions and the expected consequences 
of their action and build, at least in the case of municipality administrators, on 
their experience with similar tasks. 
The proposed changes to the Kiser and Ostrom Approach to institutional 
analysis (Kiser and Ostrom 2000) and the identification of the different transac-
tions at the different analytical levels has been helpful for the identification of 
the implementation network involved in implementation rule design. The use of 
Lipsky’s SLB model for implementation related decision making provided an 
enlightening way to link implementation research and institutional analysis. The 
combination allowed for a focused, context sensitive analysis of the interplay of 
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implementation context and rule making. However, its conceptual limitation to 
democratic administrative systems which sees SLBs, in general, as non-corrupt 
requires further adaptations in order to be of more use. 
The most relevant practical implication of this study is its documentation of a 
need for involvement of SLBs (streel-level bureaucrats) in planning of imple-
mentation strategies in order to avoid the use of blue print implementation strat-
egies which do not produce the intended effect. 
6 Street Level Bureaucrats at work. A municipality-level 
institutional analysis of community-based natural re-
source management implementation practice in the pas-
ture sector of Kyrgyzstan1  
6.1 Introduction 
Decentralization and its embodiment in environmental governance - Communi-
ty-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) – is often considered a 
rem-edy or even a panacea to environmental, governance and social 
challenges (Dressler et al. 2010; McCarthy 2004). Mainly seen as a key to 
better govern-ance at sub-national levels (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006c; 
Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Agrawal and Ostrom 2007), CBNRM has become 
a prominent policy reform approach in a number of countries, particularly in those 
states and, often rural, areas where the public administrative system is considered 
to under-perform. Hence, in many countries supported by the donor community – 
which has endorsed CBNRM as a key reform concept (Pincus 2001; Stoll-
Kleemann et al. 2010) – CBNRM programs and CBNRM-related formal laws 
and regulations are being implemented. This has specific implications: unlike 
exemplary cases of endogenously created sustainable self-governance of 
natural resources (Ostrom 1990; Wade 1988) – from which common-pool 
resource theory and the CBNRM paradigm have evolved – CBNRM today is 
externally designed and introduced.  
The external introduction of CBNRM, for example, by donor organizations 
directly, or by governmental or government-mandated implementing agencies, is 
problematic and the results are mixed. Besides success (Leisher et al. 2012; 
Banks et al. 2003; Saito-Jensen et al. 2010; Sheppard et al. 2010), research has 
documented many cases of failure – either in terms of conservation impact 
(Dumas et al. 2010; Jiang 2006) or social equity outcomes (Shrestha and 
McManus 2007; Cleaver 2005; Cornwall 2003; Blaikie 2006; Wever et al. 
2012). 
CBNRM depends on resource user involvement: 
“CBNRM … requires some degree of devolution of decision-making power and author-
ity over natural resources to communities and community-based organizations… 
[CBNRM] seeks to encourage better resource management outcomes with the full par-
ticipation of communities and pasture users in decision-making activities, and the in-
1 This chapter is a slightly revised version of the article Crewett (2015c) which was published 
in Sustainability 7(3), 3146-3174. 
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corporation of local institutions, customary practices, and knowledge systems in man-
agement, regulatory, and enforcement processes” [Armitage 2005, quoted in Gruber 
2010: 53).  
However, several studies have found that effective resource user involvement, 
considered by many an important prerequisite for sustainable and equitable self-
governance (Gruber 2010; Dinar et al. 2007; Dietz et al. 2003; Agrawal 2001; 
Rodriguez-Izquierdo et al. 2010; Parker and Thapa 2011), is difficult to achieve 
(Lo Cascio and Beilin 2010). The characteristics of CBNRM implementation 
strategies and the resulting interaction among policy implementers and resource 
users play a decisive role for CBNRM implementation outcomes (Sunam and 
McCarthy 2010; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Nkhata and Breen 2010; Nikitina et al. 
2010; Zulu 2009; Young 2006). This interaction is particularly difficult in socie-
ties with a long history of top-down government (Atmiş et al. 2007) where 
CBNRM is being introduced.  
The general objective of this chapter it to explore how a CBNRM implemen-
tation strategy and the resulting interaction among lowest-level policy imple-
menters and resource users influence resource user participation in CBNMR by 
means of information rule design. The research was motivated by a general aim 
to contribute to filling a knowledge gap on the distributional impact of munici-
pality-level CBNRM implementation, for which I assume information access a 
precondition. I assume that access to information is determined by information 
rules – that is, prescriptions which  
“… authorize channels of information flow among participants, assign the obligation, 
permission, or prohibition to communicate [specific knowledge] to participants …, and 
[define] the language and form in which communication will take place” (Ostrom 2005: 
206).  
I further assume that information rules are being created in the process of policy 
implementation. In order to contribute to the general objective of this study I 
specifically study an example of CBNRM implementation in Kyrgyzstan – the 
introduction of a community-based pasture management reform – and investi-
gate the following research questions: 
• Which specific information rules do local-level policy implementers (whom I 
define as street-level bureaucrats (SLB) design during the implementation of 
the Kyrgyz community-based pasture management reform?  
• How do these information rules influence resource user involvement opportu-
nities in community-based pasture management in Kyrgyzstan? 
• How do the implementation strategy describing street-level bureaucrats’ in-
formation tasks and the governance structure within which street-level bu-
reaucrats’ operate influence their information rule design?  
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In the following Section 6.2 I introduce the analytical framework which propos-
es that resource user involvement in CBNRM depends to a large degree on the 
characteristics of routines – in other words working rules – which policy imple-
menters create to simplify the information transfer transaction. In Section 6.3, I 
describe the case study in Kyrgyzstan, where community-based pasture man-
agement was introduced by the law “On Pastures” (Pasture Law) which was 
issued in 2009. In Section 6.4, I explore how different types of policy imple-
menters informed resource users and how the course of action they chose im-
pacted pasture users’ awareness of CBNRM (and of the implicit participation 
opportunities). In Section 6.4.1, I first summarize the policy implementation 
tasks allocated to policy implementers and outline the formally prescribed rules 
for resource user information. Section 6.4.2 reviews the working conditions and 
governance structures under which the two groups of policy implementers per-
form these information tasks: municipality administrators and staff of an imple-
menting organization (ARIS) called Community Development Support Officers. 
Section 6.4.3 reports on pasture users’ information about participation opportu-
nities under CBNRM management. In Section 6.4.4, I explore the information 
routines created by policy implementers. Section 6.4.5 discusses the reasons for 
the emergence of these routines. In Section 6.5, I present theoretical and practi-
cal implications of the study. 
6.2 Analytical framework 
In this section, I develop a modified version of the Institutions of Sustainability 
framework (Hagedorn 2008; Hagedorn et al. 2002) (IoS framework) which 
acknowledges case-study-relevant contributions from public administration 
research in order to more specifically acknowledge characteristics of actors and 
governance structures – characteristics particular to implementation situations – 
which have not been specified in other frameworks. The IoS framework (Hage-
dorn 2008; Hagedorn et al. 2002) takes the following four determinants of insti-
tutional change into account: a) properties of transactions, b) characteristics of 
existing institutions, c) characteristics of actors, and d) governance structures. 
Due to space limitations, the following outline of the IoS framework is not ex-
haustive. I only focus on the most crucial elements. For a detailed description of 
the framework’s approach, see the works of Hagedorn and colleagues (Hage-
dorn 2008; Hagedorn et al. 2002). 
Transactions have been identified as the “unit of activity” (Commons 1931; 
(p. 651) and are often considered the starting point of institutional analysis 
Hagedorn 2008). In this chapter I explore a policy implementation transaction 
during which “a policy is put into action and practice” (Parsons 1995: 461). 
Policy implementation transactions consist of a number of sub-transactions. The 
chapter looks at one specific sub-transaction: the process of transferring 
CBNRM-related information to users of natural resources, in adherence to the 
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principle of resource user involvement in CBNRM. This transaction I call in-
formation transfer transaction.  
Institutions are “systems of established and embedded social rules that struc-
ture social interaction” (Hodgson 2006). They can be formal – in other words 
mainly written – rules, i.e., codified laws, or – often unwritten – working rules 
(Commons 1957; Sproule-Jones 1993). Working rules – sometimes also called 
rules-in-use – are those rules that are “actually used, monitored, and enforced 
when individuals make choices about the actions they will take” (Ostrom 2005: 
51). Institutions are nested within other rules (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). Hence, 
besides exploring the institutional outcome of the policy implementation trans-
action – the information working rules – institutional analysis also requires tak-
ing into account the institutional setting – the rules which structure the policy 
implementation transaction itself. These are formal rules found in the law and in 
written implementation instructions as well as relevant informal rules of con-
duct. 
In the proposed study framework the actor component has a prominent role. I 
take a bottom-up perspective on policy implementation (for an overview see, 
e.g., Hill and Hupe 2009: 51ff.), according to which the actions of service pro-
viders who operate at the lowest administrative levels – commonly referred to as 
Street Level Bureaucrats (SLBs) (Hupe and Hill 2007; Hill 2003; Romzek 2000; 
Lipsky 1980) – are considered the most important determinants of a policy’s 
local effect. Implementation studies have shown the relevance of policy imple-
menter networks (Brinkerhoff 1996) in which different types of SLBs play a 
role. Note that SLBs do not necessarily live close to their clients – they are those 
members of policy implementing organizations who have regular and close 
interaction with those to whom they are to provide services. It is therefore useful 
to further distinguish between external and local SLBs both of which operate in 
different governance structures. Local SLBs are bureaucrats operating at the 
lowest level of state administration. Their offices are permanently located in the 
municipality where they serve. External SLBs – in contrast – are representatives 
of non-local administrations, donor organizations or NGOs.  
Governance structures within which transactions occur and actors operate are 
organizational constructs which establish order, mitigate conflict and ensure 
mutual gains (Commons 1932: 4). They have three stylized forms: a) market, b) 
hierarchy, or c) type of hybrid institutional arrangement, where private and pub-
lic elements intertwine. These governance structures differ by cost and compe-
tence and impose different incentives and controls on actors, which lead to dif-
ferent degrees of autonomy and cooperation (Williamson 1999: 271f.). SLBs 
are, by definition, employed in hierarchical organizations. In hierarchies actors’ 
actions are highly controlled and coordinated. Hierarchies therefore generate 
few incentives and constrain autonomy (Williamson 1999). The governance 
structure of street-level bureaucracy is not a pure version of hierarchy. The spe-
cific working conditions of the SLB increase individual autonomy and limit 
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administrative control. By influencing SLBs’ perception of rewards and costs of 
their activities, the governance structure impacts the discretionary competence 
of SLBs: 
• SLBs’ actions are constrained by their working conditions which, to a large
extent, depend on their subordination to an implementing organization – 
which can be not only a government office but also a civil society organiza-
tion (Hupe and Hill 2007), 
• SLBs work in relative spatial distance from the employing organization but in
relative spatial proximity to the citizens they serve, 
• they are confronted with ambiguous role expectations from their employing
organization and from local clients with whom they interact daily, 
• they have to deal with resource constraints but are confronted with service
demands from their clients that exceed available capacity, 
• SLBs deal with laws and rules external or internal to their employing organi-
zation which often fail to cover the diversity of cases they have to handle, 
because SLBs often need to judge case by case and therefore have some de-
gree of discretion (Romzek 2000; Lipsky 1980). 
SLBs therefore experience a paradox situation as they “see themselves as […] 
oppressed by the bureaucracy within which they work. Yet they often seem to 
have a great deal of discretionary freedom and autonomy” (Hill and Hupe 2009: 
52). 
SLBs actively design those working rules for policy implementation which 
are decisive for implementation outcomes. Hence, all SLBs can be equated with 
policy implementers. SLBs use their discretionary freedom to create routines 
and simplifications. “Routines are the regularized or habitual patterns by which 
tasks are performed. Simplifications are symbolic constructs in in terms of 
which decisions about potentially complex phenomena are made, utilizing a 
smaller set of clues than those presented by the phenomena. Routines are behav-
ioural patterns of response, simplifications are mental patterns of ordering data 
with which routines may or may not be associated” (Lipsky 1980: 225). 
SLBs develop routines and simplifications by assessing rewards and penalties 
and the available resources. Moreover, routines and simplifications let SLBs 
“organize their work to derive a solution within the resource constraints they 
encounter” (Lipsky 1980: 83). Therefore, the characteristics of the policy im-
plementation working rules SLBs develop depend on their relationship to their 
organization. 
Frequently, the resulting working rules deviate from formal rules and can 
even be “entirely informal and contrary to agency policy” (Lipsky 1980: 86), 
because the SLBs choose either a specific way of executing an existing rule, or 
select one specific rule among a set of rules (Hupe and Hill 2007). SLBs’ sim-
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plification strategies might differ, as the selection of simplifications and routines 
depends on individual perceptions of adequate professional behavior, own per-
ceptions of tasks, etc., but also on individual differences in the evaluation of 
options to overcome resource constraints (Wilson 1989). Administrators – also 
SLBs – “satisfice rather than maximize” (Simon 1997: 119). The decisions they 
take are impacted by a specific perception of the implementation task. This per-
ception is determined by: a) personal beliefs, including predispositions about 
how the job is to be done, b) previous experiences, c) sensitivity to professional 
standards, d) political ideology, and e) personal characteristics (Wilson 1989). 
It is nevertheless assumed that the routines and simplifications SLBs employ 
share some characteristics: a) they tend to limit access to and demand for SLBs’ 
services, b) they maximize utilization of available resources, and c) they aim to 
obtain client compliance over and above the procedures developed by their em-
ploying organization (Lipsky 1980).  
Hence, the case studies’ analytical framework (see Figure 6-1), which is 
based on the actors and governance structure component of the IoS, proposes the 
following relationships: first, the studied transaction is part of the implementa-
tion of a new policy; second, the actors are SLBs who carry out the policy im-
plementation transaction, i.e., they execute a formal information rule; third, 
SLBs are assumed to be bound to hierarchical governance structures and the 
associated rules for task performance; fourth, during local-level implementation, 
the SLBs design working rules which allocate CBNRM resource user opportuni-
ties to resource users.  
I assume that information working rules are routines which are consciously 
designed by SLBs depending on three factors: first, the characteristics of the 
policy implementation transaction; second, the SLBs’ perception of the imple-
mentation task; third, the governance structure, including its relevant institutions 
or rules of conduct. To select a specific course of action, SLBs coordinate their 
task perception with the given rules of conduct and the associated rewards and 
responsibilities imposed by their agency. In addition, they acknowledge that 
their actions are embedded in accountability relationships, such as the rules 
enforced by their governance structure. 
6.3 Material and methods 
The Kyrgyz Republic (henceforth Kyrgyzstan) is a Central Asian country which 
belonged to the Soviet Union until 1991. The country is highly mountainous and 
vast areas are dominated by pasture lands and agro-pastoral land use: 97 percent 
of the area is located 1000 meters above sea level and of the roughly 10.5 mil-
lion hectares of agricultural land 9.2 million hectares are classified as naturally 
grown permanent meadows and pastures (FAO 2015: n.p). The changes in the 
distribution of property rights that were associated with the break-up of the So-
viet Union also impacted pasture management in the country. Currently, the 
Street-level bureaucrats at work 149 
 
second pasture management reform – which embodies CBNRM principles and 
replaced a lease-based approach (Crewett 2015b, Dörre 2012) – is in place. 
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Figure 6-1: Analytical framework 
Source: own representation 
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In 1996, so-called Local Self-governments were established at municipality 
level. Those bodies consist of an administrative apparatus (henceforth munici-
pality administration) and a municipality council. Until 2008, both the head of 
the Local Self-government and the council members were elected by popular 
vote. The Local Self-governments are formally independent of the Kyrgyz cen-
tral state and its offices at regional and district levels. In practice, however, Lo-
cal Self-governments at municipality level report to and execute orders from the 
district-level state administrations (Mukanova 2008; Baimyrzaeva 2005; Liebert 
and Tiulegenov 2013).  
On January 26, 2009 a new law titled “On Pastures” (Pasture Law) was is-
sued by the Pasture Department of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Agriculture, Water 
Resources and Processing Industry (MAWRPI). The Pasture Law replaced a 
pasture leasing system that had been in place since 2002 (Crewett 2012; Dörre 
2012) and which had come under severe criticism for its inability to cope with 
growing pasture land degradation (Crewett 2012). It devolved pasture manage-
ment rights form regional and district level branches of the central government 
to Local Self-governments and community-based organizations, called Pasture 
User Unions (PUUs) and their executive bodies called Pasture Committees. By 
law, all municipality residents are to become members of the PUU. Devolution 
granted collective rangeland management rights to the PUUs and entitled them 
to distribute seasonal pasture use rights to individual herders, to fix annual graz-
ing fees based on animal numbers, endowed them with dispute resolution au-
thority, and the right to use revenue from fee collection for management and 
investment in pasture infrastructure. 
I used empirical data from a case study (Yin 1993) at three sites in rural Kyr-
gyzstan. The study sites were chosen according to a maximum variation sam-
pling logic (Teddlie and Yu 2007) based on initial assumptions about different 
degrees of resource user involvement in CBNRM implementation. 
Table 6-1: Timing of events and study activities 
 Pasture Law Implementation Activi-
ties 





 Data collection in municipalities 
Ala Too and Bulak, (different 
research focus); 
Background interviews with 
pasture law designers and pilot 
project implementers in munici-
pality Ala Too 
Nov 
2008 
Pasture Committee foundation in 
Kara Tash 
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Jan 
2009 
Law “On Pastures” signed 
Jul 
2009 
District-level bodies of Local State 
Administration ordered Pasture 
Committee establishment at munic-
ipality level1; 
Pasture Committee foundation in 
Ala Too; 
Pasture Committee foundation in 
Bulak 
Data collection at national level; 
Data collection in municipalities 
Ala Too and Bulak 
Aug 
2009 
ARIS Community Development 
Support Officers2 received training  
Data collection at national 
(cont.) district and municipality 
level; 
Data collection in municipalities 
Ala Too and Bulak (cont.); 




ARIS Community Development 




ARIS (internal) registration dead-
line for Pasture Committees  
Source: own representation 
Data for this study was compiled in different phases (see Table 6-1). In a first 
phase, in July 2009 expert interviews on the community-based pasture manage-
ment reform – initiated by the introduction of the Pasture Law were held. In 
addition, existing implementation experience was discussed in the Ala Too and 
Bulak municipalities, which the researcher knew from previous data collection 
activities in Kyrgyzstan. These interviews revealed that in both municipalities 
some activities for pasture committee establishment were already ongoing. It 
was noted that these processes differed in their approach and that the lack of 
implementation instructions for the Pasture Law had left great room for discre-
tion at municipality level. In the second phase, after the research questions had 
1 Presumably after the draft of presidential decree on implementation specifications for law 
“On Pastures” (Draft for Decree N 386; June 16, 2009) became public.  
2 ARIS Community Development Support Officers are the municipality-level staff of the 
quasi-governmental but mainly donor financed organization ARIS which is in charge of the 
implementation of a number of development programms throughout Kyrgyzstan. The 
implementation of the CBNRM pasture management reform embodied in the Law On 
Pastures is one of its key activities. 
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been specified further, the Kara Tash municipality was added to the set of case 
study municipalities. This municipality was selected because – unlike the other 
two municipalities – NGO staff had reported that pasture committees had been 
established here in a more participatory process. This NGO had been experi-
menting with community-based pasture governance before the Pasture Law was 
issued. In August, September and October 2009, in-depth village level-data was 
collected.3 At that time, the implementing organization had arrived in the munic-
ipalities and started to complement the activities of the municipality administra-
tors (further details of this two-phase implementation process, see 5.4) and the 
Pasture Committee establishment process was still ongoing at all study sites.  
Table 6-2: Case study selection criteria 
Municipality Researchers’ perception of Pasture Committee for-mation process 
Ala Too 
Pasture Committee was established by municipality ad-
ministration; 
No community involvement  
Bulak 
Pasture Committee was established by municipality ad-
ministration; 
Selected, wealthy livestock owners involved only 
Kara Tash 
Pasture Committee informally established by a group of 
local activists aided by NGO as part of NGO’s upscaling 
of activities 
Source: own representation 
Working rules with different degrees of deviation from the formal rules for Pas-
ture Committee establishment were expected at each site (see Table 6-2 for an 
overview on observations). However, as will be shown below, in-depth case 
study work revealed that this diversity of working rules did not actually exist. 
(What was first misunderstood as the ordered dissolution of one of the Pasture 
Committees due to its non-participatory establishment process was actually only 
a dissolution on paper; the committee was later revived in exactly the same 
composition, with only a few additional new members, who were official office 
holders.) Contrary to the initial assumption, all three Pasture Committee for-
                                                 
 
3 Those background interviews are not listed in Table 6-3because the generated information 
were only used for the identification of the case study sites and were not incorporated into 
the body of information analysed with respect to the research question. 
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mation processes followed basically the same general procedure with only cos-
metic variations. In none of the cases was there any drastic variation in the ap-
proaches policy implementers used.  
As this chapter is subject to a confidentiality agreement with all respondents, 
the names of the municipalities have partly been changed and their locations are 
not pinpointed. All municipalities lie in key livestock production areas in North-
ern Kyrgyzstan, where agro-pastoralism is the dominant source of income. All 
resident families except for the poorest own livestock and use pastures for graz-
ing, either directly, as herders, or indirectly, as users of herding services. In the 
studied municipalities, agro-pastoralism is the common practice. Herders spend 
the period from May to October on pastures outside of the village, some travel 
to summer pastures at altitudes above 2500 m (a detailed description of the mi-
gration pattern is found in Steimann 2011 and Schoch and Steimann 2010). 
Data collection started with the mapping of the policy implementation net-
work based on a set of expert-interviews and document analysis. An overview 
on the pasture law implementation actor constellation is found in Figure 6-2. At 
municipality level two types of SLBs – local and external SLBs are involved in 
policy implementation. In the study case local SLBs are municipality administra-
tors; external SLBs – in contrast – are field staff called Community Development 
Support Officers (henceforth: ARIS Community Officers) of the law-
implementing organization Kyrgyz Republic`s Community Development and 
Investment Agency (ARIS). Both actor groups are the lowest-level staff mem-
bers in hierarchical organizations. Municipality administrations depend on or-
ders of higher authorities within the Kyrgyz administrative system – mainly 
from of district administrations, where local branches of the central state admin-
istration are located. The staff of the implementing organization ARIS is clearly 
bound to its employer, which is financially almost entirely dependent on interna-
tional donor organizations – mainly the World Bank. Both these organizations 
became involved in policy implementation and the information transfer transac-
tion at different points in time.  
Municipality administrators started implementing the Pasture Law at munici-
pality level by July 2009. The staff of ARIS supported this process with addi-
tional activities from September 2009 on. This time lag can be explained by a 
delay in the provision of implementation instructions to municipality administra-
tors by central government bodies in charge of law design (for details see 
Crewett 2015b). The exact reason why policy implementation by municipality 
administrators in Ala Too and Bulak started in July 2009 could not fully be veri-
fied. In summer 2009, members of regional and district branches of the central 
government informally ordered the start of pasture committee formation. None 
of the respondents at municipality level but also no expert at district and national 
levels could remember the exact date and the way this was announced. Howev-
er, as a result of what the head of municipality Ala Too named “orders from the 
government – but at that time we got different orders,” Ala Too and Bulak, both 
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had created a Pasture Committee which existed in July 2009 – before the ARIS 
implementation process started. Hence, in all three study municipalities (for the 
explanation for Pasture Committee establishment in Kara Tash see above) Pas-
ture Committees existed before the ARIS implementation activities started. 
Table 6-3: Number of policy implementation expert interviews  
Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Processing 
Industry (MAWRPI) staff 1 
Community Development and Investment Agency (ARIS) 
staff (Leadership and ARIS Community Officers) 4 
Municipality administration staff 5 
Pasture Committee members 8 
Source: own representation 
I conducted 18 expert interviews (Bogner and Menz 2009) with “policy imple-
menters,” whom I define as individuals who possess, due to their function or 
their role in the policy implementation process, specific process knowledge 
about the information transfer transaction. I also interviewed implementation 
strategy designers including representatives of: a) the Ministry of Agriculture, b) 
the policy implementing organization ARIS, c) the municipality administration, 
d) resource users who were given positions in the newly established Pasture 
Committees (Table 6-3). In addition, I held background interviews with employ-
ees of a Kyrgyz NGO who consulted the government on pasture law design and 
implementation. In order to explore the outcomes of the information transfer 
transaction, I held 47 interviews with purposefully selected pasture users, all of 
whom owned livestock but did not hold any formal office, such as a position 
within the administration or the Pasture Committee (see Table 6-4). 
Table 6-4: Number of pasture user interviews 
Pasture users 
Kara Tash 12 
Bulak  19 
Ala Too  16 
Source: own representation 
Data collection methods were adjusted according to the interview situation. At 
national level, semi-structured expert interviews were held. However, respond-
ents at the municipality level considered the research topic very sensitive, so the 
data collection methods had to be adapted (Lee 1999; Lee and Renzetti 1990). 
Hence, semi-structured interviews were replaced by narrative interviews (von 
Klobuczynski 1999; Schütze 1983; Küsters 2009) in order to minimize the 
156 Chapter 6 
“question threat” (Foddy 1993: pp. 112). All interviews were conducted by the 
author and consecutively translated into either Kyrgyz or Russian.  
Interview transcripts were analyzed by means of qualitative content analysis 
with inductive and deductive coding (Mayring 2004), combined with stepwise 
constant comparison (Glaser 1965; Boeije 2002). Deductive coding themes were 
generated from the framework’s study variables. In addition, the Pasture Law 
and the ARIS Implementation Plan were reviewed for information related to 
policy implementation and information transfer prescriptions. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Formal rules for implementing a pasture management reform 
The following sections focus on how different types of SLBs carried out their 
task of resource user information and how their actions impacted pasture users’ 
awareness of CBNRM participation opportunities. 
The implementation of the Pasture Law is part of a donor-financed Agricul-
tural Investment and Services Project which started in 2008. As one component 
of this project, the MWRAPI had transferred actual implementation activities to 
the donor-supported Community Development and Investment Agency (ARIS). 
ARIS employees – so-called Community Development Support Officers (hence-
forth ARIS Community Officers) – were authorized to implement laws at mu-
nicipality level starting from August 2009. 
The first phase of implementation was rather un-coordinated: in spring 2009, 
municipality administrators started forming Pasture Committees without specifi-
cations from higher administrative bodies. Only in a secondary phase, from 
August 2009 on, did ARIS start their implementation operations at municipality 
level, for which they designed a detailed implementation plan (ARIS Implemen-
tation Plan) with specifications on information dissemination.  
The ARIS Implementation Plan prescribed a series of municipality-level in-
formation transfer activities as prerequisites for the establishment of Pasture 
Committees. The aim was participatory citizen mobilization and involvement of 
heterogeneous municipality-level actors, including marginalized and minority 
groups. The ARIS Implementation Plan lists 41 detailed tasks for CBNRM im-
plementation, the responsible bodies, the pasture users to address, the expected 
results of each task, and the relevant instruments. The full procedure is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. Therefore, only the prescribed municipality-level ac-
tivities are summarized in Table 6-5 and discussed in the following sections. 
At municipality level, the information campaign comprised the following: (a) 
roundtables in each district and municipality administration, (b) municipality-
level information campaigns including household-level information activities, 
(c) introductory meetings at the village level, and (d) first village meetings at the 
village level. The ARIS Implementation Plan specifically suggests that all meet-
ings and activities involve representatives of all social groups. Particularly for 
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the introductory and first village meeting, participation of representatives of the 
entire community was mandatory. During the information campaign, ARIS 
Community Officers were responsible for explaining the objectives and strate-
gies of CBNRM implementation in greater detail, both verbally during introduc-
tory and village meetings, but also by providing written information material. 
The ARIS Implementation Plan specifically advises ARIS Community Officers 
to use blackboard announcements and other dissemination activities from 
household up to village level, including distribution of written information on 
the pasture governance reform. The ARIS Implementation Plan required ARIS 
Community Officers to cooperate with the municipality administration and 
“self-motivated” local activists in distributing information to the broader com-
munity and to pasture users. 
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Figure 6-2: Pasture law implementation actor constellation in Kyrgyzstan in 2009 
Source: own representation 
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Table 6-5:Community-level information dissemination tasks exctracted from implementation guideline document  






Explanation of pasture legislation, PUU 
and Pasture Committee objectives, struc-
tures and registration procedures, discus-
sion of implementation procedure at com-
munity level, cooperation agreement 
between municipality administration and 
implementing agency on social mobiliza-
tion and implementation. 
Invitation of leading staff of 
the municipality administra-
tion, representatives of the 
village council, specific vil-
lage interest groups (includ-
ing women's groups, youth 
groups, etc.). 
Preliminary meetings with 
chairpersons of key organiza-




Dissemination of printed and verbal infor-
mation on pasture management and im-
provement project. 
Farmers (large-scale, small-
scale), herders, indirect pas-
ture users, women, elderly 
council members, youth, 
low-income households, 
local community, public and 
private organizations in 
households, streets, organiza-
tions and villages. 
Design of detailed dissemina-
tion strategy for households, 
streets, and villages. 
Involvement of existing 
community groups from 






Explanation of new legislation on pasture 
management, PUU and Pasture Committee 
objectives, structures and registration pro-
cedures, discussion of implementation 
procedure at community level, selection of 
village mobilizers, establishing four pas-
Farmers (large-scale, small-
scale), herders, indirect pas-
ture users, women, elderly 
council members, youth, 
low-income households, 
local community, public and 
Information on dates, times 
and venues of the introducto-
ry meetings is made available 
to the general public and 
local organizations during the 
information campaign. An-
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ture user groups [(1) large-scale farmers; 
(2) small-scale farmers; (3) herders; (4) 
indirect pasture users], definition of mini-








Additional information on PUU and Pas-
ture Committee, discussion of PUU char-
ter, approval of pasture user group mem-
bership, election of PUU conference 
delegates, appointment of Pasture Commit-
tee members for village. 
Farmers (large-scale, small-
scale), herders, indirect pas-
ture users, women, elderly 
council members, youth, 
low-income households, 
local community, public and 
private organizations. 
Verbal and printed infor-
mation on the goals and ob-
jectives, procedures for the 
formation of „Pasture User 
Groups“ is disseminated 
among all the parties con-
cerned. Flyers describing the 
goals and objectives of and 
procedures for their for-
mation to be posted in public 
places. Work will be also 
executed through self-
motivated people who are 
well aware of and willing to 




Discussion of PUU charter, appointment of 







Formation of PUU, discussion and approv-
al of Pasture Committee composition, for-
Delegates and invited parties Information of delegates on 
details of conference 
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mation of Auditing Committee 
Source: excerpt from ARIS Action matrix 
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6.4.2 Governance structures and Street-level Bureaucrats at work 
The following section describes the implementation situation at municipality 
level. It reviews the working conditions and governance structures under which 
two identified groups of policy implementers operate: ARIS Community Devel-
opment Officers and municipality administrators. These groups were profes-
sionally involved in implementing the Pasture Law in the first year after its pub-
lication.  
6.4.2.1 Municipality Administrators 
After the Pasture Law was passed, municipality administrators became respon-
sible for its implementation and for the formation of Pasture Committees. After 
August 2009, their status changed and they effectively became co-implementers 
of ARIS Community Officers and were endowed with an implementation plan 
that had been drafted by ARIS. This study mainly refers to heads of municipality 
administrations (municipality administrators) as local SLBs.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, municipality administrators operated 
in a strict hierarchical system lacking transparency and openness (Karashev and 
Tarbinski 2002). Therefore, at municipality level, the head of the municipality 
holds a very prominent role within the administration; other municipality admin-
istrators – e.g., so-called agricultural specialists – do not play any relevant role 
and do not hold independent decision making authority, because the head of the 
municipality usually monitors them very closely. At the same time, the head of 
the municipality, who is herself or himself under orders of higher authorities, 
such as the district administration, regional administration, or employees of the 
line ministry, holds only very limited practical authority for independent deci-
sion making (Engval 2007; Alymkulov and Kulatov 2002; Mukanova 2008; 
Liebert and Tiulegenov 2013; Martini 2013). Nevertheless, my interviews show 
that in specific situations, as in the study case, there is room for discretionary 
decision making. 
Municipality administrators had to cope with unspecific implementation in-
structions and external pressure. All interviewed municipality administrators 
critically pointed to very unspecific orders from higher administrative bodies on 
implementing the Pasture Law. While all had received access to copies of the 
Pasture Law in spring 2009 and had been instructed by Pasture Committees, no 
implementation instructions had been provided. Hence, all municipality admin-
istrators expressed a lack of information and a need for support and guidance on 
the implementation of the Pasture Law. In one municipality, the interviewed 
administrator even asked me for my own knowledge about ongoing implementa-
tion in other municipalities. He said he expected insights into the proper imple-
mentation of the Pasture Law. 
Street-level bureaucrats at work 163 
Despite the initial pressure for implementation, interviews revealed that mu-
nicipality administrators’ actual implementation of the Pasture Law was not 
monitored by higher administrative staff. This caused large room for discretion-
ary decision making and also insecurity and uncertainty. Hence, information 
gaps and strong discretionary power led municipality administrations – in the 
manner of SLBs – to use their own version of appropriate procedure for resource 
user information and Pasture Committee establishment, which will be explored 
in Section 6.4.4.1. 
Throughout the first year of the implementation process, municipality admin-
istrators did not gain a full understanding of the concept of CBNRM as a form 
of participatory resource user self-governance. Although, from August 2009, 
ARIS Community Officers introduced the ARIS Implementation Plan to munic-
ipality administrators to fill information gaps on the expected process of Pasture 
Law implementation, CBNRM-related training was not provided. Therefore, 
municipality administrators’ information on the concepts of CBNRM remained 
very vague. The importance of resource user mobilization and participatory 
aspects of CBNRM in general did not reach municipality administrations. As 
will be shown later, this impacted how municipality administrators performed 
the information transaction.  
6.4.2.2 The implementing agencies’ Community Development Support Officers 
ARIS Community Development Support Officers (henceforth ARIS Community 
Officers) are external SLBs who became the responsible municipality-level poli-
cy implementers for local information activities from August 2009 on. They 
were instructed to carry out time-consuming information transfer activities pre-
scribed by the ARIS Implementation Plan and also had a very tight timeframe to 
execute their task. On the other hand, there was some room for discretion due to 
low enforcement and lack of regulations for some of the challenges which 
emerged from cooperation with municipality administrators.  
As employees of ARIS, ARIS Community Officers were introduced to the de-
tailed ARIS Implementation Plan (Table 6-5) during a one-week training work-
shop. As a result of this training, ARIS Community Officers considered munici-
pality participation during the entire CBNRM establishment process critical for 
success and therefore a desirable objective for municipality-level activities. All 
interviewed ARIS Community Officers shared a common task perception: they 
claimed as their objective to ensure an understanding of CBNRM objectives 
among all municipality residents and to ensure the involvement of all pasture 
users in CBNRM. However, as will be shown below, this ideal task perception 
deviated from their actual task performance.  
ARIS Community Officers worked under considerable time pressure, which 
motivated them to use their right to rely on support from municipality adminis-
trators for the information transfer transaction. Their time plan gave them only 
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about 8 weeks to establish a Pasture Committee. Hence, they were effectively 
unable to perform the information tasks prescribed in the ARIS Implementation 
Plan, which included: a) street-level and household-level information dissemina-
tion, b) delivery of written invitations to participants in the roundtable meetings 
at municipality level, and c) inclusion of defined minority groups in all imple-
mentation activities. Consequently, they transferred these activities to the mu-
nicipality administrators. 
ARIS Community Officers had to cope with incomplete and inadequate im-
plementation rules. The ARIS Implementation Plan did not provide rules for 
management of cases which deviated from the expected situation, but such cases 
were found in all studied municipalities. One example: upon their arrival, ARIS 
Community Officers found Pasture Committees that had earlier been established 
by municipality administrations and violated the sequence of required action and 
citizen participation prescribed by the ARIS Implementation Plan. ARIS Com-
munity Officers were therefore informally instructed by their employing organi-
zation ARIS to dissolve such non-participatory Pasture Committees and to re-
start Pasture Law implementation according to the ARIS Implementation Plan. 
However, ARIS did not provide formal process requirements on dissolving ex-
isting Pasture Committees and tools for participation evaluation. This left con-
siderable room for discretion. Another observed effect of incomplete rules by 
ARIS was that ARIS Community Officers lost control of information transfer 
activities they had delegated to municipality administrators. ARIS Community 
Officers neither possessed the means to evaluate the information activities they 
shifted to municipality administrators, nor did they hold any formal rights to 
enforce specific tasks, because they were not members of the higher administra-
tion – to which municipality administrators effectively report. Hence, the munic-
ipality administrations possessed wide discretion regarding the degree of citizen 
involvement and followed their own perceptions of adequate citizen involve-
ment and information procedures (see Section 6.4.2.1).  
Also, the prescribed time plan was inadequate with respect to pasture users’ 
needs and implementers’ capacities. A static and overloaded process schedule 
put ARIS Community Officers under substantial time pressure. In their opinion, 
the prescribed procedure did not acknowledge local time preferences and was 
not adjusted to the pasture users’ capacities and needs.  
First, the information campaign and Pasture Committee formation was to take 
place during the yearly migration season, when an important group of pasture 
users, the migrating herder families, were absent from the villages.  
Interviewer: “ Do you have a specific plan by when you expect to have pasture 
committees registered?” 
Respondent:  “By October 10, we were told.” 
Interviewer:  “Do you think that is realistic?” 
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Respondent:  “No, because we were on the training course in Bishkek in August, 
where we discussed the first component of the project, and there we 
were given this date. But we also suggested starting it only after No-
vember 10.” 
Interviewer:  “To start?”  
Respondent:  “To start, yes, because you know that all herdsmen are in the moun-
tains right now and we have few people here in the village.” 
Second, the ARIS Implementation Plan required a number of meetings which 
was assumed to overstretch the capacity of the usually small group of municipal-
ity residents who tend to be involved in self-governance activities. Given that 
municipality administrations had formed Pasture Committees already, ARIS 
Community Officers considered the obvious replication of implementation ac-
tivities to contradict the objective of broad resource user mobilization. ARIS 
Community Officers feared that duplicate meetings would demobilize potential-
ly interested municipality members, because those who engage in municipality-
level self-governance activities are usually asked by the municipality admin-
istration and other community members to participate in many of the existing 
self-governance committees, such as the community development committee, 
irrigation water committee, drinking water committee, and the like.  
“We already told [ARIS] that there is no need for the information meeting, because we 
have a lot of meetings. We have subcomponents for which we have to hold different 
meetings and usually the same people come to the meetings, and they are already fed up 
with the meetings. That's why we suggested not to hold this information meeting but to 
have only one meeting – the first one – where we can give general information. […] 
Our management also supported our suggestion not to hold so many meetings. We 
thought that we could just combine the information meeting with the pasture user 
groups and the first meeting. All this could be one procedure” (Community Develop-
ment Officer). 
The following quote illustrates an additional challenge from the ARIS Imple-
mentation Plan. The Plan held inadequate assumptions about resource users’ 
interest in self-governance activities. ARIS counted on “self-motivated people” 
willing to engage in implementation, but the mobilization of pasture users was 
difficult. One member of a Pasture Committee described his situation as follows:  
“My wife is already very angry with me because I keep spending so much time with 
working for the community. I am always being asked to do more tasks. I have to pay for 
everything myself: paper, stamps, etc. She says that I should stop spending all my time 
for the community, because I do not get anything” (Kara Tash village, Pasture Commit-
tee member). 
Also, ARIS did not reward the commitment of ARIS Community Officers for 
full resource user involvement, but insisted on plan fulfilment, while accepting 
low levels of participation. All interviewed ARIS Community Officers ques-
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tioned the adequacy of the strict timeframe for Pasture Committee registration, 
which they considered to impact negatively upon resource user involvement. An 
initiative by ARIS Community Officers to modify the ARIS Implementation 
Plan to better meet citizens’ capacities and needs, such as holding municipality 
meetings at a time of the year when the pastures users, most of them pastoralists, 
were actually present in the village, was not acknowledged by ARIS Manage-
ment. Instead, ARIS Management encouraged the ARIS Community Officers to 
focus on registering Pasture Committees within the prescribed deadline.  
Interviews revealed that ARIS Management staff had in fact abandoned the 
objective of reaching full municipality information by means of the prescribed 
measures in the ARIS Implementation Plan:  
“… our staff [ARIS Community Officers] also cannot give information to everyone [in 
the municipality]. Of course it will take time. When the members of the Pasture Com-
mittee come to the house and collect payments, like the electrician for electricity, then 
people will maybe understand everything about the [pasture] law. I think in one or two 
years everybody will know about the pasture law, payment and taxes” (Representative 
of ARIS). 
6.4.3 Outcomes of the information campaign  
The impact of the created information working rules on pasture users’ awareness 
of opportunities to participate in CBNRM was studied by means of 47 pasture 
user interviews. The analysis showed a very limited impact of the mainly munic-
ipality-run information dissemination activities by October 2009, when the Pas-
ture Committees were to be officially registered. 
Most respondents claimed to be informed about the existence of a Pasture 
Law; however, this knowledge was very vague and incomplete. Both groups, 
those who claimed to know about the law and, interestingly, also those who said 
they knew nothing, had a very incomplete understanding of its content. It was a 
surprise that several respondents who claimed to know nothing about any legal 
change were aware of at least some details of the CBNRM reform, such as the 
abandonment of rental payments for pastures and a decentralization of manage-
ment authority.  
Respondents were not aware of the future importance of the Pasture Commit-
tee in distributing pasture access rights and regulating the amount and spending 
of pasture user fees, to name some tasks. Some kind of Pasture Committee ex-
isted in all municipalities. Of all respondents, ten claimed to know the head of 
the municipality Pasture Committee. Only three among all respondents believed 
– correctly – that the Pasture Committee was the new responsible body for pas-
ture management.  
Participation opportunities were largely unknown to pasture users. First, not 
one respondent was aware of the existence of a Pasture User Union – of which, 
according to the law, all municipality residents are members. Neither did anyone 
know about the associated election rights for pasture users or any participation 
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opportunities. Also, no respondent embraced the idea that the Pasture Law had 
shifted pasture management and administration rights from state bodies to pas-
ture users. Second, membership in the Pasture Committee was considered a 
privilege for selected community members. Those who had heard about the 
possibility to become a member in a Pasture Committee assumed that this mem-
bership was not open to “average or poor people” but only to “the active peo-
ple,” “educated people,” the wealthy and owners of large herds, or members of 
the local elected community council. Furthermore, none of the respondents were 
aware of any future information transfer activities at the time the interviews 
were held. This was particularly striking in the municipality of Kara Tash, where 
– according to information provided by the ARIS Community Officers – the 
introductory village meeting was to be held three days after the interviews; still, 
none of the interview partners had heard of this upcoming meeting. 
Table 6-6: Respondents’ sources of CBNRM-related information 
 Ala Too Bulak Kara Tash Total 
Awareness of Pasture 
Law        
No  6  14  6 26 
Yes  10  14  6 30 
Source of information        
Paper  1  -  1 2 
Radio  -  -  2 2 
Television  1  3  - 4 
Neighbor / family 
member  7  7  1 15 
Municipality admin-
istration   1  3  2 6 
Municipality council  -  -  - - 
Meeting at municipal-
ity/village level  -  1  - 1 
Source: own representation 
The formal information campaign had not been a relevant channel of infor-
mation dissemination. Table 6-6 shows that informal information transfer 
proved more effective than formal information transfer and that the majority of 
those respondents, who claimed to be aware of a new law on pasture, had re-
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ceived information via other channels. Only one interviewed non-office holder 
had participated in an information meeting on pasture management. 
In all municipalities information transfer was obviously not inclusive and did 
not aim to reach the broader community. The interviews indicated that relevant 
and consistent information reached either only those individuals or families who 
maintain a tight relationship with the municipality administration or local activ-
ists or who were chosen for participation in the process of Pasture Committee 
establishment. The three respondents who were aware of the future role of the 
Pasture Committee were in fact relatives of the head of the administration or 
relatives of those who were designated Pasture Committee members, such as the 
father of a Pasture Committee member and a livestock expert whom the munici-
pality administration had invited to become a member in the Pasture Committee, 
though he had not accepted.  
The interviews showed that information channels used completely circum-
vented families and individuals who were not part of the communication net-
work of those who had been selected for participation in CBNRM implementa-
tion. A case which exemplifies the lack of trickling-down of information, or the 
use of neutral information channels, are two neighbors in municipality Ala Too: 
while the sister of the head of the administration was by far the best-informed 
interviewed non-officeholder among all respondents, her neighbor, a forty-five-
year-old male herder, was not aware of any legal changes in pasture manage-
ment. 
6.4.4 Working rules for resource user mobilization  
Low resource user involvement resulted from incomplete information transfer as 
a result of simplification of implementation tasks by both types of SLBs: the 
ARIS Community Officers and the municipality administrators. 
6.4.4.1 Information campaign performance of municipality administrations 
Municipality administrations did not follow instructions of the ARIS Implemen-
tation Plan. Instead – as is characteristic for SLBs – they designed working rules 
that deviated strongly from the participatory principles prescribed in the ARIS 
Implementation Plan and greatly simplified information tasks.  
According to the implementation plan, the information campaign required or-
ganization of the information meetings, ensuring awareness of these meetings – 
particularly among vulnerable municipality residents – providing household-
level and street-level information, and making the relevant announcements on 
participation opportunities on blackboards. 
Field data showed that municipality administrations did not effectively com-
municate information on participation opportunities to pasture users. Instead of 
formal and equally accessible public information, such as written material, only 
informal information dissemination was observed and reported. Information 
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material was not distributed in any municipality; the household-level infor-
mation campaign was transformed into the personal invitation of individuals 
whom municipality administrators considered capable for participation in Pas-
ture Committee. The information meetings were de facto neither open to all 
potential stakeholders, nor always held at the prescribed intervals. In the munic-
ipalities Ala Too and Bulak, personal invitations to constituent meetings for 
Pasture Committee establishment were the only information activity reported. 
Only in Kara Tash had a public meeting been held. However, this meeting had 
been part of a pasture-management-related training workshop of an NGO, and 
not all pasture users had been aware of it. An elderly animal owner in Kara Tash 
explained:  
“We did not hear about a new pasture law you are talking about. The administration 
usually sends people and asks us to come [to community meetings], but we did not hear 
anything. … If this law is there already, why is nothing going on in our village?” (El-
derly animal owner, Kara Tash) 
6.4.4.2 Information campaign performance of ARIS Community Officers 
During the implementation process, ARIS Community Officers modified their 
perception of the task allocated to them and introduced a number of routines: 
ARIS Community Officers ignored information requirements in the ARIS Im-
plementation Plan. They did not ensure information dissemination to all groups 
of pasture users and municipality residents targeted in the ARIS Implementation 
Plan. They cut down the number of activities planned for the mobilization cam-
paign and streamlined other resource user involvement activities and did not 
effectively supervise the resource user information activities they had shifted to 
the municipality administrators. They even accepted the exclusion of active 
herders in the process of Pasture Committee establishment (after their agency 
had not supported the idea to adapt the time schedule to the needs of herders) 
and allowed elderly ex-herders or other relatives to replace active herders who 
were on migration.  
Instead of following the agency requirement of restarting the entire Pasture 
Committee formation in case of insufficient information transfer, they accepted 
minor reconfigurations in the composition of existing Pasture Committees, 
which had already been formed by municipality administrations, but did not 
meet participation requirements:  
"We started in September. When we arrived here a lot of meetings had already been 
held in the municipality administrations. However, according to the requirements of the 
World Bank we had to hold meetings once more. Before [we arrived], according to ex-
planations made by the [district] administration, Pasture Committees were formed in 
different ways in different municipalities. Now we see that the structure of the Pasture 
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Committee is very different in each AO1. For example in one Pasture Committee they 
have only 5, in another 23 members. Then we came and started to form the Pasture 
Committee with a minimum of 15 people in each. The head of the municipality admin-
istration is automatically in the Pasture Committee, representatives of ARIS are also in 
the committee, we call it Territorial Investment Committee, and we also require 5 dele-
gates from the municipality council” (Community Development Officer). 
The following example shows that the Community Development Officer in that 
municipality simplified resource user information: only one “municipality 
roundtable” was held; only selected participants received a basic introduction to 
the Pasture Law and the steps in the ARIS Implementation Plan. This meeting 
took place without particular citizen involvement. During this meeting, the ini-
tially formed Pasture Committee was slightly modified by adding members 
chosen in a top-down hand-picking procedure; this process just repeated the 
selection of participants in the first meetings.  
The following statements by a Pasture Committee member in Ala Too clarify 
the process:  
Interviewer: “As a member of the municipality council, did you know that there 
was a meeting with ARIS yesterday?” 
Respondent: “I was not in the village because I was away for job training. It was 
announced only two days before. Actually they have to announce it 
five days before. Those who are close to the municipality administra-
tion knew it earlier. That is the way they [the administration] work. 
We have a mafia here. The agricultural officer in the municipality 
administration just came today and told me that I was included in the 
Pasture Committee which was formed yesterday. No one asked me.” 
Interviewer: “Was there a Pasture Committee before?” 
Respondent: “I do not know exactly. Since spring there has been something like 
an agricultural commission.” 
Interviewer: “How many other people are on the Pasture Committee?” 
Respondent: “I do not know.” 
Interviewer: “When is the next meeting?” 
Respondent: “I do not know.” 
Pasture Committee establishment in Bulak followed the same office-holder ad-
dition logic:  
11 Municipality Administration 
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Interviewer:  “We heard there were some changes made when ARIS came for 
training…” 
Respondent:  “Yes, we needed one more deputy from the municipality council on 
the Pasture Committee [that had been formed already]. They [ARIS 
Community Officers] said that the chairman of the [municipality] 
council had to be included and that we needed to get the head of the 
Territorial Investment Committee of the ARIS program on the Pas-
ture Committee.” 
6.4.5 Determinants of working rule design 
Due to time pressure and a lack of familiarity with the local conditions, ARIS 
Community Officers of the government-mandated implementing organization 
ARIS shifted the information campaign task to municipality administrators. 
Municipality administrators, however, ignored the prescribed public information 
campaign, which included public announcement of information meetings and 
distribution of information material specified by ARIS. Instead, municipality 
administrators selected pasture experts, honorable members of the community 
and their closer network and invited them for upcoming meetings and potential 
participation in the planned CBNRM self-governance organization, called Pas-
ture Committee.  
While this might be considered a strategy for rent seeking, I propose a differ-
ent explanation: The responsibility for the information campaign was shifted 
from ARIS Community Officers – who had received training on CBNRM and 
therefore knew the relevance of the resource user information campaign – to 
municipality administrators, who had only received implementation information 
from ARIS Community Officers, but lacked any further training on CBNRM 
principles. Hence, municipality administrators in charge of the information 
campaign held a different perception of the required information dissemination 
activities. By contacting only those members of the community whom they 
deemed to possess the relevant expertise and influence, they followed a previ-
ously used, non-participatory, but rational strategy. They selected people whom 
they considered qualified for self-governance. This has to be seen as an existing 
local governance practice. It meets (at least) administrators’ perceptions of ade-
quate transparency and accountability, according to which primarily those who 
will effectively manage the pastures – the potential Pasture Committee members 
– qualify for information access. This working rule, however, led to task per-
formance which was non-participatory and sometimes clandestine.  
The shift of responsibility for the information campaign was not accompanied 
by adequate steering by ARIS Community Officers for a number of reasons: 
First, they lacked time to monitor and control the performance of the infor-
mation campaign. Second, besides insufficient means for enforcing the execu-
tion of information activities there was a lack of formal rules to regulate the 
cooperation between municipality administrators who were basically members 
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of the state administration, and ARIS Community Officers, who are employees 
of a government-mandated and donor-financed organization. Hence, municipali-
ty administrators are not formally accountable, neither to the ARIS Community 
Officers, nor to ARIS as an organization. Third, ARIS Community Officers’ 
motivation for improving the quality of the information campaign abated after 
they recognized that ARIS showed little interest in the campaign. As discussed 
in Section 6.4.2.2, ARIS did not effectively support the proposed modification 
of rules for improving the outreach of the information campaign, as proposed by 
the ARIS Community Officers. Instead, ARIS encouraged them to meet the 
deadline for Pasture Committee formation in any case. My interpretation is that 
ARIS’ denial of the ARIS Community Officers’ request to adapt the dissemina-
tion strategy to municipality needs had two effects: it firstly made these Officers 
perceive their agency’s main interest to be the timely formation of Pasture 
Committees instead of municipality information, and secondly, it led to some 
degree of frustration and therefore made Officers prefer to invest their limited 
time in the establishment of Pasture Committees (as preferred by ARIS) instead 
of sharing information about CBNRM principles with resource users.  
ARIS Community Officers therefore enforced those participation require-
ments for Pasture Committee membership which were easy to observe and con-
trol, such as minimum number of members or participation of municipality 
council members. 
6.5 Discussion and conclusions 
I aimed to answer the question how and which information rules are designed 
for Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) during the 
implementation of a pasture management reform in Kyrgyzstan and how they 
impact the distribution of CBNRM-related information. The research was moti-
vated by an interest in filling a knowledge gap on determinants of the distribu-
tion of CBNRM-related benefits at resource user level, which has been linked to 
access to information and participation opportunities.  
My data shows that information working rules were designed by the staff of a 
policy implementing organization in cooperation with municipality-level admin-
istrators. In contrast to implementing agency regulations – which aimed to in-
volve all pasture users in CBNRM (albeit in different roles) – the designed in-
formation rules limited information access on CBNRM participation 
opportunities to resource users hand-picked by municipality-level administra-
tors. 
My study found difficult working conditions, both for staff of the policy im-
plementing organization and for municipality administrators, who were heavily 
influenced by the governance structures to whom they reported. They had to 
cope with: a) an initially uncoordinated implementation process; b) unclear dis-
tribution of competencies; and c) delayed provision of insufficiently tailored 
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implementation rules, designed by the implementing organization, not its local 
staff. This has motivated the staff of the implementing agency to develop rou-
tines which aligned their own tasks with the available capacity and time and also 
satisfied the implementing organizations. However, these routines, which repre-
sent the actual information working rules, did not contribute to resource users’ 
awareness of CBNRM participation opportunities. There are two reasons for 
this: a) municipality administrators adopted information working rules which 
they considered most successful, informing only a few instead of all resource 
users; b) staff of the implementing organization ignored their agency’s second-
ary goal of ensuring full resource user participation and largely accepted the 
working rules created by municipality administrators. 
This study explains information working rule design for donor-initiated policy 
implementation transaction as an unintentional effect that emerged from bound-
ed rational (Simon 1997) choice of routines by lowest-level policy implement-
ers’. This happened in an attempt to cope with difficulties and ambiguities in 
task prescriptions they had received from their agency. The developed routines 
serve to achieve satisfaction instead of optimization of decisions and processes. 
Satisficing led to the emergence of information rules which did not fulfil the 
donors’ stated participation goals, but allowed keeping the timeline prescribed 
by the agency. 
These findings pose theoretical implications. First, rule design motivated by 
satisficing leads to institutional persistence instead of institutional change. In the 
study case, employees of the implementing agency, in order to avoid difficult 
and time-consuming enforcement of agency rules, were satisfied with infor-
mation working rules set by the municipality administrators. (It is important to 
note that between those actors no formal accountability relationship existed, but 
that municipality administrators felt accountable to the staff of the implementing 
agency due to the agency’s proximity to the central government and donors.) 
Since municipality administrators also wanted to avoid time-consuming and 
potentially conflict-bearing full resource user involvement, they employed non-
participatory, non-inclusive information rules which did not differ from previous 
practices, also not from those used during the Soviet period. This resulted in 
satisficing which encouraged institutional persistence, in other words path de-
pendency, and hindered institutional change.  
Second, the findings are in contrast to perceptions of institutional competition 
or rent-seeking theory, according to which actors would intentionally design 
rules which exclude others in order to increase their individual benefits. In the 
study case, rent-seeking does not play a role. This is, however, no surprise as at 
the time of data collection – a very early phase of CBNRM implementation in 
the pasture sector – those in charge of working rule design could not anticipate 
the potential economic rents associated with participation or non-participation in 
CBNRM. In 2009, municipality administrators, on the one hand, had no infor-
mation on rules for fee collection, resource access or other potential economic 
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implications of CBNRM for the pasture sector in Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, 
Community Development Officers did not entertain economic relationships with 
municipality residents and local pasture users because they are non-local exter-
nal staff members of a non-local organization. Rent-seeking, however, might – 
under different circumstances, e.g. once the full potential of Pasture Committees 
is understood, rent-seeking may become a motivation for rule design. 
The analytical framework was well-suited to structured data collection and 
analysis. The specifications of the actor-governance relationship, which I intro-
duced with the concept of street-level bureaucracy, helped to explore a very 
important relationship in rule design during policy implementation processes, 
which is often not explored. The framework is appropriate for studying a rarely 
explored link between governance structures and working rule design. It offers 
an explanation for actors’ choice of action, which is well accepted in public 
administration theory, but has to date not received much attention in institutional 
analysis. The study therefore revealed the impact that governance structures, via 
their procedural regulations and practices, have on working rule design. It helps 
to study the (only implicit) relationships and mechanisms by which governance 
structures impact actors’ behaviour.  
The application of the framework remains a challenge. Each of the frame-
work’s elements requires extensive background research (legal reviews, explor-
ing and mapping of actor networks, study of actor characteristics at different 
administrative levels, exploration of governance structures and the linkages 
between these elements), which is only possible by using in-depth case studies 
with qualitative research methods combined with other data collection methods. 
Such data collection is time-consuming and requires substantial funding. Be-
sides, research on the characteristics of governance structures is risky, particu-
larly in environments where governance structures are intentionally opaque. In 
such environments, rules of conduct are difficult to understand and respondents 
might hesitate to reveal insights into ongoing governance practices. Hence, there 
is a risk that substantial data gaps might remain, endangering the success of the 
research.  
This leads to a further limitation of the study. The present study reports on the 
first year after proclamation of the Pasture Law, which was characterized by 
confusion about the adequate implementation on all administrative levels. 
Therefore, the study’s findings about very low levels of resource user infor-
mation require careful interpretation, and it is very likely that information has 
since been transferred by various means, increasing awareness of the pasture 
management reform.  
The study has practical implications for designing CBNRM implementation. 
The findings emphasize that implementation and information transfer in particu-
lar, as well as the goal of active resource user participation, require a well-
designed, time-consuming strategy. Strategies based on blueprint perceptions of 
simple, local, informal information transfer or an assumed automatism accord-
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ing to which information, once provided to a limited number of people, quickly 
spreads to all members of the resource user group, including minorities and 
vulnerable segments of the population, are insufficient. Similarly incorrect is the 
assumption that resource users are eager to participate in municipality-level 
activities. The local situation is, instead, that a small group of actors with a lim-
ited capacity, voluntarily or under pressure, assumes offices and is only partly 
interested in self-governance. Therefore, careful planning and full acknowl-
edgement of local policy implementers’ roles, resources and perceptions of re-
ward structures, as well as resource users’ capacities and interests, is required to 
create effective implementation strategies.  
Implementation strategies must also encompass trainings which ensure a 
complete understanding and acceptance of all objectives, including intermediary 
objectives, such as full resource user awareness of ongoing changes, among 
implementers at all hierarchy levels, and particularly among those working at 
the service frontline. The strategy must cover rules which are complementary to 
the working environment of local policy implementers. Designers of implemen-
tation strategies need to understand decision making among implementation 
actors. The study’s findings clearly show the need to fully acknowledge the 
implementation contexts. Therefore, the implementation strategy design must be 
preceded by a review of the hierarchical relationships of CBNRM policy im-
plementers, including those at different levels of the administrative system, in 
order to develop meaningful monitoring and enforcement mechanisms which go 
beyond command and control and allow for a meaningful evaluation of partici-
patory activities. There is also a need to review existing information channels by 
which different groups at each municipality level can be reached. Information on 
resource users’ availability and capacity for participation is also needed. It is 
obvious that local policy implementers play a key role as sources of information. 
However, they should also participate in designing meaningful rules and tools 





The essays in this book examine agricultural service decentralization in the 
Central Asian Kyrgyz Republic. They explore agricultural service 
decentralization strategies and outcomes at the municipality level. They 
contribute to the hitherto very limited literature on the decentralization of 
agricultural services in post-socialist developing countries. Decentralization of 
services is generally assumed to lead to improved service provision, the idea 
being that shifting service provision responsibility from state to private actors 
increases service providers’ accountability towards service users and allows 
services to be more specifically tailored to local needs. However, the results of 
my research based on four case studies drawn from different agricultural 
services exhibit a surprising degree of decentralization failure. They show that 
agricultural service decentralization, as designed and implemented to date, has 
improved neither the quality nor availability of services. The specific 
conclusions of each case study can be found in the respective chapters. In this 
section, I deduce from my findings some practical conclusions how 
decentralization strategy design and research could be improved. 
Following withdrawal of the state and in the absence of an emerging private 
agricultural service sector, international NGOs have become the most important 
or, often, the sole provider of agricultural services at municipality level in the 
Kyrgyz Republic. Therefore, municipality-level service availability depends in 
practice, firstly, on the international NGO’s decisions about the geographical 
distribution of specific agricultural service projects; and secondly, on the moti-
vation and ability of municipality-level decision-makers to apply for this NGO-
type of support on behalf of their community. 
The involvement of international donor organizations has not increased ser-
vice providers’ accountability to service users. In practice, the international 
NGO determines which agricultural services are to be provided in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, as well as where and how. The research in this book revealed that the 
most common strategy pursued by the international NGO for municipality-level 
service provision is the community-based service provision group. The research 
further show that this approach has not proved effective in the Kyrgyz Republic: 
the community-based service provision groups observed there did not meet 
farmers’ expectations and also failed to mobilize full community involvement.  
The research found that externally designed decentralization strategies and 
implementation plans had been applied. These so-called blueprints are based on 
false assumptions about municipality-level decision-making and participation, 
and consequently have a negative impact on municipality involvement. Inappro-
priate planning assumptions are generally rooted, firstly, in oversimplified no-
tions of how participatory service groups can be implemented in the absence of 
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a culture of deliberation, open debate, and democratic representation; and sec-
ondly, in a failure to fully recognize the role of the municipality-level project 
implementers who are in charge of making the decentralization project work on 
the ground. 
The present research therefore demonstrates the urgent need to adjust project 
design and implementation strategies for externally driven service decentraliza-
tion. This is of particular relevance when—as in the case of the Kyrgyz pasture 
management reform—the donor organization becomes the driving force behind 
project implementation, i.e. finds itself guiding developments, because the gov-
ernment itself lacks the capacity and experience to deliver novel project ap-
proaches.  
In terms of service planning, three important issues need to be considered: 
service user’ preferences for specific services, their motivation for participation 
in service user groups, and the capacity of their communities to get involved in 
community-based management. Therefore a number of planning assumptions 
need to be critically reviewed:  
• service user preferences for services and service needs as perceived by the 
international NGO as service provider can differ greatly  
• service users might not necessarily prefer community-based service provision 
over other (state or private) forms of service provision which require less 
personal involvement 
• at municipality level, information on participation opportunities is not made 
publicly available and/or used as leverage in village politics 
• an externally driven participatory service provision strategy does not neces-
sarily lead to democratic decision-making.  
With regard to the planning of service decentralization implementation, it is vital 
to take into account the local administrative and decision-making context. In the 
cases examined here, service decentralization implementation did shift much 
responsibility and discretionary power to municipality administrators (such as 
the head of the municipality-level administration) as well as to municipality-
level staff of the international NGO. However, the international NGO, when 
designing the implementation strategy, failed to acknowledge the importance of 
local-level decentralization and the project implementers’ personal perceptions 
of their tasks and scope of action. One proposal based on my research findings is 
accordingly that project (implementation) planners should review their assump-
tions regarding municipality-level roles, decision-making processes, and means 
of information transfer in order to better align project objectives and project 
outcomes. My research further showed that the interests, capacities in terms of 
knowledge and time resources, and working environments of the local policy 
implementers—who by definition have broad scope to take decisions and action 
at their personal discretion—can have a major impact on their motivation and 
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hence also on the outcomes of service reform implementation. Therefore, the 
design of implementation rules must be adjusted to the administrative context 
within which local-level project implementers operate and which shapes their 
perceptions of their implementation of work tasks and their scope for action. 
With regard to municipality-level policy implementers (local administrators, 
local staff of implementing organizations) more attention must accordingly be 
given to:  
• their involvement in accountability relationships//structures  
• their access to project implementation resources 
• the implementation rules they are bound to and their understanding thereof 
• their perceptions of the tasks to be implemented, and  
• their present capacity and further training needs.  
The reason for the inappropriate design of rules as described above is that do-
nor-driven implementation strategies are based on a number of premises that 
lack empirical foundations. One major conclusion of the present research is that 
if decentralization projects//agricultural service decentralization in the post-
Soviet realm are//is ever to be effectively designed, then solely on the basis of 
more qualitative research that can broaden and consolidate the empirical data 
available to date. This simultaneously implies that blueprint assumptions about 
the lives, interests, and decision-making structures of rural individuals and 
communities, and—very importantly—their lowest-level policy implementers 
must be abandoned; and it further implies that policy implementation assump-
tions based on experiences made in other administrative contexts than the rele-
vant current one must be fundamentally called into question. What is required, 
to sum up, is careful acknowledgement of the specific implementation back-
ground in hand as well as the kind of detailed, in-depth knowledge that can be 
gained solely through qualitative data collection and analysis: knowledge of 
local-level decision-making structures, local-level administrative processes and 
capacities, and local-level information flows.  
For such empirical research to fulfill its potential to effectively inform policy 
and policy implementation design, two things are required: firstly, a solid com-
mitment to allocating sufficient time and resources to detailed, local-level quali-
tative studies; and secondly, a willingness to acknowledge and adopt the find-
ings of such studies in policy implementation design. 
The theoretical focus of this research was to better understand local-level pro-
cesses of institutional change. Institutional change has not materialized as origi-
nally intended. The theoretical lens of the case studies in this research is institu-
tional economics. The novel theoretical approach employed in this study is to 
consider policy implementation outcomes to result from individual instances of 
working rule design by local-level policy implementers. Until now, institutional 
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economics has not further specified the role of policy implementers as rule de-
signers but has mainly been concerned with either the policymaker or the re-
source user. 
My proposal to explore the role of these actors makes an important contribu-
tion to institutional theory. Community-based approaches to resource manage-
ment or service provision have become a widespread policy recommendation in 
recent years. Hence, external policy implementers have become an important 
role model for the local-level design of community-based resource management. 
The case studies in this book highlight the important role played by local-level 
policy implementers, a role which has been largely overlooked until now, in 
institutional analysis in general and in decentralization research in particular. In 
this book I suggest how to use institutional theory as a means to better account 
for the impact these actors have. I believe that my proposal to combine Ostroms’ 
leveled approach to institutional analysis with the use of Ostroms’ grammar of 
institutions for the exploration of local rule constellations, and Lipskys’ concept 
of street-level bureaucrats as a means to structure the study of municipality-level 
decision-making constitutes an effective analysis of municipality-level policy 
implementation and can help explain decentralization approaches under the 
specific conditions prevailing still in several post-socialist countries: namely,  
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Figure A-1: Annual GDP growth in % 1990-2012 
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Figure A-2: Sectoral contribution to GDP 1990-2012 
Source: World Bank 2014 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 31,4 27,5 23,1 26,9 33,6 36,5 31,9 32,5 37,7 37,3 31,8 33,7 38,9 40,6 42,5 45,6 47,1 49,6 49,4 52,3 51,3 50,5 54,9
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 35,0 35,4 37,7 32,0 25,4 19,5 18,2 22,8 22,7 24,9 31,3 28,9 23,3 22,3 24,1 22,3 20,0 19,2 23,5 26,5 29,2 30,8 25,3













Figure A-3: GINI index1990-2010 
Source: World Bank 2014 
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Table A-1: List of interview partners 
Date Name1 Location2 Sex Position 
02.05.2008 Kadyrbek Kalkanov Bishkek M Head of Department of Interbudgetary Policy of the Ministry 
of Finance 
02.05.2008 Medet Sulatanbaev Bishkek M ARIS 
03.05.2008 Baktiyarhan Fattachov Bishkek M State Secretary at the Ministry of Local Self Government 
and Regional Development 
04.05.2008 Topchugul Shadullaeva Bishkek F Editor of the journal “Agro-Press”  
04.05.2008 Botol Argynov Bishkek M Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Processing 
Industry (MAWRPI)  
05.05.2008 Klaus Lehrke Bishkek M Deutscher Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisenverband 
05.05.2008 Kanyshai Shrashenkova Bishkek F Financial Company for the Support of Credit Unions, Head 
06.05.2008 Tatiana Vedeneva Bishkek F Public relations officer of NGO Legal Advise to Rural Citi-
zens (LARC) 
06.05.2008 Almas Musabaev Bishkek M Head of NGO Legal Advise to Rural Citizens (LARC) 
10.05.2008 Elisabeth Kaatz and Bishkek F NGO Hevetas‘ Rural Advisory Service 
                                                 
 
1 I am bound to a confidentiality agreement with all municipality-level respondents and non-supervisory staff members of organizations. The 
names of those respondents are therfore not published in this table.  
2 I have, as promised to the respondents at municipality-level, changed the names of the case study municiapalities in order to protect the 




10.05.2008 Aynura N. Bishkek F NGO RDS Elet 
11.05.2008 Tim Stevenson Bishkek M NGO Winrock international — Central Asian Initiative 
11.05.2008 Kedar Dabke Bishkek M Ak Chardak (Agricultral input trading company) 
12.05.2008 Ulan Kasymov Bishkek M Camp Ala Too 
13.05.2008 Guljan Suiunalieva Bishkek F JICA 
13.05.2008 Gulnura Muratova Bishkek F GTZ [Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit] 
13.06.2008 Inam-ur-Rahin Bishkek M Researcher 
16.05.2008 Nazgul Nurjanova Bishkek F NGO Helvetas, Local Market Development project 
16.05.2008 Damira Sulpieva Bishkek F Coordinator of UNDP Local Self Governance and Decen-
tralization Programme  
17.06.2008 Tilek Ashymov Bishkek M Deutscher Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisenverband 
08.06.2008 Rita Kaldasheva Thon F Secretary of district (rayon) Kenesh in Thong 
19.06.2008 Shabdan Ala Too M Secretary of municipality administration 
10.06.2008 Baktygul Sapar kyzy Ala Too F Social worker 
20.06.2008 Janysh Esengulov Ala Too M Para-veterinarian 
21.06.2008 8 anonymous respond-
ents 
Ala Too F Rapid Rural Appraisal/Group interview  
21.06.2008 Taalai Ala Too M Murab (Irrigation manager) 
22.06.2008 Anonymous  Ala Too F Mother of land specialis (Timur Gasetov) 
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22.06.2008 2 anonymous respond-
ents 
Ala Too M Poor family 
22.06.2008 Samira, Turar, Aimbek, 
Baishigigit 
Ala Too F/M Livestock owners 
22.06.2008 Abdu Karimov 
Torömösh 
Ala Too M Head of drinking water user association 
22.06.2008 Gülasem Ala Too F Accountant of drinking water user association 
23.06.2008 Sodanbek Baslakunov Ala Too M Head of municipality administration 
23.06.2008 Esenaman Israilov Ala Too M Part-time gold mine worker, farmer 
23.06.2008 Saken  Ala Too F Credit holder, mother of craft workshop owner 
23.06.2008 Anonymous Ala Too F Farmer and livestock owner 
24.06.2008 Anonymous Ala Too F Farmer and livestock owner 
25.06.2008 Saikaran and Aralbai Ala Too F/M Host family B, Farmer and livestock owner 
25.06.2008 Anonymous Ala Too F Livestock owner 
25.06.2008 Anonymous Ala Too M Elderly livestock owner 
25.06.2008 Anonymous Ala Too M Extremely poor man and his friend 
25.06.2008 2 anonymous respond-
ents 
Ala Too F/M Animal owners 
25.06.2008 Aisalkyn Ala Too F Social worker; accountant of ARIS Territorial Investments 
Committee (TIC) 
26.06.2008 Samyi Eraliev Ala Too F Livestock owner 
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26.06.2008 Mambetkasieva Ala Too F Livestock owner 
26.06.2008 Sydykova Ala Too F Livestock owner 
26.06.2008 Bayzakova Ala Too F Livestock owner 
26.06.2008 Kurmanalieva Ala Too F Livestock owner 
26.06.2008 Anonymous Ala Too F Livestock owner 
26.06.2008 Anonymous Ala Too M Livestock owner 
26.06.2008 Sanak Ala Too  Livstock owner and farmer 
27.06.2008 Ermek Baibagyshov Naryn M State University of Naryn 
28.06.2008 Balbaev Bakyt Useino-
vich 
Naryn M Regional Manger Rural Advisory Service in Naryn 
28.06.2008 Temirlan Naryn M Representative of UNDP Poverty Eradication Program 
Naryn 
28.06.2008 Aigul Abdyldaeva Naryn F Aga Khan Fundation 
28.06.2008 Kubanych Tagaev Naryn M Head of UNDP Democratic Governance Program 
29.06.2008 Murzabek Kulukeev At Bashy M Coordinator Municipal Resource Centre in At Bashy  
30.06.2008 Süjunbek Jolboldiev Bulak M Head of Bulak municipality administration 
30.06.2008 Nassyr Djusupov At Bashy M Regional manager of Rural Advisory service in At Bashy 
30.06.2008 Nurdjan Abduldaeva Bulak F Nurse 
01.07.2008 Esengasy Alymkulov Bulak M Secretary of municipality administration 
02.07.2008 Djunus Djekshenov Bulak M Social worker 
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02.07.2008 Anonymous Bulak F/M Rapid Rural Appraisal / Group interview 1 
04.07.2008 Anonymous Bulak F/M Rapid Rural Appraisal/ Group interview 2 
04.07.2008 Djanbolot Ayepov Bulak M Financial officer  
04.07.2008 Samarbek Tcholbaev Bulak M Land expert 
02.07.2008 Umurtaly Salayev Bulak M Veterinarian 
05.07.2008 Anonymous Bulak F Poor women 
05.07.2008 Anonymous Bulak F Self-help group member 
06.07.2008 Anonymous Bulak F Teacher  
03.07.2008 Representatives of dif-
ferent AOs 
Naryn M/F Regional workshop of National Academy of Science 
07.07.2008 Akhun Bulak M Hunter  
08.07.2008 Shukurbek Kapatov Bulak M Mechanic 
08.07.2008 Anonymous Bulak F Tractor owner 
08.07.2008 Burul Shamalova Bulak F Livestock owner and farmer 
09.07.2008 Turatbek Bulak M Livstock owner and farmer, lorry owner 
09.07.2008 Anonymous Bulak F Livstock owner and farmer 
09.07.2008 Sabira Bulak F Former local contact of Rural Advisory Service (RAS)  
09.07.2008 Anonymous Bulak F Pensioneer 
14.07.2008 Sharabidin Tairov Osh M UNDP Democratic governance programme 
14.07.2008 Ainagul Nasyrova Osh F/M TES centre manager in Osh 
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15.07.2008 Toktonazar Temiraliev Kyzyl Suu M Kyzyl Suu deputy head  
15.07.2008 Maksuda Kyzyl Suu F Farmer 
16.07.2008 Turusbek Kyzyl Suu M Director of School  
16.07.2008 Anonyomous Kyzyl Suu F/M Rapid Rural Appraisal/ Group interview 1 
16.07.2008 Kalia Kyzyl Suu F Livestock owner and farmer 
17.07.2008 Anonymous Kyzyl Suu F Rapid Rural Appraisal/ Group interview 2 
17.07.2008 Toktobay Kyzyl Suu M Agricultural Cooperative “Aicenem” member 
17.07.2008 Madanbek Pasilov Kyzyl Suu M Machinery cooperative member, ARIS-TIC member, Aiyl 
kenesh member 
17.07.2008 Dajiachan Kyzyl Suu F Credit group member 
18.07.2008 Ulukbek Zairov Kara Suu M RAS Kara Suu, Livestock expert 
18.07.2008 Akylbek Dosaliev Kara Suu M LARC Kara Suu Lawyer 
20.07.2008 Adambek Sarachev Kyzyl Suu M Veterinarian 
20.07.2008 Anonymous Kyzyl Suu F Farmer 
20.07.2008 Anonymous Kyzyl Suu F Farmer 
20.07.2008 Anonymous Kyzyl Suu M Trader 
20.07.2008 Anonymous Kyzyl Suu M Farmer 
21.07.2008 Anonymous Kyzyl Suu M Farmer 
21.07.2008 Kalybek Akybaev Kyzyl Suu M Head of Kyzyl Suu municipality 
21.07.2008 Kalyicha Jusupova Kyzyl Suu F Farmer 
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21.07.2008 Jyltyr Kadyrov Kyzyl Suu M Farmer and livestock owner 
21.07.2008 Kokkozova Kaiyrsa Kyzyl Suu F Farmer, widow 
21.07.2008 Ibraimova Anyk Kyzyl Suu F Farmer 
21.07.2008 Jiydegul Kyzyl Suu F Farmer  
21.07.2008 Ismail Tashbekov Bolshevik M Head of state seed breeding station in Kara Suu 
22.07.2008 Alima Amatova Bolshevik F Financial expert at Bolshevik municipality 
22.07.2008 Ibrahim Kaiyrbekov Bolshevik M Land expert at Bolshevik municipality 
22.07.2008 Zura Abazova Bolshevik F Social worker at Bolshevik municipality 
22.07.2008 Anonymous Bolshevik M Head of Bolshevik municipality 
22.07.2008 Joldubai Jorobaev Bolshevik M Veterinarian 
23.07.2008 Jusup Tashantov Bolshevik M Farmer and livestock owner 
23.07.2008 Jusup Tashtanov, Ai-




Bolshevik M/F Rapid Rural Appraisal/ Group interview 1 
23.07.2008 Batma Abdraimova, S. 
Baltabaeva, Sainabidim 
Djaipov, Omurbek Sher-
aliev, Akmataliev Kalbai 
Bolshevik M/F Rapid Rural Appraisal/ Group interview 2 
23.07.2008 Kundus Cholponbaeva Bolshevik F Farmer 
24.07.2008 Ermek Bolshevik M Farmer and livestock owner, Sauna owner 
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25.07.2008 Saadat Genenbekova Bolshevik F Farmer and livestock owner 
25.07.2008 Assambay Matraimov Bolshevik M Drinking water association 
25.07.2008 Nasar Sultanov Bolshevik M Irrigation water user association 
25.07.2008 Zulphiya Bolshevik F Farmer and livestock owner 
25.07.2008 Jaanbai Maksutov Bolshevik M Farmer and livestock owner 
25.07.2008 Maksut Bolshevik M Farmer and livestock owner 
25.07.2008 Turgunbaeva Jypar Bolshevik F Farmer and livestock owner 
26.07.2008 Mederbek Mursabekov Papan M Head of municipality Papan 
28.07.2008 Taalaigul Sharsh-
embieva 
Bishkek F NGO RDS Elet 
28.07.2008 Ulanbek Duishenaliev Bishkek M Association of Municipalities of Kyrgyz Republic 
29.07.2008 Clare Romanik Bishkek F NGO USAID - Urban Institute 
28.07.2009 Anton van Engelen Bishkek M World Bank 
01.08.2009 Ulan Kasymov Bishkek M NGO CAMP Alatoo 
03.08.2009 Asambek Aliev Alamidin M Head of Alamidin municipality, former Veterinarian 
03.08.2009 Nurlan Atakanov Bishkek M Coordinator of UNDP Poverty Reduction Programme 
05.08.2009 Muchtarbek  Ala Too M Agricultural specialist in municipality Ala Too 
05.08.2009 Lida and Shady (Kha-
liykhan, Akhnazar) 
Ala Too M Small-scale livestock owner 
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05.08.2009 Anonymous Ala Too M Large-scale livestock owner 
05.08.2009 Arabai and his wife Ala Too M Small livestock owner 
05.08.2009 Shadbdan Ala Too M Head of municipality Ala Too 
06.08.2009 Janysh Esengulov Ala Too M Para-veterinarian 
06.08.2009 Timur Tashow Ala Too M Accountant and agricultural specialis at Ala Too municipali-
ty 
06.08.2009 Chynara Ala Too F Member of municipality council (Aiyl kenesh) 
06.08.2009 Arabai Ala Too M Small-scale livestock owner 
07.08.2009 Syrdbek  Ala Too M Dairy cow herding group coordinator 
07.09.2009 Muchtarbek Ala Too M Land specialist of Ala Too municipality 
07.09.2009 Janysh Enegulov Ala Too M Para-veterinarian 
07.08.2009 Sarbat Thon M Representative of District (Rayon) Veterinary Department in 
Thon 
07.08.2009 Sanakh Ala Too M Para-veterinarian 
07.08.2009 Karabai Ala Too M Member of the elderly council  
08.08.2009 Aralbai  Ala Too M Livestock owner and farmer 
13.08.2009 Anton van Engelen Bishkek M Veterinary Expert at the World Bank in Kyrgz Republic 
17.08.2009 Hugh Coulter Bishkek F Veterinary Expert with the Delegation of the European Un-
ion, Commission in Kyrgyz Republic 
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18.08.2009 Ute Fischer and Ulan 
Kasymov 
Bishkek M/F CAMP Alatoo 
18.08.2009 Olaf Heidelbach Bishkek M Delegation of the European Union, Commission in Kyrgyz 
Republic 
18.08.2009 Hugh Coulter Bishkek M Delegation of the European Union, Commission in Kyrgyz 
Republic 
18.08.2009 Stephen J. Newton Bishkek M European Commission in Kyrgyz Republic Project “Support 
to Civil Service Reform in Kyrgyz Republic” 
19.08.2009 Baktiyarhan Fattachov Bishkek M Ministry of Local Self Government and Regional Develop-
ment 
25.08.2009 Kaimurat and Maxim Bishkek M Private Veterinarian 
25.08.2009 Kaimurat and Maxim Near Ming 
Bulak 
M Private Veterinarian 
26.08.2009 Kaimurat Ming Bu-
lak 
M Participation in Veterinary Workshop in study municipality 
organized by NGO 
30.08.2009 Anonymous At Bashy M MAWRPI at the At Bashy District (Rayon) Administration 
30.08.2009 Anonymous At Bashy M Rayon Agricultural Department at At Bashy District (Rayon) 
01.09.2009 Alybek Matanbekov At Bashy M Rayon Chief Veterinary in At Bashy District (Rayon) Veter-
inary Diagnostic Center 
02.09.2009 Samarbek Zcholbaev Bulak M Land expert of Bulak municipality 
03.09.2009 Sabad Talipov At Bashy M Bacteriological Department of the At Bashy District (Rayon) 
Veterinary Diagnostic Center 
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03.09.2009 Anonymous At Bashy M Kyrgyz State Agency for Registration of Rights for 
Immovable Property, At Bashy office 
03.09.2009 Samarbek Zcholbaev Bulak M Bulak municipality land expert 
04.09.2009 Umurtaly Salaiev Bulak M Head of Bulak private veterinary service 
04.09.2009 Raiya Bulak F Widow small-scale livestock owner 
04.09.2009 Akhun Bulak M Former herdsmen, now pensioneer 
10.09.2009 Narmasbek and Tindbek Ala Too M Livestock owners and farmers 
10.09.2009 Damir Ala Too M Former head of Ala Too municipality, shop owner 
10.09.2009 Anonymous Ala Too M Herder 
10.09.2009 Dinara Ala Too F Teacher 
11.09.2009 Damir Ala Too M Ex head of Ala Too municipality, shop owner 
11.09.2009 Sudlambekovic Ala Too M Head of Ala Too municipality 
11.09.2009 Anonymous Ala Too M Poor herder 
11.09.2009 Seyitbek and his wife Ala Too F Large-scale livestock owner, stable owner 
11.09.2009 Chynara Ala Too F Municipality council (Aiyl kenesh) member, Pasture Com-
mittee member 
12.09.2009 Sadyk  Ala Too M Penisoneer, herdsman 
12.09.2009 Anonymous  Ala Too M Veteran, pensioneer, herdsman 
12.09.2009 Anonymous Ala Too F Large-scale livestock owner, stable owner 
12.09.2009 Joldosh and Gulzana  Ala Too M/ F Livestock owner, stable owner 
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13.09.2009 Khato Ala Too M Livestock owner, stable owner 
13.09.2009 Jyrgalbek Ala Too M Livestock owner 
13.09.2009 Anonymous Ala Too F Small-scale livestock owner, widow 
14.09.2009 Damir Ala Too M Former head of municipality Ala Too, shop owner 
18.09.2009 Mamatkalil Razaev Bishkek M Advisor to the Director of the National Agency of the Kyr-
gyz Republic on Local Self-governance Affairs 
22.09.2009 Mairambek Taírov Bishkek M Agricultural Investments and Services Project Coordinator 
22.09.2009 Zahaifa Omorbekova Bishkek F Director Agricultural Projects Implementation Unit at the 
MAWRPI of the Kyrgyz Republic (MAWRPI) 
25.09.2009 Süjünduk Abkirovich At Bashy M Head of the At Bashy office of Kyrgyz State Agency for 
Registration of Rights for Immovable Property 
25.09.2009 Satarov Taalaibek At Bashy M ARIS, At Bashy coordinator 
26.09.2009 Suiunbek Jolbolduev Bulak M Head of Bulak municipality 
26.09.2009 Satyndy Ümüraliev Bulak M Chairman of Pasture Committee 
27.09.2009 Anonymous Bulak M Father of host family 
27.09.2009 Jamangul Bulak M Ex-veterinarian in Bulak Kolkhkoz 
27.09.2009 Kerimbügü Bulak F Herder 
27.09.2009 Turdubiev Altybai Bulak M Shop owner, municipality council (aiyl kenesh) member 
27.09.2009 Turdaly Tolomüshov Bulak M Secretary of Pasture Committee 
28.09.2009 Albina Bulak F Livestock owner 
206 Annex 
 
28.09.2009 Arnam Bulak M Livestock owner 
28.09.2009 Aitbek Bulak M Livestock owner 
28.09.2009 Anonymous Bulak F Small-scale livestock owner 
28.09.2009 Anonymous Bulak M Small-scale livestock owner 
28.09.2009 Cholpon Bulak F Livestock owner 
28.09.2009 Jamilya and Nurgul Bulak F Poor women 
28.09.2009 Jamilya Toktogulova 
and Ainura Jamabekova 
Bulak F Livestock owners and farmers 
28.09.2009 Kachkyn Janbaev; Ürüs 
Janybaeva 
Bulak F/M Livestock owners and farmers 
28.09.2009 Aizada Esenalieva, 
Sayras 
Bulak F Livestock owner and farmer 
30.09.2009 Tölömüsh  Bulak M Large-scale livestock owner 
30.09.2009 Jumabai  Bulak M Small-scale livestock owner, Pasture Committee member 
30.09.2009 Anonymous Bulak F Small-scale livestock owner (widow) 
30.09.2009 Anonymous Bulak F Small-scale livestock owner 
01.10.2009 Mukash Sairov Bulak F Large-scale livestock owner and farmer 
01.10.2009 Beishenbek Kalchaev Bulak M Large-scale livestock owner and farmer 
01.10.2009 Kazybek Turdubaev Bulak M Pasture committee member 
01.10.2009 Gulmayran Kyrgyzbaeva Bulak F Livestock owner and farmer 
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02.10.2009 Anonymous Bulak M Accountant in municipality Bulak 
02.10.2009 Orosbek Kulov Bulak M Elderly herder 
02.10.2009 Turdubek Isakbaev Bulak M Livestock owner and farmer 
02.10.2009 Anonymous At Bashy F Leskhoz in At Bashy 
03.10.2009 Abdymalik Sulaimanov Naryn M Representative of ARIS in Naryn 
03.10.2009 Murat Ömuraliev Kara Tash M Pasture committee member, large-scale livestock owner, 
municipality council (Aiyl kenesh) member 
03.10.2009 Ulan Kara Tash M Livestock owner, herder 
03.10.2009 Asylbek Kara Tash M Livestock owner and farmer 
03.10.2009 Cholpon Kara Tash F Livestock owner and farmer 
03.10.2009 Murat Ömuraliev Kara Tash M Pasture committee member, large-scale livestock owner, 
municipality council (Aiyl kenesh) member 
04.10.2009 XXXX Ming 
Bulak 
M Head of Ming Bulak municipality administration 
04.10.2009 Anonymous Ming  
Bulak 
M Agricultural Expert in Ming Bulak municipality 
04.10.2009 Sharshambek  Kara Tash M Livestock owner and farmer 
04.10.2009 Anonymous Kara Tash F Herder 
04.10.2009 Talant Kara Tash M Pasture committee member, small—scale livestock owner 
05.10.2009 Gülbübü Kara Tash F Small-scale livestock owner and farmer 
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05.10.2009 Ainur Kara Tash F Livestock owner and farmer 
05.10.2009 Orosakun Orosbekov Kara Tash M Large-scale livestock owner and farmer 
05.10.2009 Sharshek Kara Tash F Large-scale livestock owner and farmer 
06.10.2009 Kurmanbek Issaev Kara Tash M Large-scale livestock owner and farmer 
06.10.2009 Japar Kadyrov Kara Tash M Pasture committee member, large-scale livestock owner 
06.10.2009 Murat's brother Kara Tash M Pasture committee member, large-scale livestock owner 
07.10.2009 Sharip Bayaliev Kara Tash M Pasture committee member, large-scale livestock owner and 
farmer, municipality council (Aiyl kenesh) member 
07.10.2009 Murat Ömuraliev Kara Tash M Pasture committee member, large-scale livestock owner and 
farmer, municipality council (Aiyl kenesh) member 
09.10.2009 Nurlan Kadyrov Thon M ARIS in Thon  
10.10.2009  Anonymous Ala Too M Zootechnician  
10.10.2009  Gülsün Ismailova  Ala Too F Livestock owner and farmer 
10.10.2009  Elzat Ala Too F Livestock owner and farmer 
10.10.2009  Altyn Ala Too F Livestock owner and farmer, stable owner 
10.11.2009  Jangelik Ala Too F Livestock owner and farmer, stable owner 
10.11.2009 Muchtarbek Ala Too M Agricultural specialist in municipality Ala Too 
12.10.2009 Tortogul Ömurakunov Ala Too M Livestock owner and farmer 
12.10.2009 Anonymous Ala Too F Large-scale livestock owner and farmer 
12.10.2009 Anonymous Ala Too F Lady who invests in animal breeding 
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12.10.2009 Nurjan Mambetkasieva Ala Too F Livestock owner and farmer 
12.10.2009 Anonymous Ala Too F Livestock owner and farmer 
12.10.2009 Dinara Ala Too F Teacher in Ala Too 
13.10.2009 Köbök Chynaliev  Ala Too M Livestock owner and farmer 
13.10.2009 Anonyoumous  Ala Too M Brother of former head of municipality administration (Aiyl 
okmotu); livestock owner 
13.10.2009 Anonymous Ala Too M Livestock owner and farmer 
13.10.2009 Anonymous Ala Too M Livestock owner, construction worker 
14.10.2009 Karybek Takyrbashev Thon M Head of District (Rayon) Veterinary Department in Thon 
14.10.2009 Süiünduk Abakirovich Thon M Head of the Thon office of Kyrgyz State Agency for 
Registration of Rights for Immovable Property  
15.10.2009 Ainura Rachimova Bokonbae-
va 
F NGO Shoola in Bokonbaeva 
16.10.2009 Almas' father Ala Too M Livestock owner and farmer; taxi driver 
17.12.2009 Gulzat Namatbekova Bishkek F Senior Lawyer USAID/Chemonics 
17.12.2009 Ulan Kasymov Bishkek M Camp Ala Too  
10.09.2009 Anonymous  Ala Too F Livestock owner and farmer, stable owner in Torgus Bulak 
02.10.2009 Gulzat Bulak F Host family member 
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